The global situation, including the safety situation of Poland in 2025, is comparable to that of the late 1980s and 1990s. At the time, we had a systemic change in our country and countries of the region, as well as a transformation of the European safety system. It can be said that countries specified as Poland have been removed from their feet. We lost the block safety strategy – it was the cost of bringing communism down, so no 1 regretted it. But the problem was that at the time we had nothing in return. On the contrary, 1 could get the impression that Poland is retreating to a disastrous geopolitical situation: between the unifying Germans and Russia, or, in a somewhat more favourable variant, it reaches the grey safety region emerging between the West (NATO) and Russia. It is better not to mention interior economical weakness at the time. And yet it was not so bad – precisely due to the fact that we were encouraged by global and regional improvement trends associated with the formation of a fresh global order.
Safety deterioration
Today, the situation seems the opposite. Poland is an incomparably stronger country – systemically and economically – than it was at the beginning of the 1990s. He is simply a associate of the most crucial safety communities: NATO and the European Union. And yet the sense of danger is highly strong today. So strong that in relation to GDP Poland spends more on defence than any another associate of the Alliance – almost 5% of GDP. Is that right? It's a substance of separate analysis. On the another hand, it is certain that specified a advanced level of spending results from this sense of danger.
Even though the ground was being removed from our feet in the 1990s, destiny favored those who could find a direction. present we must pass a akin test, but under little favorable circumstances.
This situation deserves consideration by the prism of the 5 key values that form the foundation of state safety policy: independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, identity and improvement capacity. At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, Polish authorities were actually struggling to guarantee the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of borders – their treaty designation by all neighbours. These objectives have been achieved. Equally problematic at the time was the ability to make – and in this case the state policy proved effective: Poland was freed from the debt loop, Balcerowicz's Plan liberated economical dynamics and the state began the process of integration with the European Union.
Which of these 5 values of state safety are at hazard today? And where do these threats come from?
In the short term, Russia's policy under Vladimir Putin remains a major challenge. Russia does not have real plans or the anticipation of military conquest of Europe, either in the foreseeable future. 4 years after the start of the war, it did not even accomplish its limited targets in Ukraine. Europe is so applying an indirect strategy aimed at changing the political agreement in the associate States of the European Union. The nonsubjective of Russia is to revise the European global order – and this is what threatens Poland's sovereignty, 1 of the key values protected by safety policy.
Russia wants to force a certain level of compliance of the countries of our region to its own expectations. He besides wants to encourage states specified as Germany and France to cooperate with her on Russian conditions. To this end, it uses a combination of measures: intimidation, incentives, misinformation and the creation of an impact agentry. An perfect script for Moscow would be the disintegration of the European Union, which is why it supports, openly or not, anti-European forces within associate States.
Stronger than ever, Poland is again confronted with the question of whether it can defend what is most precious: its sovereignty, consistency and ability to make in a planet full of fresh complex threats.
For this reason, the opposition to the Russian strategy must go beyond the construction of military defence capabilities. The safety of Poland besides requires resilience – both organization and social – to anti-European disinformation and propaganda, including the political forces and media of various categories.
Another kind of threat to Poland is due to transformations in the global global order – specifically the disintegration of liberal governance and its replacement with logic power politics. Let us remind: the period of liberal order – lasting about 3 decades from the end of the Cold War to the beginning of this decade – was for Poland the best time since the coronation of Bolesław Chrobry. This besides active national security, or perhaps, above all.
Order based on power politics It is characterised not only by the dominance of uniterary activities and the expanding importance of tough force in global relations, but besides by the expanding disregard – especially by the powers – of multilateral institutions. Meanwhile, multilateral institutions specified as NATO and the European Union have been pillars of Poland's safety since the 1990s.
The threat present is not the Russian tank, but the Russian communicative – that's why Poland's safety is not only a question of weapons, but besides of opposition to misinformation and erosion of assurance in the West.
The most severe change in this context is the reversal of the United States from the principles of liberal global order. This is reflected, among another things, in the far-reaching knowing of the president of the United States with respect to Putin's aggressive Russia policy, in the reluctance to the US's presence in NATO, and in open hostility towards the European Union, which he wishes to break up and supports political forces in the associate States in favour of weakening or leaving it.
While Russia's aggressive policy was an effort at an external blow to liberal order, it was more effective to strike from within – from the US, especially since January this year. China besides makes an crucial contribution to the disintegration process, acting according to the same logic power politics. An example is their support for Russian aggression against Ukraine and their ambition to take the place of the United States as the first planet power.
All of this weakens the strength and consistency of the West – and this is essential not only for the global general situation, but besides for the safety of NATO states. In addition, Russia and China support any countries of the Global South – especially those in the BRICS Group – which are both responsive to the West and unwilling to liberal political standards.
It is not war, but the breakdown of trust that most threatens safety – erstwhile the spirit of cooperation disappears, and the large powers choose strength alternatively of principles, the full architecture of peace begins to falter.
As a result, the climate of distrust in global relations is deepening, which clearly confirms the dramatic increase in arms worldwide. In addition to Russian aggression against Ukraine, the second region of the planet nearing the outbreak of a larger armed conflict remains the mediate East – an area where respective smaller wars are taking place today.
Uncertainty brought to global relations by logic power politics, inter alia, it involves any countries undermining the principles of global law that have so far served the stableness and predictability of relations between countries. This applies in peculiar to the prohibition of force, but besides to the sustainability of borders – which begin to be relativised in any disputed places, and erstwhile territorial claims – defrosted. Bad examples are spreading rapidly in this area.
When the trust in the law and institutions is weakening and strength becomes an argument again – the return to the logic of "everyone to himself" is not only possible, but besides dangerously close.
Sleepy animosities are revived, and power is more easy gained by politicians who, under the pretext of defending security, introduce strong-arm governments, disregard global obligations and multilateral institutions, and, to keep power, initiate conflicts with neighbors or lead their own societies to the brink of civilian war.
Overall uncertainty and concerns about the improvement of the situation prompt countries to increase their arms spending. In the past, in akin moments, the logic of “Save Who Can” prevailed – leading straight to wars. Fortunately, we're not in this position yet. Western countries, especially European countries, are inactive trying to coordinate their safety policies within the alliances and communities they are members of.
However, the current policy of the United States remains a problem - weakening the credibility of the North Atlantic Alliance (including the key Article 5) and the European Union's cohesion.
Polish reaction
What should Poland do in this situation? What should her safety policy be? First of all – carefully recognise threats: present and future, military and extra-military. Meanwhile, present there is simply a hazard that Polish safety policy is shaped under the influence of Russia's aggression on Ukraine, as well as under force from populist bidding – who, or which political force, will spend more on defence. This bidding is more about "backs" than building a coherent defence and safety system.
Meanwhile, Poland is not threatened by Russia's aggression, as in February 2022. Russia does not make territorial claims against Poland – neither against another NATO or EU countries. The real threat to Poland is the indirect strategy (called not precisely the hybrid war). Therefore, reasoning about safety should be based on logic Resilience than conventional defence – understood as a protection against land invasion.
Today we would request a plan of Kutrzeba and Mossor from 1938 – unfortunately never implemented – alternatively than another version of the Maginot line. In the meantime, we see more of a car in front of horses: feverish and costly shopping, unsurpassed by a reliable, unpoliticized analysis of threats and our own weaknesses.
The danger present is not a planet War II kinetic offensive. The threat to Europe and Poland is the Russian strategy of malignant cancer. And it is in this category that we should think about the real policies of the Kremlin.
Security is not born out of emotion or politicized arms tenders – it requires a cool analysis, a long-term strategy and resilience stronger than steel.
It does not seem reasonable for the public to spend 5% of GDP on defence, tank purchases in the US and South Korea and a imagination of the 300 000th army. Tanks are offensive weapons – are we planning 1 in the east direction? Moreover, on the front of the Russian-Ukrainian War they became the first and easiest goal. Polish safety requires, above all, effective protection of the sky and protection from the sea side – but in these respects we are weak.
The current spending scale creates a powerful public debt, and their structure seems to well illustrate the saying of past conflicts: "generals are waged in past wars." The east Shield is the best example of this. Even if we spend even 7% of our GDP on defense, it will not supply us with safety if the amount of investment becomes a fetish alternatively than a reflection of real needs.
The increasing debt, besides resulting from rising defence spending, will limit the anticipation of financing another key tasks of the state, especially social ones. Meanwhile, the long-term safety of Poland depends not only on military strength, but besides on demography. In this respect, we are in a state of deep collapse – with fertility rates below 1.1 – for years ignored by subsequent governments.
The current spending scale creates a powerful public debt, and their structure seems to well illustrate the saying of past conflicts: "generals are waged in past wars." Modern threats do not require tanks, but imagination and improvement – the strategy of the future.
Instead of spending on tanks, a fast and thoughtful redirection of funds to specified a social, educational and cultural policy is needed, which will make conditions for the demographic safety of Poland. Migrants can supply hands to work, but the defence of the state – in the current social and political strategy – will not guarantee.
It is besides known that Poland will not even defend well spent 5% of GDP in defence. statistic don't fight themselves. We can't win alone with Russia. That is why, in addition to the better or worse-implemented "jeese strategy", it is besides essential to "sider strategy", that is, weaving a dense network of defence and safety links in the region and in Europe.
It is essential to strengthen links, both in military and non-military terms, along the east flank and with the countries of north-western Europe. They share our perception of danger and show akin determination to face possible actions by Russia and its allies. The combined, well-rounded possible of this group of states is adequate to discourage Moscow from engaging. And then even 3.5% of GDP can be enough.
Safety is not only due to the number of tanks, but besides to the number of births, networks of alliances and reason. Taking care of demography education and building cooperation capacity are besides elements of an active defence system.
The spider strategy besides requires investment – specified as purchases in countries “from our network”, joint reinforcement projects, the construction of coordinated cybersecurity systems and the prevention of misinformation. A good example can be the Polish-French Treaty of 8 May, if it is actually filled with content.
Let's say again: statistic don't fight. Therefore, refusing to participate in a possible peace mission to insure a future truce over the Dnieprem is not a good signal. We sent our soldiers to die in an unnecessary war in Iraq, and now, together with European partners, we do not want to participate in an operation that could actually service our security.
Stefek Burczymucha's attitude does not reflect our political class' knowing of real safety requirements. And although as long as possible, NATO's defence capacity and credibility must be maintained – it is besides essential to be ready for a script in which the United States, even if formally in the Alliance, will not feel obliged to act in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
Security is not built by declarations or statistic – its basis is shared responsibility, courage and ability to act together in the name of peace.
These issues, and many others related to national security, should besides be the subject of government dialog with competent civilian society organisations. It is not adequate to inform about decisions taken in the privacy of ministerial cabinets – a debate is needed in which the vote of citizens will be taken seriously alternatively than instrumentally.
