Chinese cars won't even park close the army

A car that sees, hears and remembers

Modern cars – especially electrical and semi-autonomic models – are no longer closed mechanical systems. They function as inactive active network nodes, capable of observing the environment, saving events and communication with external infrastructure. Today, the standard includes 360-degree camera sets around the vehicle, radar and ultrasound sensors, precision positioning systems and extended cellular communication modules. Their aim is to improve driving safety, assist systems and make autonomous functions. From a military perspective, however, this means that a car moving close a unit scans and digitally maps the area through which it passes.

It is of peculiar importance that a crucial part of this data is processed in an automated manner, frequently without the active participation of the driver. Information about ambient image, topography of the site, location of objects, and even regular traffic patterns can be stored locally, i.e. on a car computer or sent to external analytical systems. In practice, this means that the vehicle user does not have full control of what data is collected and where they are hit.

The issue of distant software updates is besides crucial for the military. The OTA (over-the-air) mechanics allows the maker not only to correct errors or add fresh functions, but besides to modify the way sensors and algorithms work. From a safety point of view, this means that the possible hazard is not permanent – it can change with another update, which the user frequently agrees to automatically. These properties of modern cars put them on the same level as a drone or another mobile reflection system. The difference lies in scale and universality – civilian vehicles decision freely, regularly and without raising suspicion, besides in the immediate vicinity of military infrastructure.

LiDAR knows more than enough

One of the key elements that generates threats is LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) technology. In simplification, it is an active space scanning strategy utilizing laser pulses. The emitted light reflects from objects around the vehicle and the sensor measures the time of its return. On this basis, the onboard computer builds a precise, three-dimensional image of the space, much more precise than that obtained exclusively from cameras or radars.

For car manufacturers, LiDAR is 1 of the foundations of autonomous driving development. It not only identifies obstacles, but besides identifies their shape, distance and location in space with an accuracy of up to centimetres. Unlike cameras, this strategy besides works effectively at night and with limited lighting, and in favorable weather conditions it can “see” much more than the human eye.

From a military perspective, this precision could be the origin of danger. LiDAR does not make average images, but digital space models that may contain detailed information on the terrain, location of buildings, infrastructure elements, fences, entry points or access roads. A car equipped with specified a system, which regularly moves close a military unit, collects data in a confidential manner comparable to those which have been late obtained through specialist reconnaissance platforms.

It is besides crucial that LiDAR data request not be utilized only locally. In modern vehicles they are frequently combined with information from another sensors, then analyzed by device learning algorithms (a computer program that learns itself). This process serves the improvement of autonomous systems, but at the same time means that maps and spatial models can be archived, compared and sent outside the vehicle. The user is not always aware of the scale and item of this information.

In the context of military facilities, the problem is not the single pass, but the cumulative effect. Repeated scanning of the same area allows for the creation of increasingly more detailed models, taking into account changes in time, the rhythm of infrastructure operation or traffic patterns. From the point of view of military planning, these are possibly high-value data, even if at first glance they seem neutral.

This is not about assuming that all vehicle with LiDAR is simply a spy tool. Rather, the problem is that the technology designed for civilian purposes can be reused in a hard way to detect, and its operation is mostly invisible to the user and the object administrator. In a peaceful environment, this hazard may seem abstract, but in a crisis or conflict situation it gains a completely different dimension.

Technology, law and policy in 1 package

The fact that cars from China are being censored is not random. It is crucial to combine advanced digital solutions with a different legal strategy in which the producers there operate. It is this combination that makes the hazard assessed differently from those of companies operating in the European Union or North America.

Chinese technology companies, regardless of the industry, are covered by the provisions requiring them to cooperate with state authorities on safety issues. This means that the data collected by commercial systems can, at least theoretically, be made available to the central administration. From the position of the NATO States, the problem is not the specified fact of specified regulations, but the deficiency of transparency as to the scope and mode of their application, as well as the deficiency of real controls on the end-user side.

In the case of modern cars, the situation complicates further. These vehicles not only collect immense amounts of data, but besides function in a continuous connection model with the manufacturer's infrastructure. Telemetry data, camera, radar or LiDAR systems can be sent to abroad processing centers where they are analyzed and archived. For the military, this means that any of the information relating to the space around military facilities can leave the country, even if this is done indirectly and automatedly.

This is the aspect that makes the problem of Chinese cars seen as systemic alternatively than casual. This is not about the suspicion of a peculiar user or model of the car, but about the assessment of the full chain: from the sensor in the vehicle, through software, to the legal environment in which the maker operates. In this view, the hazard does not gotta mean informed intelligence – it is adequate that access to data will become an component of information force or advantage in the event of a crisis.

According to the SAMAR Motor marketplace investigation Institute, 9821 fresh Chinese cars were registered in Poland in December 2025 – 427% more than a year ago. In December, Chinese brands already accounted for 14.5 percent of all recently registered passenger cars, and over 49 000 were sold throughout 2025.