Borkowski: Poland can harm Russia in cyberspace. The request for State Courage

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Zdjęcie: Borkowski: Polska może szkodzić Rosji w cyberprzestrzeni. Potrzeba odwagi państwa


Former ABW officer Piotr Borkowski said on 23 August in the WP program “Didaskalia” that Poland has the people and competence to carry out offensive activities in cyberspace against Russia, but needs clear law and specialized civilian service. The conclusion is simple: without deterrence, the state's infrastructure is simply a target.

Poland has people. The state must give them tools

Piotr Borkowski, erstwhile officer of the interior safety Agency and cybersecurity expert, in the interview in the program WP ‘Didaskalia’ pointed out the issue sharply: Poland has the possible to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace. It's not about spectacular declarations, it's about deterrence. Russia is expected to know that an attack on Polish systems can meet with an costly answer.

This is the language the front country should usage more often. Poland is not in the quiet back of the West. We are at the interface of war in Ukraine, Russian diversion, influence operations and infrastructure pressures. In specified a position, the defence itself resembles waiting for the opponent to choose the time of impact. The sovereign state must have a shield and a sword.

Borkowski pointed out that Polish specialists regularly show advanced competence in global exercises and competitions. This argument matters due to the fact that cybersecurity does not arise from conferences and slogans. It arises from people who can enter the system, find a gap, realize the reaction of the opponent and shut him down. Sometimes besides show that Poland can answer.

Cyber deterrence alternatively of paper strategy

In an interview with WP Borkowski, he argued that offensive abilities were an component of the bogeyman. The point is militaryly simple: the opponent is to calculate the risk. If he knows that Poland can only accept punches and compose post-accident reports, he will test boundaries. If he knows that he can bear the real cost, he starts counting more carefully.

This is not a call for uncontrolled action. On the contrary. Borkowski spoke about the request for precise regulations which will find erstwhile troops and services can operate in the full spectrum of operations. Without clear law, the courage of technicians and soldiers is buried in authoritative uncertainty. The State may not require effectiveness and at the same time leave contractors in the grey area of responsibility.

Locked Shields 2026, organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, gathered more than 4,000 participants from 41 countries and checked the protection of critical infrastructure and military systems under force from real attacks. This shows the scale of the domain in which you are already practicing present as if to conflict. Poland cannot treat this as an addition to the “real” army.

Sleepy threats in networks

The most disturbing part of the conversation was about dormant malware. Borkowski warned that many critical infrastructure operators may have tools left behind by hostile groups ready to activate at a convenient time. An attack like this doesn't gotta start with an explosion. It can start with a breakdown, chaos in services, a break in institutions or failure of citizens' confidence.

The expert besides talked about the Red squad tests, in which it frequently manages to break the organisation's safety by the emotions of employees or inconspicuous devices connected to the network. This is an crucial informing for the Polish state and the economy. The weakest point is simply a man, a procedure, a poorly configured screen, a Wi-Fi network for guests or equipment that no 1 treats as an entry into a strategy anymore.

The National diary wrote about a wider background of safety on the occasion of the text About NATO's AWACS on the Baltic. It was about aerial surveillance and a military signal to Russia. In cyberspace, logic is similar: the state must see before, respond faster and have resources that the opponent cannot underestimate.

Civil Cybersecurity Service

Borkowski suggested that Poland should consider the Anglo-Saxon model of a separate, civilian cybersecurity peculiar service supporting military and intelligence activities. It's an thought worth a serious debate. The military has its tasks, services have their procedures, and the civilian sector has staff that frequently precede administration with pace of work and experience.

However, a national state cannot build safety solely on contracts, grants and projects distributed between institutions. A core is needed: a service with clear responsibility, parliamentary control, the ability to cooperate with the military and a real mandate for action. Without this, Poland will have large people, but it will not always be able to usage their possible in a time of crisis.

It is worth remembering about data from NASK on Locked Shields 2025: Polish-French squad placed second, and in the squad were CERT specialists Poland and representatives of cyberspace defence troops. It's concrete, not propaganda. The staff are here. The question is whether the state can give them a unchangeable architecture of operation.

Russia understands cost, not declarations

Russia has been investigating the West for years below the threshold of open war: cyber attacks, misinformation, sabotage, energy pressure, intimidation. Poland knows this language from its own past and from the current war in Ukraine. erstwhile Russia hits Ukraine and Poland hits airplanes, we see the military side of the threat. The same game goes quieter online.

Therefore, the conversation with Borkowski should be taken seriously by the rulers, regardless of organization colors. Cybersecurity is not a toy for hotel presentations. It is simply a substance of wallets of Poles, hospitals, energy, railways, banks and communications. erstwhile these systems are silent, the citizen does not ask about the strategy. He asks why you weren't ready.

The Polish right should be clear here: sovereignty in the 21st century besides has a origin code, a consequence procedure and a deterrent capacity. If you don't understand, you leave it open. And an east opponent doesn't request an invitation.

Source: WP News, CCDCOE, NASK.

Source: WP News

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