In March of that year, ABW detained a civilian state official, Tomasz L. He is suspected of cooperating with Russian intelligence. But now another electrifying information about this authoritative has come to light. According to reportersTVN, mhe was a associate of the committee For the liquidation of Military Information Services.
This means that the Russian intelligence could possibly have sped up the narrow environment of those liable for the process of extinction of the activities of 1 of the Polish peculiar Services and the formation of 2 more – SKW and SWW. So it is clear how delicate cognition could have gained the Kremlin.
For effectively devising the valuable asset that Thomas L. was for Moscow, the ABW deserved praise. This case, however, can only be the tip of the iceberg of problems connected with the Russian agent in Poland. It besides illustrates the immense scale of challenges facing our counterintelligence services today.
The detention of Tomasz L. is simply a success of ABW
One of the tasks of counterintelligence is to monitor the activity of diplomatic staff members residing in a given country. This enables the recognition of intelligence officers among them. They usage this activity as 1 of the forms of covering their operational work.
Following this lead, KW may then effort to reduce the effects of the adverse actions of abroad “diplomats”. Increased surveillance of specified persons besides provides an chance to track down their sources. This is peculiarly crucial in the case of anti-activity of Russian services, which are characterised by a very offensive working style.
The GRU, SWR and FSB officers do not hesitate to recruit and lead colleagues from the embassy position. Contrary to appearances, in the planet of interviews, this is not a universal rule. any services are afraid to take that risk. The work of officers sent by them abroad under diplomatic cover does not disagree importantly from the activities of actual diplomats.
The offensive kind of operational work of Russians, however, is associated with an increased probability of "dump". And that was the case with Thomas L. On his way ABW came by subject to supervision by a SWR officer operating in Poland.
The recognition of the traitor and the subsequent collection of evidence of his cooperation with a abroad state is the undisputed success of KW. Especially since Tomasz L.'s activity most likely active many negative repercussions for the safety of the Polish...
Losses caused by Tomasz L.
Tomasz L. was most likely a valuable associate of Russian intelligence. His position at the Office of civilian State (USC) enabled him, among others, access to the PESEL database of citizens, as well as death and birth certificates.
On a regular basis this could be used, for example, to make legends for the “legalization” of activities of another officers and collaborators of the Russian services, verification of information obtained by them, and even attempts to deconspiration Polish intelligence and counterintelligence officers.
The appointment of an authoritative in USC structures had to be seen by SWR office as beneficial due to the fact that since 2006 it has not changed jobs. Its environmental links are likely to make specified an opportunity.
Tomasz L. besides served on the committee aimed at inventory of WSI resources. In advancement he was so acquainted with operational matters, the working methods of this service and details of the activities of its sources and of its officers. Moreover, he could besides measure the effectiveness of WSI's work in individual directions.
Risk of deconspiration of at least part of SWW and SKW activities
The information disclosed by TVN is so a actual “hardcore”. SWW and SKW were not built from a full “zero”. A part of WSI staff has moved to fresh structures. This was especially the case with junior officers. fresh services "inherited" most likely besides buildings, cars, or apartments utilized by the erstwhile formation.
SWW and SKW could even take over co-workers from WSI who were considered useful in further operational work. Tomasz L. thus had tremendous cognition that projected the beginnings of the fresh formations. Moreover, he besides knew the scenes of the liquidation of WSI, as well as collected by this formation compromising materials and on the political environment.
Even if the authoritative did not cooperate with the Russians at the time, his leaders were surely trying to get information from Tomasz L. regarding the functioning of the WSI, SWW and SKW. He could even point out to abroad intelligence erstwhile or current officers and associates of these formations who he felt were susceptible to recruitment.
Many service officers were besides on the liquidation commission, and those associated with this environment then held advanced functions in the structures of SKW and SWW. So the question is: did Thomas L. proceed to have relations with these people, so he could get information about what was happening in the military services?
The activities of Tomasz L. should be carefully examined
The threads we have drawn are only 1 of many areas in which Tomasz L. could origin harm to Poland. Therefore, a peculiar squad should be set up to measure the negative consequences of the official's cooperation with SWR. Only not on the basis of another “media circus” but on the basis of tangible work distant from the electoral “hull”.
This is the case, among another things, in the US in the case of disclosure peculiarly delicate to the safety of your spy activity. It is besides noted that, as a associate of the WSI liquidation committee, Tomasz L. was required to receive a safety clearance entitling him to have access to ‘closely secret’ materials.
The counterintelligence had to give him a affirmative advice in 2006. This verification may have been carried out correctly, and Thomas L. has not yet begun working with Russian intelligence. However, the anticipation of granting access to the most delicate state materials to a individual associated with SWR should be excluded.
It is besides reasonable to believe that procedures for granting access to classified information may neglect in certain situations. In the service environment, it has been speculated for a long time that specified situations may happen in the case of investigations involving persons with a strong political standing.
An example of this is the procedure for granting safety certificates to members of the WSI decommissioning committee, which pShe ran at a very fast pace.. This may show its superficiality, and that KW may not have wanted or actually had the chance to refuse members of the committee access to classified materials.
It is so essential to clarify whether akin mechanisms do not besides work in the case of another investigations initiated against politicians, crucial officials or members of the board of directors of state companies? This would entail serious threats to national security.
We so believe that the results of the investigation into this subject should be made public. The limited independency of KW within the state structures may make it hard for the formation to identify the most valuable co-workers who may have abroad services in Poland.
How many Thomas L. remains unidentified by counterintelligence?
For years, she's been alarming about ‘hybrid threats’ from Russiabut no actual action is taken to combat them. And specified are the obstacles to the functioning of abroad service officers in Poland.
Look at it this way. Until the start of fresh months in many countries the expulsions of Russian diplomats, About 50-70 worked in Poland. Our intuition tells us there may have been about 25-50 officers in that group. any of them are coders and the people liable for the alleged SIGINT (listening to different communication methods).
So let us presume that the "operational" was about 15-40. And each of them can successfully lead from 2 to 8 associates. This possibly gives the number of 30 – 320 individual sources conducted by the Russians in Poland. Of course, it is more likely that there are hundreds of specified persons. Their activity is most likely besides varied over time.
However, can you imagine what forces and resources are needed to keep an eye on the number of intelligence officers and identify their associates? Therefore, think about how many another collaborators specified as Tomasz L. may inactive have Russians in Poland, whom the Polish services could not identify?
We have written many times in the blog that KW has besides small resources in relation to the threats in our country. Moreover, this kind of activity is only a fragment of all tasks entrusted to the ABW. In turn, another areas of activity “company” overlap partially with the competences of another services!
That's what's going on. poor efficiency in the usage of the capacities of individual officers and progressive degradation of human resources quality. On the another hand, Polish diplomats in Russia are watched in a very thorough manner. Especially in fresh years. And erstwhile they are able to establish valuable contact, it turns out, for example, that it is rapidly cut off after the “educational talk”.
So do we want to fight Russia seriously, or do we want to fake it?
What another co-workers does Russia have in Poland?
We besides believe that the deconspiration of Tomasz L. can only be the tip of the iceberg, symbolizing the Russian agent in Poland.
Each interview realises that their officers working in the facilities are the easiest targets for local KW, and the hazard of their deconspiration is considerable. Therefore, the most valuable co-workers Russia has in Poland are most likely led by another categories of officers.
First of all, they are people working regular at the service office and travelling only short-term to keep contact with the source. another SWR, GRU and FSB officers are placed under the cover of ‘unofficial’ organisations and enterprises associated with Moscow.
Another category of Russian officers is the so-called. ‘LeadCommon“. Meetings with more valuable assets may besides take place outside the territory of Poland. Maintaining assets in a way unrelated to the diplomatic activity of a given country makes it very hard for local KW.
So, since even comparatively valuable assets, specified as Tomasz L. are only limitedly enshrined and led by the Russians from the position of the facility, what another co-workers do they have in Poland, which are "cared" by officers another than those working under diplomatic cover?
Note, too, that if a spy is caught in Poland, he is usually associated with the GRU or SWR. Do you think that since 1 of the tasks of the FSB is to conduct intelligence activities in the area of the alleged ‘close foreign’, it does not have its assets in our country?
The threat from Russian intelligence will not disappear, and its character will evolve
Let's go back to 2014. As a consequence of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the relation between Moscow and the capitals of Western states was then tightened. Since then, has Russian intelligence activity in both the alleged "near foreign" and key NATO members increased or decreased? It's grown.
SWR, GRU and FSB can besides be divided into 2 areas. The first is getting information, and the second is impact and diversion operations, which aim to form reality according to Kremlin's interests. In our view, in the current geopolitical context, efforts in both spheres are expected to intensify.
Especially as Moscow's nonsubjective remains to rebuild its own sphere of influence in Europe. Therefore, while the attention of Poles is almost exclusively directed towards Ukraine, Russia tries in parallel to take over Moldova. Therefore, the Kremlin's destabilisation operations besides carried out in another countries are to be expected.
W Poland ‘hybrid’ activities will be of a different nature from those in Moldova or Ukraine. This does not change the fact that our KW will gotta adapt to combat a much broader spectrum of threats from Russian intelligence than has been the case so far.
Soon the case of uncovering a dead truck driver in Rzeszów may not, by definition, be a subject for police “terror”, or may require cooperation with the ABW and/or the SKW.
Not long ago, U.S. peculiar Forces and CIA transferred also information indicating that the Russians offered Taliban fighters prizes for killing coalition soldiers in Afghanistan. Are you certain that a akin "deal" could not be included, for example, with Chechen criminal groups in Poland for those active in the transportation of aid to Ukraine?
Changing the modus operandi of Russian intelligence
Governments of many countries have carried out in fresh months, InYidals Russian diplomats surely will importantly impede the activity of the intelligence community. In the face of the expanding number of tasks assigned to the services by the Kremlin, this will require SWR, GRU and FSB to change their current M.O.
The first of the modifications we anticipate is the usage by Moscow of countries with which it continues to keep at least a correct relationship. Intelligence activities in another countries will be carried out from their territories. He can already observe, among others, rapidly growing iczbau Russian diplomats in Hungary.
Switzerland can besides play a akin function in Russia's plans. Part of expelled by another countries from the Kremlin alternatively of returning to Moscow, she went to the territory of that country. There they can enjoy the freedom of Swiss neutrality.
With a Schengen visa and diplomatic passport, Russian officers who are stationed in Bern on a regular basis can travel freely across Europe, gathering with individual colleagues.
In addition, we anticipate increased usage by Russian services of officers operating under unofficial cover (without diplomatic immunity). For example, specified persons can be located in Russia-managed International Investment Bank, which has its office in Budapest and branches in Slovakia, among others.
The “banker” employed there can easy cross the border with the Polish “legend” is simply a business trip, have a gathering with the origin in Krakow and return the next day to Bratislava. It besides seems that ordering 175 000 fresh diplomatic passportsMoscow has embarked on mass handing them out to non-attached persons in any way with diplomacy itself.
It can so be assumed that mass expulsions of Russian representatives do not mean that those who claim to be specified will not appear in the country with respective days of visits. possibly they will be intended to acquisition luxury brand products, or possibly to receive information from assets...
Russia is not the only threat to the safety of Poland
In Poland, there is besides a tendency to ignore threats from another directions than Russian. We believe that in Poland peculiar services of Moscow cooperate closely with their counterparts in Minsk. This trend has been intensified since the outbreak of protests in Belarus and the country's increasing dependence on Russia.
This cooperation is likely to vary. Minsk may sometimes operate independently. On another occasion, the actions of the KGB and the GRU (In Belarus not all have noticed yet that the USSR has fallen apart ;) may be supervised or even commissioned by the Russians.
However, it is certain that the Polish counterintelligence is presently dealing with not 1 main opponent, but at least two. On the scale of the threat that flows from cooperation on the Moscow-Minsk line, we were able to find out about the outbreak of the migration crisis at the border, or the information operation conducted under the aegis of the Confidential Conversation channel.
As part of the latter, for many months the correspondence of the most crucial Polish officials has been published. Nor can it be ruled out that they will be similarly, or are already utilized by Russians to service others OUBZ countries.
It should be borne in mind, therefore, that the monitoring by KW should cover not only Russian institutions but besides the representations of Belarus, China, as well as respective another little apparent countries in the kind of Hungary or Armenia.
On the horizon, we besides have a increasing threat associated with the increasing Ukrainian diaspora in Poland. This creates a immense fieldwork for the intelligence community, whose effectiveness we can observe during the ongoing war. Just don't get us incorrect – we're not saying that Kiev will blow up the bridge in Warsaw
However, we point to the fact that Ukrainian elites are presently characterized by a more realistic approach to global relations than their counterparts in Poland. In the optics of our neighbours, friendly relations do not gotta exclude aggressive efforts to get information. In the meantime, even in the ministry, there are sometimes “romantics”.
Summary of Thomas L.
We have been critical of the activities of Polish peculiar services. We besides pointed out that KW frequently captures "peaks" or operates on the basis of information from partners. However, in the case of Tomasz L. ABW, she did a good occupation and deserved praise. This official’s spying activity should now be analysed in depth.
Much will depend on the attitude of Thomas L. himself and the degree to which he decides to cooperate with law enforcement. In view of the evolving nature of the threats on the part of Russia, we would besides anticipate to follow the blow in combating them.
This requires an increase in spending on KW, the expansion of its resources, as well as the reorganisation of ABW and SKW. Our services love to follow the pattern. “Since we have been doing this and that for x years, why change it?” and besides, “everything is great.” In this way it is easy to "sleep" changes taking place in the surroundings of Poland.
Meanwhile, it is likely that Russian intelligence from the post of the facility will weaken, but will be intensified by another methods. Conducting operations utilizing unofficial cover-ups and "diplomats" from neighbouring countries, or cooperation with "friendly" services are much more hard to work out by local KW.
At the same time, we believe that the state's resilience to threats is being built by accepting their existence and by being willing to fight them, alternatively than by displacing the safety challenges emerging on the horizon.
