Bleaching: In the chains of Atlantism

It is impossible to realize the process of degradation of the Polish east policy, and more broadly, the elimination of independent global activity on many azimuts, without a careful look at the strategical consequences of being connected with the alleged collective West.

Despite the common phraseology about regaining freedom and exercising full sovereignty, Poland's last 3 decades have rolled gradually, but consistently in full dependence on Atlantic structures. In these, however, the primacy is exercised by the United States, whose safety strategy determines the listening and loyalty of all those who usage their "protective umbrella".

For post-communist countries entering NATO and the European Union, the West was a large force of attraction, due to its alternate model of improvement and its inflexibility in the Cold War confrontation. The paradox was that what gave the countries of Central and east Europe an chance to join the anti-communist West shortly lost their right to remain. Anti-communism has ceased to be an ideology defining the West. There has been a return to rivalry of powers, and many economical and political crises have undermined the credibility of American leadership.

Polish politicians with a post-communist and post-communist pedigree were perfectly included in the “band” of Western politicians, who, at the cost of maintaining the position quo (comfort of wealth and security), submitted to the American interests. They did this not only due to simple comfort, but besides due to circumstantial inertia, which is simply a function of deficiency of insterility. It turned out that the widely understood strategy of bandwagoning (concentration of forces under the leadership of America) did not bring the desired benefits. Above all, cohesion and solidarity in the Western strategy have been put to the test for presidency Donald Trump. due to the weakening of America and the emergence of fresh centres of power, it turned out that today's West is no longer the entity that erstwhile led in the global system. Today, it must face a “great awakening” of the peoples on a global scale, which show a strong opposition to the Western ambition of rule.

The United States, however, as the strongest of the powers, is prepared to strictly and without partial opposition to the failure of their roles – influences, control, intervention – thus putting themselves at the forefront and military maintenance of their state of possession. Anyone who stands on the side of the United States is obliged to engage “solidar” in the conflicts raised by Washington. Anyone who opposes this is an enemy of America and the West. In Poland no 1 dares to announcement that the “end of the West” in the sense of imposing its values on others, without their affirmation and acceptance, leads to expanding aggressiveness of centres promoting them. Those who have failed to submit, alternatively colonize, become enemies of the West.

This constitution directs the observer's attention, on the 1 hand, to the intellectual origin and on the other, to the nature of modern capitalism. The United States, and indeed their propaganda machine, have succeeded in defining in this way their "security dilemma" that all tensions and misfortunes are always to blame for others, strangers. The world's strongest power of threat to global peace and safety is located in the politics of another centres of force, not at home. The fact that US defence spending is as much as the sum of defence budgets of the next 7 states (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2019, www.sipri.org), shows the absurdity of the situation. The manipulation of fear, resulting from the alleged Tukidides trap, has become a specialty of American strategists who explain their aggressiveness to China's emergence in power and fresh multipolarity.

To mask the actual nature of global capitalism, subjecting itself to an ever-increasing plane of the planet, a false thesis of rivalry between democratic and authoritarian states was coined in the US. Meanwhile, both authoritarianism and liberal democracy are only cover-ups for the realisation of private capital interests and its clientele. They are 2 sides of the same process – maintaining and expanding wealth and exploiting the majority by a vast minority. Without knowing the essence of the symbiosis of states with global corporations, it is hard to realize many phenomena that disturb people – from war in Ukraine to exploitation of African wealth. In Poland this subject in public discourse takes a marginal place (Grzegorz Kolodko, Tadeusz Klementewicz).

It is no discovery that global relations are a consequence of polyarchy, which is appropriate for competition, competition, combat, conflict and war. The another side of the same medal is the tendency to compromise, cooperation, integration and cooperation. Which trends take place in a given period depends, among others, on common perception, on political will, discretion and discretion of decision-makers, but besides on objectively conflicting interests. However, American stratages like to emphasize that the eventual form of power manifesting in the polyarchical global strategy comes from the top powers, utilizing force (violence) as a means of repression, force and coercion.

Polish governments...

Since the early 1990s, they have been very easy reconciled with the function assigned to Poland by the collective West as the leader of the confrontation with Russia and the front country on the east flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. The war in Ukraine proved to be an crucial catalyst for specified identification. For the foolish propaganda and the American indoctrination of Central European governments and societies, post-war peace has not become a clear and lasting value. They began to submit to pro-war propaganda, and even militaristic mobilization, to lay ranks against Russia.

Only that the American strategy is about thwarting (the strategy of denial) the Russian attack on any of the allies within NATO, alternatively than inciting large brawls or provoking Russia to further attacks. It seems that the pilots of the Polish safety policy do not separate between this “defensive” strategy and the active “expulsion” of Russia beyond the “red lines” defined by it, deciding to realize its vital interests.

There is no reason to present here all the conditions for conflicting the West with Russia, as there has already been immense literature (see e.g. Kees Van Der Pijl,The tragedy of Ukraine. From Malaysian Boeing to War, Wrocław 2023). Political and technological opinions were dominated by the thesis that Russia unilaterally broke ties with the West, rejecting all its values. erstwhile fewer in the United States note that post-cold Western triumphism and expansion in the russian space must have led to extremist opposition from Russia, there are suspicions that Russia is favoured by them (see, for example, reactions to speeches: Barry Posen, Jeffrey Sachs, Stephen Walt and others). This illness of diphamation and “hunting witches” covered almost the full planet of the collective West. Among politicians, they have become brightly rejected Viktor Orban, and lately Robert Fico, which causes deep confusion in the circles of Western politicians.

The Polish elites and opinion-making circles have never made an effort to redefine the place of the fresh Russia (this non-communist one) in the Polish safety strategy. Through anti-Soviet and anti-Russian atavism, any indirect solutions were abandoned – a neutral neighbourhood or not harming each other. Restraint and prudence have completely disappeared from the arsenal of diplomatic means that have been subjected to the blind subordination of American protection.

Based on the cold-war heritage, Polish decision-makers are absolutely convinced that the U.S. hegemony in the global strategy is eternal and inviolable. And reasoning about a lasting and indisputable alliance with the US is powerfully mitologized in Poland. There is no basis in any bilateral arrangement or in any US strategy. This story is utilized by subsequent ruling teams as a way of interpreting reality – more imagined and desirable than the existing one.

In the meantime, the old strategy of forces is being dismantled before our eyes. In the United States alone, there are deep overestimations of costs and their scale of commitment in an increasingly reluctant world. The ongoing disputes in the U.S. political establishment show that the Americans barely agree with global aspirations and commitments with the possibilities and intentions to implement them.

The blindness of Atlantism...

caused that no negative sides of belonging to the subordinate North Atlantic Alliance are seen in Poland. It has long been known that apart from the advantages of collective defense, alliances combine with the hazard of getting active in unnecessary or besides costly wars. Allianceal solidarity with the United States, during their lewd interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan, proved unnecessary and harmful to the Polish national interest. Apart from individual and material costs, Poland gained nothing. At present, the highly advanced costs of engaging in Ukraine's assistance do not go hand in hand with benefits, either in the image or in circumstantial compensations. On the contrary, the implications of this conflict, even in the form of a grain crisis, show the weakness of the real foundations of dialog and the deficiency of political will on both sides in search of compromises, both symbolically and measurablely.

There are serious concerns that the Polish side, in order to repair relations with Ukrainian authorities after the regulation of law and justice, will again devote further values and interests, in the name of improving its image in the eyes of Washington and Brussels. Meanwhile, an analysis of the war in Ukraine is needed in the context of the American strategy. There are many indications that Asia, as well as the mediate and mediate East, is simply a more crucial theatre of anti-China power. Only in 3rd place is the threat of Russian attack on European allies in the US. Their reassurance and consolidation can prevent Russia's ambitions of restoring its regulation in east Europe for years. However, this strategy will force European countries to put more self-sufficiency and immense costs on the table.

In the context of the variable geometry of the global distribution of forces and the dramatic consequences of the war in Ukraine, Poland needs a fresh position on Russia's roles in the immediate neighbourhood as well as on a wider global scale. First of all, it is worth assessing how much Russia's assertiveness and determination to defend national interests have decreased due to western sanctions and exclusion from various global bodies. It all points to the fact that Russia's tenacity has alternatively increased, and the effectiveness and permanence of its actions on various azimuts is not weaker. Yes, there has been a shuffle in the erstwhile preferences, but the balance of Russian global turnover as well as the interior condition has not been affected. Nor did the spatial scope of Russian influences decrease.

Rusophobia

The most crucial enemy of reliable diagnosis and analysis is the tendency to immense simplifications in the perception of modern Russia and the contamination of rusophobia. In the West, however, it is pointed – in a realistic way – to the resources of Russia, which let it to successfully prosecute its geopolitical objectives over a longer period of time. Even erstwhile there are views about Russia's sinking into a crisis, as is the case in the context of the war in Ukraine, the Russians hold many advantages that let them to accomplish their goals (supply, demographic, transport, technological and other). It happens anyway, which is not news, that even Russia's weakness is its asset in the inter-power game. The more this atomic colossus is in trouble, the more willing he is to take on risky behaviors that should be reckoned with.

The School of Structural Realism, whose most outstanding typical is the Chicago prof. John Mearsheimer for a reason, it has been attacked since the "orange" revolution in Ukraine, as it revealed the real expansive intentions and motives of the large powers – both Russia and the West. erstwhile there was a clash between them and the victim became Ukraine, Poland clearly spoke out against Russia. By not entering into the assessment of the sense of emotional uplifting, this position gained the collective political support. However, noble outrage did not go hand in hand with any sober analysis, nor was it even more predicated on possible options for developments. It was expected not only to weaken Russia but besides to defeat it, which in Western strategy meant subjecting it to hegemonic control and capital expansion. It is the eternal dream of the American and German elites, which dream in the subsequent generations of immeasurable resources and spaces for improvement and exploitation. By the way, specified countries as Poland or the Baltic republics would like to make up for historical humiliation and harm.

In the context of the beginning of fresh war fronts to the US in the mediate East and the request to keep war readiness against China, Russia's eventual triumph in the war in Ukraine will put before the North Atlantic Alliance not only the question of its defence credibility but besides the stableness of American leadership. It is not known from now on that in the USA questions arise about the rationality of the continued presence of their armed forces on the Old Continent. In specified a situation, will the countries of Central Europe, including Poland, not "land" outside the ellipse of direct work for their safety? They may find themselves in a situation that is not enviable, even due to the fact that America's task is not mostly to "keep an eye on" peace, but to step in armed action only after an attack on 1 of its allies. Casus foederis The Washington Treaty in Article 5 defines this case precisely.

Conscious of specified threats, the weak members of the alliance with this greater zeal may search the engagement of the US, not only by placing more and more American soldiers in their territories, but even asking for "friendly" sharing atomic weapons. Experience has shown that atomic weapons effectively execute deterrent functions if their distributors operate within the limits of logic and reason. If the hazard is common destruction, it is not worth reaching for. What, though, would it be if countries not utilized to specified work to usage atomic weapons to “play back” on a stronger power, even at the price of full destruction? With the tremendous unpredictability of Central European governments, specified solutions do not seem to find support in the West.

What about after the war?

Russia will undoubtedly come out of the ongoing war in Ukraine, but if it gains acceptance of its triumph by the West in the form of any modus vivendi – which is not taken into account in Poland at the moment, as in many another compromise solutions – it is the United States, and the remainder of the West considers it harmless from the point of view of pretense to dominate the European continent. At least for a time then, the Atlantic ties may be loosed, due to the increased importance of China's aspirations to dominate Asia and the Pacific. The U.S. will only be guided by their business if they come to defend their erstwhile hegemony in Asia. It is clear from the U.S. strategy that the precedence is to effectively defend Taiwan or another Asian allies against "any action to defend NATO's east flank". He discovers these assumptions without any camouflage 1 of the American experts, and during Trump's tenure an assistant secretary of defence who worked on the strategy and improvement of the armed forces. It should be assumed that after the possible return of Republicans to the White House, the U.S. can lead to extremist “return” alliances (Elbridge A. Colby, Displacement strategy. American defence in a time of power conflict, Warsaw 2023).

Even if the determination of the United States remained unchanged in defence of the Central European states against Russian aggression, it is always essential to bear in head the disproportionate cost of the stake that is being claimed. If Russia were forced to usage atomic weapons, being in positions of losers in a conventional clash with NATO, then the U.S. would most likely retreat from the confrontation, saving their state of possession (Americana First!).

These considerations draw the attention of observers towards the redevelopment of the safety doctrines of NATO associate States and Russia itself. The "hard force" measures show that modern wars bear erratic consequences for each organization – the attacker and the victim. It is so worth addressing the proven forms of dialog and compromise for counterweight. The common attractiveness and attraction – despite the periodic deadlock – can be restored. In the United States there is no shortage of calculation that at the price of any concessions and reset of relations The West would have gained much by having Russia side with the “anti-hegemonic coalition” towards China. Restoring the moderation and balance of Russian-American and Russian-Natrian relations (regardless of the dedication of Ukraine's fate) would be "a birthplace" for the US strategy in Asia. This would besides be 1 of the successive victories of political realism in global relations.

If U.S. strategists consider that engagement in the war in Ukraine, which from their point of view begins to be ‘peripheral’, is besides costly due to the fact that it drains American strength and will, exhausts public patience and promotes tensions in another places of the planet (though in the mediate East), they will decide that ‘the benefits are not worth the cost and hazard under specified circumstances’ (E.A. Colby, p. 420).

In the light of the above considerations, it is worth noting that Polish politicians do not uncover any suppositions (as if they didn't care at all) that the United States is most afraid about Chinese hegemony in Asia, which, along with the unfavorable remainder of the world, could endanger the power of the economy by excluding them from global trade and limiting access to rich regions. In total, this would open the way to direct force that threatens America's freedom and prosperity.

Knowing the cynicism and the calculating of the Anglo-Saxons, it is not expected that in the event of their own problems, they will be willing to sacrifice their strength for their partners or even allies. so Poland must be prepared for all eventuality in order to avoid unnecessary failures and disappointments. Without knowing the final results of the reassessment of the US safety strategy, complementary solutions should be sought. First of all, the implementation of the "zero problems with neighbours" call will open the way to greater regional certainty and to get free of the fear of increasingly irrational rusophobia and Germanophobia in the regulation of the Law and Justice.

Prof. Stanisław Bielen

photo. Wikipedia

Think Poland, No. 47-48 (19-26.11.2023)