When a individual carousel was announced in the Kiev presidential palace a fewer days ago, the reactions were two: surprise and immediate calculations. Surprise – due to the fact that shuffling has reached the very center of state management; calculations – due to the fact that during the war all human movement at specified a advanced level has a direct transfer to the front and to the negotiating table. Kyrylo Budanow, erstwhile Chief of Military Intelligence (HUR), assumed the position of Head of the President's Office, and Mikhail Fedorow, Deputy Prime Minister, State Digitization Architect and the Army's drone base, is simply a candidate for Minister of Defence. These are not cosmetic changes.
Budanow is simply a "hardy man", well known to the public as the face of spectacular intelligence actions. HUR led by him consistently shifted the burden of action beyond the front line. Strikes at strategical Bombers Airport, diversion operations in Crimea, sabotage of transport infrastructure and actions against Russian leadership and propaganda backgrounds had a common objective: to force Moscow to disperse forces, increase the cost of back-up safety and undermine Kremlin propaganda with full control of the situation. Gen. Kyryło Budanow sees the war as a combined vessel strategy – a combination of intelligence activities, precise impact measures and a conscious impact on interior and external narrative.
Mikhail Fedrow in turn built the state's digital base based on the Diia platform. Initially, the civilian strategy of recognition and administrative service was extended during the war with solutions supporting the military: recruitment, data verification, benefit handling and ongoing contact of soldiers with the administration. In parallel, the Fedorov acquis includes the "Army of Drones" ecosystem: simplified certification and shopping, inclusion of private companies and start-ups in production, and digital systems for recording, repair and rotation of unmanned equipment. This program shortened the way from plan to combat usage and increased the scale of drone supplies to the front.
Budanov and Fedrow thus form a couple with complementary competences. The first is secret cognition and operational experience, the second is the management approach to the state in war conditions and technology proven in practice. How will specified a merger translate into a way of carrying out armed action?
Productivity, precision and escalation
Budanov should accelerate the link between intelligence and operational planning. The general left the head of service seat, but it would be naive to presume that he had “let go” HUR. The insider of the safety apparatus at the president's side reduces the distance between information and decision, which may translate into better coordination of precise strokes and faster usage of operational opportunities – from action in the back of the opponent to consequence to his maneuvers.
Fedrow is known for promoting unmanned combat systems, digital command and logistics support tools, and the fast industrialization of simple, inexpensive and easy-to-scale solutions, while at the same time effective on the battlefield. Its emergence at the head of the defence department may accelerate the mass production of drones, the improvement of radio-electronic combat systems and the wider integration of the private technology sector into the arms production process – with shorter supply chains and greater flexibility of industry.
Major General Kyrylo Budanow during the celebration commemorating the first anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian War in Kiev, 24 February 2023, photograph Eastnews
When the administration focuses on intelligence and offensive technology, it can translate into more frequent and precise attacks on the critical infrastructure of the opponent. This will rise costs for Russia, but will besides accelerate the hazard of local escalation and retaliation. From Kiev's point of view, however, specified tension can be profitable: a fast increase in force today, strengthening the position at the negotiating table tomorrow.
Hard cognition and strong competence
Military strength straight translates into the ability to conduct effective political and diplomatic dialogue. Kyryło Budanow brings to this process a uncommon experience of contacts kept distant from headlamps – from working channels to negotiations on exchange of prisoners. This predestinates him for the function of an intermediary who knows the mechanisms of his opponent's actions and can take them into account without giving up defending key interests. His presence at the President's Office suggests that Kiev wants to conduct peace talks based on hard intelligence and the ability to verify the findings on an ongoing basis.
Fedorov as Minister of Defence will strengthen Ukraine's economical and industrial argument in talks with partners and possible mediators. The ability to rapidly rebuild production, make their own weapons systems and keep the continuity of the state's functioning in war conditions becomes a tangible component of credibility. If Kiev can show that it is not only a recipient of aid, but an active maker of defence capabilities – from drones to digital and logistical facilities – it can negociate from the position of a country capable of maintaining its own safety. In this sense, defence modernisation ceases to be only a military issue and begins to service as a guarantee: the signal that a possible agreement is not based on promises, but on a real ability to enforce it.
Time for an independent test
However, the Budanow-Fedorow duo in the immediate vicinity of president Zelenski is not only tangible benefits but besides risks. Firstly, moving people with strong operational facilities to the very centre of power can weaken civilian control of the military and blur the division of competences. specified a model carries the hazard of excessive militarisation of political decisions if intelligence imperatives begin to dominate wider strategical and social calculations. The shortening of the decision-making way increases the velocity of action, but at the same time limits the space for correction and control – and this favours decisions taken under force of the moment.
Mikhail Fyodorov, Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, during a gathering with students of the Institute of global Relations of the National Taras Shevchenko University in Kiev, photograph by Eastnews
Secondly, accelerated modernisation and defensive industrialisation, if not supported by safety of stocks, unchangeable supply chains and alternate sources of components, can only make an illusion of resilience. The past of wars shows that the ability to manufacture equipment is as crucial as the ability to supplement and service it for a long time.
Thirdly, finally, staff changes besides have an intra-political dimension. If they are perceived as an component of consolidating power or eliminating rivals alternatively than as decisions dictated by safety logic, they can undermine social and elite support for costly, long-term defence reforms. The social responses to Budanov's nomination and plans for Fedorov's fresh post have been mostly positive. However, the final test will be the degree of the real independency of this duo towards the President. Whether they become pillars of organization change, or simply performers of the will of Volodymyr Zelenski, will depend not only on the effectiveness of reforms, but besides on the credibility of the intentions declared by the authorities: professionalization of state management, depoliticisation of defence decisions and submission to the real needs of war.

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