No election campaign. Political scenery of Ukraine in the 4th year of the war

For respective months now, Ukraine has seen an increase in political activity of both authorities and opposition. The U.S. President's declarations of willingness to rapidly negociate a ceasefire that could lead to the abolition of martial law and the holding of elections have intensified the fight for support. This is despite the political and social consensus in the country that this vote should not be organised during armed action. The conditions under which the hot war phase will end will be crucial for the chances of possible candidates and parties.

Volodymyr Zelenski's assertive reactions to Donald Trump's unfriendly steps and statements towards Kiev resulted in a correction in the distribution of electoral sympathy and assurance in politicians. For the time being, its main beneficiary is the president of Ukraine, around whom citizens are consolidating again, although it is hard to measure how long this trend will last. It seems that the first subject of the future run will be to measure the country's preparations for the defence and war leadership of Zelenski. It will besides be crucial to draw the lines: those who stayed in the country, and those who left, as well as those who fought, and those who stayed in the back. However, it is not yet known how they will translate into political sympathy that is dynamically changing under the influence of civilian war.

Legal and political conditions for elections

Organization of elections during martial law prohibits Ukrainian law: parliamentary – constitution, and presidential – law on the legal government of martial law. There is besides a social consensus on this issue^[1] – 78% of residents argue their conduct before the end of the war^[2]. The door to the vote could open a ceasefire with Russia, as the consequence would increase interior pressures on the non-prolongation of this bill, as well as those from overseas. The American administration has repeatedly challenged Zelenski's electoral mandate, suggesting that he does not enjoy the support of citizens, or simply, like Trump, called him dictator^[3]. These words corresponded to the Kremlin's repeated demands to hold elections in Ukraine. This created an impression of a coordinated force on Kiev to remove from the authority of the President-in-Office, with whom the leader of the United States has been conflicted in the past^[4], and negotiating a peace agreement with a more agreeable policy, although it seems improbable present that specified a democratic election will be won. The media even reported meetings of Trump's surroundings with opposition representatives – Petr Poroshenko and Julia Tymoshenko^[5] – which may have served to rally her readiness to organize the vote.

Not only external factors are fostering competition, but besides expanding consumption of the current political system. They are reflected in the situation in the ultimate Council of Ukraine (RN). In 2019, the presidential organization of the Servant of the Nation (SN) won the election and introduced as many as 254 deputies into parliament – thus it was the first in past to gain an independent majority. This one, however, has long been a fiction. Although formally the faction has 232 members, the votes seldom affect more than 170–180. Most of the laws manage to accept thanks to the voices of oligarchic organization activists, specified as Dovira or Za Majbutnie, and the illegalized in 2022 Opposition Platform – For Life (OPZ)^[6].

Forced by circumstances and an unofficial coalition with these groups is the semblance of instrumental treatment of deputies on the 1 hand, resulting in a decline in discipline in factions^[7]and, on the another hand, departures 22 critical of the president of the SN parliamentarians to the interfractional knowing of Reasonable Politics, founded by erstwhile RN president Dmytra Razumkov. The strong opposition remains, in principle, Batquishina of the erstwhile Prime Minister Tymoshenko and the European Solidarity (ES) of the erstwhile president Poroshenko, although these formations frequently advocate legislative initiatives of the authorities related to European integration^[8].

Chart.Distribution of power in parliament as of April 23, 2025

Source: Supreme Council of Ukraine.

Demand for fresh political forces

According to investigation by the Razumkov Centre, as many as 54% of Ukrainians do not see among existing political formations specified as they would like to entrust power. As many as 47% of citizens anticipate a fresh force from the military and 24% from volunteer groups^[9].

However, recently formed groups would gotta find recognised and trusted leaders. This is due to the political culture there, which has a advanced personalization: in SN specified a individual is Zelenski, in ES – Poroshenko, and in Batkiwszczyn – Tymoshenko. The request for a leader of the “military party” is answered by erstwhile commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Walery Załużny, who enjoys the top public assurance (76%)^[10]. If he had decided to run in the presidential election, he would have faced the task of forming a formation, most likely at least partially composed of veterans and military. In order to neutralize the competition, the President's camp is to effort to convince him not to run and join the Zelenski organization as the 1 on his list^[11]. Although it is inactive unclear whether the Desirable will want to be in politics in any arrangement at all – in interviews he constantly says that war is not the time for akin talks – his return to the first place of Ukrainian electoral preferences is likely after the "Trump's effect" on the leader is exhausted^[12]. specified a situation would strengthen social pressures, as well as from military and economical environments (including the oligarchical parts) for the general to search the position of head of state^[13].

The parties effort to fight for the future favour not only of the Deserved, but besides of the General Military: Poroshenko publishes the scale of assistance given to armed forces since the beginning of the war (6.8 billion hryvnia, or about 620 million PLN)^[14], akin to regional SN troops^[15]. Tymoshenko, in turn, mentions the fight against better treatment and rehabilitation conditions for veterans.^[16]. It can be expected that the group's electoral lists will compete to attract the popular military much more than in 2015. Among them may be popular commanders associated with the Azov movement, e.g. Andrij Biłecki and Bohdan Krotewycz^[17]. Both of them are officially depriving themselves of politics – they indicate that fighting the front, they cannot engage in it^[18]. The possible of their individual success is possibly dispelled by the fact that more people do not trust them than they trust them.^[19].

Part of the request for a “volunteer party” is met by the Justice Platform – registered in the summertime of 2024 by the well-known writer and social writer Serhija Prytuła^[20]. It could put any Holos MPs on its lists, thus utilizing the liberal electorate orphaned by it.

Rebranding the Servants of the Nation

The presidential organization is aware of both its own problems and social sentiments. Although Zelenski himself enjoys large public assurance (69% in March 2025).^[21], besides leads election polls^[22]), this cannot be said of his group. SN is negatively estimated by 61% of Ukrainians – this is simply a consequence worse than even the quotations of the Platform for Life and Peace, associated with pro-Russian politicians^[23]. The problem of the faction makes her gotta join the election under a fresh sign. The reformed organization would most likely have fewer active politicians, and the lists would include many military names and volunteers^[24].

At present, there is no clear indication that the president and his surroundings are preparing for applicable elections. However, the leader clearly seeks the affirmative opinion of the Ukrainians, and thanks to the control of parliament and government, he can make decisions to win him a society. Among another things, there is simply a "thousand Zelenski" – 1000 hryvnia (about PLN 100) for each citizen for municipal charges, medicines or acquisition of military bonds – as well as a moratorium for increases in gas prices for heating for consumers until the end of April 2025^[25] and lowering medicines prices. The head of state blocks (or postpones time) implementation of unpopular solutions, specified as an increase in excise work on cigarettes (signed only 5 months after the adoption). In fresh months, the rulers have besides softened policy towards refugees and migrants – for example by enabling men to update military papers without having to come to the country^[26]. Without extending mobilization to people under 25 years of age (until 2024 the limit was 27), the presidential camp besides takes care of maintaining support among young people who mostly contributed to its win in 2019.

If there is no fresh military party, the reformed SN, powerfully identified with Zelenski, may be strong due to the deficiency of convincing alternatives. Leaders of another groups have a crucial negative electorate: Tymoshenko and Bojce do not trust 83% of respondents, and Poroshence – 76%^[27]. This gives the current leader an advantage in the possible elections (he does not trust only 28% of the respondents). If it remains valid, this will prompt the authorities to carry it out simultaneously with those parliamentary (and possibly self-government) so that the support for the head of state translates into the consequence of the reformed party.

The main adversaries

The presidential camp continues in attempts to marginalize Poroshenko. He is accused of moving a business and paying taxes in Russia^[28], and his boy was fined and his bank account blocked due to alleged deficiency of military service responsibilities^[29]. In February this year, sanctions were imposed on the erstwhile president – among others, his assets were frozen and he was banned from moving capital abroad.^[30]. In March, it turned out that the services were conducting an investigation against him, as they suspected him of being a ‘state traitor’ in 2010, erstwhile he was to negociate an unfavourable agreement for Ukraine with Russia (actually Viktor Yanukovych's administration was liable for the negotiations, and Poroshenko stopped directing the hotel before signing the contract). The impact on the ES leader contrasts with its actual political meaning or popularity. They should be regarded as an expression of the antipathy of the incumbent leader to the predecessor and as a reaction to criticism of Zelenski, whom Poroshenko accuses, among others, of pushing the country towards dictatorship^[31].

Despite the force from the ES authorities, it is inactive the main opposition force and a group that is internally and ideologically coherent, and thanks to Poroshenko's money (his son's property is estimated to be over $1 billion) it has constant backing and media access, specified as Channel 5 or Espreso TV. It is besides the only formation of which more people are affirmative than negative (34% vs 33%)^[32].

The organization uses patriotic rhetoric – nationalistic places (authenticity in this respect adds, among others, the presence in its ranks of the erstwhile head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory Volodymyr Vjatrowycz, known for promoting the story of the Ukrainian Insurgency Army) – anti-Russian and pro-Western. Emphasis on the deep Ukrainianisation of public life (she powerfully advocated, for example, the passing of the law of the Ukrainian Orthodox Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate – UCP PM) and the deprivation of the right to participate in RN deliberations^[33].

Who will he vote for?

The triumph in 2019 was due, among others, to the conviction of part of the post-Soviet electorate, formerly voting for the organization of Regions, sometimes called warts or watts. Currently, its population is estimated at about 5–15%^[34]. These people have sentiment until the russian times and talk Russian, but this does not necessarily mean their pro-Russianity in a political sense. Nor should this group be identified solely with voters from the south and east of the country, for example due to 5 million interior refugees from these areas^[35]which settled in another areas.

They are supporters of, above all, the illegal ADF, which has already started the fight for their mobilisation. Boyko has been activated in social media, especially on TikTok, where he publishes referenced to the protection of Russian language and russian heritage materials in Russian. The authorities mention to radicals as wanting to “destroy their native speech” and “forbade going to church”. It besides tries to address the problems of internally displaced people^[36] – addresses identity and social issues.

In this field, he may have rivals: in addition to the Russian-speaking wing of the SN, the electorate will most likely be sought by Razumkow. any of his deputies – like Boyko – opposed, for example, the illegalisation of UCP PM^[37].

Another crucial group, which may depend on the result of the election, and which Zelenski owes much to, are voters who are not curious in politics all day. They are not attached to a peculiar organization or ideology, they frequently conformistically support candidates who have the best chances of winning and are subjected to black PR towards others. Historically, they are the widest number of voters^[38] (although it is hard to measure his numbers during the war). They will be sought by all candidates, and the distribution of their votes depends on the assessment of the terms of the truce and the scale of the economical crisis.

Anti-Western Resentiment Electorate

It is hard to estimation the size of a group of voters who will have a sense of “failure” on the part of the West (especially the US) – recognising that the partners did not aid Ukraine sufficiently during the war, prevented Russia from defeating and the recovery of all lost areas. specified sentiments will translate into the request to increase the independency of the state, including the increase in defence spending. They can besides deepen scepticism towards EU integration. If the terms of the truce prove unfavorable, then aversion to the West can become a major part of the pro-Soviet, cyclical and radically patriotic electorate. This will force another candidates and their parties to usage specified rhetoric – including Zelenski (his criticism of West's slow actions to support Kiev – even if partially right – lays the foundation for it).

Today it seems that Batkiwszczyna works with this collective most intensively. It was activated in the second half of 2024, and Tymoshenko was active on YouTube for any time. Group politicians focus on reproving authorities. They frequently scope for populist slogans – in the autumn of 2024 its leader claimed that the prices of medicines in the country are higher than in Western Europe, and fought to lower them. First of all, the erstwhile Prime Minister strikes sovereign tons (she does not like the participation of global experts in the selection of judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine or a bill allegedly allowing the sale of minerals to foreigners, even before negotiations with Americans on this matter). It besides occupies conservative positions, opposing projects to decriminalize prostitution or legalize medical marijuana, which falls on susceptible ground among its "iron electorate" – voters from smaller centres, frequently worse placed. Batkiwszczyna's rival in the fight about their voices will most likely be Razumkow. The erstwhile president of the RN powerfully criticizes Zelenski in his speeches, hitting populist notes and referring to the situation of workers and entrepreneurs who are persecuted by the authorities in his narrative^[39].

In launch blocks

The activation of political rivalry accelerated Trump's election victory. Despite his announcements of a fast end to the war and the clear suggestions of holding elections in Ukraine, the ceasefire is simply a subject of negotiation and a inactive distant prospect. National politicians are motivated by the desire to remind voters of their existence in a situation where the presidential camp will have a crucial advantage in the elections due to control of administrative, financial and media resources.

Since the 2019 election, the erstwhile division of Ukraine into the pro-European-oriented west and pro-Russian east has remained in the shadows and the boundaries between the parties have blurred. The fronts of the political conflict will only be established after the conditions of the ceasefire are announced – if the public finds them to be a triumph or a defeat. This will be a key category of Zelenski's assessment and its possible successor. The election will mostly be a plebiscite “in favour” of the current president and his group and “against” him. Social divisions – created during the war, but besides pushed to the background – will become more visible, and the tightening of the electoral conflict will have negative consequences for the stableness of the country's interior stability.