Bankruptcy of the German Gepolitical strategy [Analysis]

krzysztofwojczal.pl 2 years ago

This article will make and update part of the chapter in the book: "Third Decade. planet present and in 10 yearsIt’s okay. ”

On 8 December, Olaf Scholz celebrated his first anniversary as Chancellor of Germany. We must honestly admit that the German leader has hit the worst possible minute for himself to take power. Since February 24, 2022, the global situation, but besides the situation of Germany has changed dramatically. However, this cannot be an excuse for Scholz's actions in the last 10 months, which have been topped by a visit to Beijing (4.XI). If the German Chancellor does not change his geopolitical strategy, there is no way that his government would give birth to any affirmative effects on the national Republic of Germany.

Such a critical assessment is based on respective facts. It seems that since the end of planet War II, the national Republic of Germany and its Chancellor have never had specified a bad image among allies and partners. The Berlin authorities have done everything possible to undermine their credibility and undermine the years of trust built. Especially in Central and east Europe, but not only. Olav Scholz's restraint on material assistance for Ukraine should not be a surprise to anyone, but the kind in which Scholz tried to hold providing support was terrible. It can be compared to the kind Joe Biden brought American troops out of Afghanistan. In both cases, decisions were not surprising. On the another hand, the form of action in a disastrous way affected the image of the states and their leaders. Only that shortly after this Joe Biden rebuilt his image and credibility of the US at the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is not so certain, however, that Olaf Scholz will get his chance to rehabilitate, and if he does, will he usage it?

THE LEADER OF EUROPE?

Help Ukraine, show the aggressor that war does not pay off – the stabilisation of the continent

In this respect, serious doubts arise. Scholz's torpedoing of the transfer of circumstantial military equipment to Ukraine ended in a loud scandal revealed by ‘BildIt’s okay. ” The German “help” symbol was the transfer of 5 1000 helmets. This image failure was not masked by later attempts to save face and importantly increase the scale of aid. In the ranking of the countries that gave Ukraine the most military equipment, the richest and largest in the European Union Germany were (at 24.X) inactive behind Poland or the United Kingdom, not to mention the United States. Although the German army itself suffered many deficiencies in equipment, spare parts and ammunition – which has been loud in fresh years – it is, however, the fact that Scholz blocked the transportation of dense equipment to Ukraine (although military recommendations) speaks for itself. On the another hand, it must be acknowledged that, after summing up all forms of aid (in the supply of military, humanitarian and financial equipment) Germany is ranked 2nd (after the US) in terms of the value of support. However, it is crucial to draw attention to the proportions. due to the fact that Berlin has allocated only 0.08% of its GDP to Ukraine. For comparison, for Poland it is 0.5% of GDP (about 6.5 times more). The US, Canada and the United Kingdom have devoted 0.2% of GDP to this nonsubjective and Norway 0.4%, Estonia as much as 0.8% of GDP and Latvia as evidence 0.9% of GDP.

In addition, it is hard to estimation the costs associated with the admission of refugees, but if they are taken into account, it may turn out that Germany provides proportionally little aid than... Bulgaria.

Poorly, for a European leader and a state that should be 1 of the most curious in the safety of the east part of the continent. It is so no wonder that in the context of the subject of assistance of Ukraine, the German subject which does not want to support Kiev appeared in the press many times. Destroying the image of the Berlin authorities.

And erstwhile it seemed that the image of Germany was slow beginning to change, German decision-makers made another shot in the knee. Of course, the question of “borrowing” Poland German launchers Patriot. In consequence to this proposal, Poland threw the thought of passing on this weaponry to Ukraine for deployment in its western territory, where it would be easier to defend NATO borders (vide Last case of rocket strikes in Poland and fatalities). Abstract from the full political cover that took place here, 1 thing is certain. Berlin badly chose the kind of justification on which he considered the thought impossible. German Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht 24.XI.22’ stated ‘Any usage of them [Patriots] outside NATO would require prior talks with NATO and alliesIt’s okay. ” What happened almost immediately with comment NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who 25.XI.22’ stated in this regard: “It is up to the States to decideIt’s okay. ” As if it were just a period later president Joe Biden announcedthat the U.S. will hand over Ukraine to the Patriot launchers – which yet undermined the translation of the German minister.

The German Patriots will yet go to Poland, but again the actions that were expected to improve the image of the RFN contributed to a considerable confusion and yet caused the other effect.

Ensure the safety of strategical investments and infrastructure

Another image (and more) The defeat of the Berlin authorities is to let individual to sabotage the Nord Stream pipelines dragged over the Baltic bottom. Regardless of who is liable for this, 1 thing is certain. individual played Berlin on his nose, and the Germans were incapable to counter it. Gas pipelines were damaged just before the heating period in a situation where Germany did not have filled gas warehouses. The national Republic of Germany, which has so far emerged as a serious state, received a blow showing Berlin's powerlessness. And it was in a situation where the German authorities had to cay for months and admit that Germany had become energetically dependent on Russia, which proved to be a terrible strategy. A strategy that enabled and at least facilitated Putin's decision to make a full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022. The Kremlin's man could number on Germany to stand by him or not at least to interfere with the Ukrainians. At the same time thanks to the construction of Nord Stream II (which Angela Merkel contracted after the 2014 aggression), The Russians could number on cutting Ukraine off from gas supply and its military attack without the hazard that Russian gas would not scope western Europe. The United States intervened in this area and even physically completed the gas pipeline did not lead to the transfer of gas.

Of course, the fact that Chancellor Olaf Scholz has to sprinkle ashes in this respect stems from the policy pursued by his predecessors. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that for months German diplomacy has been in deep defence and must constantly explain itself, extinguish fires or repair devastated – besides by Olaf Scholz – image.

Learn from your own mistakes

The diplomacy conducted by Scholz's office is truly fatal. The Chancellor has barely explained that Germany has learned from the experience of cooperation with the countries de facto Authoritarians (Russia), and already started visiting Beijing. Just after the 20th legislature of the Communist organization of China, which kind of approved Xi Jingping's authoritarian rule. Building relationships on the Berlin-Pekin line should not be surprising, but again, global politics besides number points for style. Reliability is simply a currency. In business and politics. Olaf Scholz, on the another hand, does everything to make Germany an image bankrupt. besides in the eyes of partners specified as Emmanuel Macron, who had to take Scholz's lonely journey to China as a cheek.

At the same time at the end of October, Chancellor He pushed – despite many objections, including its own ministers – the alleged port agreement with China. As a result, Germany does not object to the anticipation for a Chinese State company to acquisition shares in an operating company of a container terminal in Hamburg. The speech here is about a part of cake that counts almost 25% of all shares. The case reminds us of the subject of Germany's transfer of its energy infrastructure to Russians (e.g. gas storage). Before making this transaction, they observe Americans who have disapproval of the Chancellor's later visit to the mediate State.

It is hard not to defy the impression that Olaf Scholz acts like individual who avoids working with the United States at all costs from the very beginning. In the first months after the invasion, he tried to go on hand to Putin (a corpse in arms deliveries to Ukraine). However, this could be explained by the energy blackmail hanging over Germany. However, with the landing in the air of the Nord Streams, the Russian leash for the German doberman was broken. At the first moment, the most urgent substance was to guarantee that gas retention facilities were filled, but erstwhile it was done, Scholz took a step towards China. Knowing the Americans wouldn't like it. Americans who depend on LNG to be delivered to Europe as well as European security. Is the bow made before Xi Jingping by the German Chancellor a sign of more than a deficiency of geopolitical sense? possibly there was a belief in Berlin that Russia was not behind the Nord Stream diversion? If so, it must be remembered that with specified a variant of events, the German authorities themselves would be responsible. If Olaf Scholz had acted more skillfully and at the same time did not origin Washington's concerns about Western unity towards Russia's aggression, then possibly Nord Streamy would have remained entirely. deficiency of assurance in Berlin could be the reason that more extremist measures were sought. Of course, in this respect, we can only speculate.

The priorities are right.

On the another hand, Scholz's policy can be rationalised on an economical and economical level. China is Germany's largest trading partner, as well as the immense marketplace for the German automotive industry, which is present there. In the mediate country. For these reasons, the Germans gotta talk to the Chinese.

However, German interests with China are not a problem, and the fact that these interests are a precedence for German abroad policy. What happens at the expense of safety (relationship with the US), but worse, at the expense of partners from the European Union. The German Chancellor acts as if he were a commercial typical of German companies, not a head of state whose interests go far beyond the sphere of profits and losses of the holding.

In the interest of Germany, leadership positions in the EU are being built, especially in the context of countries located in Central Europe (Trimor). It is in the interests of Germany to cooperate with France. It is in Germany's interest to weaken the political and economical position of the US in Europe while maintaining the American safety anchor. At least until the European army was formed (if any). German national, state, political and economical interests go far beyond the profits of German corporations.

However, it seems that German political elites inactive deficiency awareness of all this. They don't see the large picture. It matters here and now. Berlin most likely rejected the French thought of building a European army and decided to reconstruct the Bundeswehr. Which must have hurt the French, and possibly even caused unpleasant historical associations. At the same time, the Scholz government announced government aid to the German private sector value EUR 200 billion (due to energy price inflation). This is equivalent to 5% of German GDP. specified powerful backing can have a fatal impact on competitiveness throughout the European market. German companies can gain an advantage over EU competition and get convenient conditions for expansion into weaker and little prosperous markets. This subject has sparked much controversy across the Union (including France, Italy and Spain), and the Berlin authorities have added another stone to the construction of the image of Germany as a self-centered and non-regardless state.

Olaf Scholz – the best chancellor... for Poland?

Meanwhile, it seems that in order to accomplish its strategical objectives (building a single-polar Europe with Berlin at the summit), The Germans would gotta act like... Americans. The second were able to build a strategy in which even their competitors could develop. specified a liberal approach to planet politics has made everyone accept American leadership and associated mechanisms. This is what created the American hegemony and allowed it to last so long. The Germans tried to take control of Europe twice by imposing their will. And they've been trying to do it for the 3rd time for years. precisely the same method as a 100 years ago (imposing will), but with another tools (economy/politics alternatively than war). That is why Germany will not become the real leader of the European Union. On the contrary, their egoistic and subservient policies can lead to the disintegration of the Community.

In just a fewer months, Olaf Scholz himself had a disaster in terms of the image of the national Republic of Germany and its credibility as a partner. He undermined the trust of the previously favored administration Joe Biden, alienated Emmanuel Macron, and besides devastated the image of Germany in the eyes of Ukrainians.

From the position of Poland, we should want Olaf Scholz to regulation Germany for another 20 years, in the way he has done so far. Thanks to this, Poland has a much better chance of gaining the position of lawyer in the field of American interests on the continent. Furthermore, Ukrainians see Warsaw as a much more reliable partner than Berlin in terms of far-reaching plans. In turn, the French have no opposition – even to spite Berlin – to make any Poles deal. Despite the earlier caracal scandal, it is from France that Poland will buy satellites and usage the French satellite strategy in the field of safety (vide Agreement with 27.XII.2022).

Observation satellites will strengthen exploratory capabilities #WarPolish
–
Today, Deputy Prime Minister @mblaszczak The guest was in #Warsaw Minister of Defence of the Republic of Moldova. During the meeting, a contract was concluded for the transportation of 2 reflection satellites together with the reception station in Poland.

What? https://t.co/WmHwKNnNhg pic.twitter.com/RMed37orsn

— Ministry of National Defence ????? (@MON_GOV_PL) December 27, 2022

At the same time, however, we must hope that the European Union will be able to last the German ineptitude as long as possible, in a expression that is inactive conducive to us (although Germany is slow changing it).

What is the reason that subsequent governments from Berlin (because Scholz is not an exception here) frequently act as if Germany did not gotta number on others in the EU? What causes the German authorities to even ostentatically show their superiority and, without a shadow of embarrassment, carry out individual German interests no substance how they perceive it?

In my opinion, the reason for this is... State of possession. And a German mentality. Germany simply cannot decision in politics at the level of soft tools. For them, power is the only basis for diplomacy. In the old days, they put on military power, and erstwhile German militarism was castrated, the economy became a measurement of power. And here the Germans have reasons for satisfaction.

ECONOMIC GIGANT

The national Republic of Germany is inhabited by 84 million people who produce GDP annually worth $4.2 trillion (2021). All this on an area of 357,000 km2. The much larger France (552 000 km2 of the metropolis itself and 675 000 km2 together with overseas territories) is inhabited by nearly 67.5 million people (65 million of the metropolis itself) generating 2.9 trillion USD. GDP per capita, taking into account the purchasing power parity of money, besides speaks in favour of Germany, as each German accounts for $52.9 1000 while the Frenchman accounts for $45.1 1000 (the euro area average is $46.3 1000 per person).

These comparisons are desirable due to the fact that we are writing about the 2 largest populations and economies of the European Union. Thus, the German state is more populated than France by 20% and produces up to 31% of GDP. The 3rd country – Italy – has half the economy compared to Germany (GDP = $2.1 trillion at 59 million population). In this range, the differences are enormous. German GDP alone accounts for as much as 29% of the EU's full GDP (27 countries – 14.5 trillion USD). And no wonder, due to the fact that the German economy is the 4th largest in the planet taking into account purchasing power parity (about USD 5 trillion). The size of the German population and economy is translated into EU policy and the distribution of political power in the Community. So for Germany's number of seats in the European Parliament as well as for the filling of individual functions.

At the same time, Germany has a comfortable debt situation compared to the western and confederate countries of the European Union. State sector debt is unchangeable at 70% in relation to GDP. The private sector looks worse (180% of debt comparative to GDP), but there is no disaster here. Compared to France (government debt 113% of GDP, private sector as much as 284% of GDP), Italy (155% and 156% respectively), Spain (118% and 206%) and the Netherlands (52% and 281%) look like a wellness specimen.

It's bathy versus waste.

However, the difference in levels of sovereign and private debt generates the axis of dispute. Although Germany has a crucial impact on the European Central Bank, the ECB frequently takes steps to support the euro area members who are profoundly in debt, which sometimes undermines German interests and portfolios. Hence many disputes on this plane (lately frequently on the Rome-Berlin line). This is why the suppression of the ECB's spending policy has been an crucial precedence for German intra-EU policies for any time. In financial matters, the votes in the Governing Council of the ECB (which establishes the bank’s financial policy and strategy) shall be weighted in accordance with the national central banks’ shares in the subscribed capital of the bank. It is not hard to guess that the German central bank has the largest share of the ECB's capital (26.4% of 19 euro area countries). In an alliance with the Benelux countries, Berlin can number on about 36% of the vote. However, it is frequently easier to build the applicable majority in the council, as France (20.4%), Italy (17%) and Spain (12%) alone have a full of 49.4% votes. They are mostly joined by Portugal and Greece, which forms an absolute majority.

Little wonder, therefore, that the ECB has been pursuing a policy of supporting euro area debt countries for years (vide ‘quantitative loosening’ policy. The elections to the Executive Board of the ECB are besides not accidental, with Dutch (1998-2003), French (2003-2011), Italy (the celebrated "father of reprint" by Mario Draghi - 2011-2019) and since 2019 French Chistine Lagarde.

So 1 thing seems obvious. Germany could usage allies at the ECB. Countries with a akin situation (relatively low debt) to Germany, which would let to make a counterweight for the coalitions of the indebted states of the west and south. Allies specified as Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, Romania or even Hungary. This is 1 of the reasons, though not the most important, for which the Berlin authorities were open to the fast expansion of the euro area to "healthy" economies. For now, however, Germany has to face the force of “expandable” in the ECB, but besides across the Union. Which, on the 1 hand, creates tensions, but on the another hand, most likely the only reason why the euro area is inactive holding up. If Germany had managed its financial policy in its own right, it is possible that any countries (i.e. Italy, Spain, Greece or Portugal) would have decided to return to their national currencies.

World maker and exporter

When Poland and another post-communist countries of Central Europe were persuaded to redesign economies into a "modern" service-based model while reducing dense manufacture (those who remember the beginning of the 21st century know what I am writing about), The Germans built their industrial power. Today, this branch of the economy is liable for Okay. 26% GDP share (before COVIDEM and the war could have been by various sources up to 29%). In France it is 16.5%. However, it should be remembered that a large part of the German manufacture is located, for example, in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland or yet China. In another words, German factories in another countries in statistic translate into industrialisation of these countries. However, a crucial part of the capital received elsewhere is transferred to Germany. And it is there that is invested in the improvement of technology, so German products have enjoyed the reputation of the most modern, the most luxurious and frequently the most reliable. In conclusion, the industrialisation of Germany – understood as territory – affects 1⁄4 of GDP. However, the impact of German manufacture (spreading around the world) on the German economy may be considerably higher.

Although according to dry statistics, Germany is the largest maker in Europe and the 4th largest in the planet with 6% share in the global market. The value of all German trade in 2019 was 77% of German GDP. By 2020 it was already 89%, as was 2021. Export alone accounts for 47.5% of GDP. The German trade economy stands, and the export of goods produced by the Germans is its main pillar.

Commercial tycoon

Many commentators of the global scene emphasize that Germany has the largest trade turnover in transfers with China. This is true, but should be put in the right context. Although the turnover with China is the highest in terms of value, it is with you that Germany has the least favourable, negative trade balance. Meanwhile, the biggest profits are made in trade with... the United States. And that's where Germany exports the most. In 2020 by the planet Bank Germany has achieved a failure of $24.5 billion in trade with China. At the same time, they made profit in transactions with the US worth $40.8 billion. In total, this gives about 65 billion reasons to keep a better relation with Washington alternatively than Beijing. On the another hand, in France the Germans made likewise – $39 billion, and in the British $37 billion. A affirmative balance sheet of USD 7.3 billion was besides achieved with Poland.

The first 5 countries to buy the most from Germans as follows::

USA – 9% of all German exports.
China – 7.7%,
France – 7.5%
Netherlands – 6.8%
Poland – 5.7%.

By comparison, V4 countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) import as much as 12.3% of the value of all German exports. Only Czech Republic (3.4%) and Poland import more than the US.

Germany mainly buys from:

China – 12%,
Netherlands – 7.9%
USA – 6.4%
Poland – 6%
Italy – 5.7%.

In a more global way, In 2020 Germany made more than $212 billion in trade (export minus import). Of which USD 180 billion for trade with Europe and Central Asia and an additional USD 40 billion with the United States. In regional terms, Germany suffers trade losses with East Asia (26.5 billion USD), South Asia (-5.5 billion USD) and Sub-Saharan Africa (-1.4 billion USD).

Conclusion? The most crucial for the German economy is the European marketplace and then the American market..

However, it should be borne in head that German companies are making immense profits from the external markets on which production is carried out. For example, the share of German companies in the Chinese automotive marketplace (cars) amounted to about 23% in 2019. German cars of celebrated brands: Volkswagen, Opel, Mercedes, Audi and BWM are among the best-selling in China. ♪ Alone ♪ Volkswagen Group It delivered 3.3 million cars to Chinese customers in 2021, earning EUR 3.6 billion pure. By comparison, the full company generated profit EUR 20 billion in gross of EUR 250 billion (So Volkswagen's gross is higher than the gross to the Polish budget). Since factories are besides located in the territory of the Central State, the figures for this marketplace are not included in the general commercial statistic of the German economy. The German automotive manufacture is like a state in the country, only that it goes far beyond German borders. German companies own, among others, European brands from another countries (Lamborghini, Bentley, Scania, Seat or Skoda), while producing their own vehicles in 3rd territories. The profits are huge, and much influence is expected in the planet of German politics. And a suitable translation into German abroad policy.

Importer of natural materials

The 5th Achilles of Germany is simply a shortage of its own energy resources. Our western neighbour must import 97% of its gas and oil request and 90% of its coal request from outside. Until recently, the largest exporter of these natural materials to Germany was the Russian Federation.

Importantly, gas is not only essential for maintaining the largest economy in the planet (industrial destination), but it plays an crucial function in energy. The gas itself generated about 15% of electricity in Germany in 2021. Although it should be stressed that Germany's long-term energy policy – precisely due to its dependence on natural materials from outside – has for years assumed that the alleged "climate neutrality". This means nothing more than a crucial increase in the share of renewable energy in the full marketplace and an increase in Germany's energy independence. However, these plans did not put an end to cooperation with Russia, as Berlin, thanks to the Nord Stream projects, intended to become a gas hub for Europe as a whole. In another words, even erstwhile the request for Russian gas was reduced, Germany intended to make money on it. In addition, erstwhile Poland did not have Baltic Pipe, bypassing it with gas pipelines gave the Berlin-Moscow axis serious jacks on Warsaw. Thus, Nord Streamy was mostly a political project, both from the position of Germany and Russia.

Returning to the German "Energywende", its assumptions could be achieved through the improvement of atomic power plants... However, here – it seems purely ideological – the Germans decided to go against common sense and put out existing power plants in Germany. This has not changed the situation in Ukraine and the energy crisis. Berlin simply delayed the plans to destruct the atom (which has been the cheapest supplier of electricity for years, while remaining “eco”).

Analyzing the latest data, in the first half of 2022 coal, natural gas and atomic energy accounted for nearly 53% of all electricity production in Germany. Renewable energy sources generated 47%, which is an awesome result. Throughout 2021, this share was 41%.

On the another hand, it should be remembered that coal, gas and oil are inactive very much needed for Germany, as for all others (though in industry). And they will be for many years. At the same time, futuristic automotive transformation plans (electric cars) will not change Germany's dependence on imports of natural materials. For if specified a transformation had taken place today, Germans from the petent of Russia (gas/oil) would have become a petent... China (nickel, cobalt, lithium and manganese needed for battery production). So here we see another thread that may have let Olaf Scholz down to Beijing.

Electric power eater

Germany is – which is not hard to guess – the largest consumer of European Union electricity. request in 2021 was 560 terawato-hours (France utilized 504 terawato-hours with second score). Of which up to 63.7% Germany had to import. In the light of the energy crisis (limited or interrupted imports of sur. Energiz from Russia), Germany is curious in acquiring any surplus electricity to be generated in the EU. Consequently, this fact itself has and will affect energy prices. If there are more (and there is) net energy importers in the EU, prices request to emergence powerfully due to the crucial difference between request and supply. On the another hand, it is worth remembering that Poland besides had periods erstwhile thanks to imports (mainly from Sweden) it maintained a appropriate energy balance. It is hard to imagine that, if necessary, we can offer a price on the marketplace for energy higher than that offered by Germany. However, it is besides a kind of opportunity. Germany is already reasoning about oil imports from Naftoport in Gdańsk and gas imports from Świnoujście. Although we do not have our own natural materials, thanks to our infrastructure, we can re-export another people's natural materials. It is besides worth remembering German problems in the context of building their own atomic power plants and RES. due to the fact that if we were to increase our own electricity production in the next 10 years, then possibly we could make rather a profit. I raised this subject in Krynica Forum:

Communication!

In the context of the German economy, it is not possible to ignore the highly crucial subject of the transport infrastructure that serves it. Germany is 1 of the best-connected countries in Europe and in the world. Each of us will surely associate Germany with good highways, which, like a network, environment the full territory of the country. In terms of the full dimension of roads of this class, the RFN ranks second in the EU with a consequence of 15,000 km. The position of the leader – and this comparatively late – was achieved by Spain with a consequence of 17 1000 km. However, German roads are more profitable. Germany can afford no charges for passenger vehicles, among others, due to the fact that German highways gain on themselves. They connect the richest cities of Europe, and at the same time constitute 1 of the most crucial continental routes on the east-west and north-south lines. Spain, located in the periphery, will never have the chance to get as advanced a return on investment in land transport routes as Germany, located in the heart of Europe.

However, road transport is comparatively young and began to play an crucial function only in the 20th century. In the 19th century, however, Germany became celebrated for its powerful investments in railways. Although a real boom in this respect followed the unification of the state and the creation of a strategical merger plan. Historical issues concerning transport are described in the book, while for the purposes of this text it should be remembered that the modern German rail strategy is among the most developed in the world. German railway stations are among the most exploited in Europe. Between 2017 and 2018 the railways served about 2.85 billion passengers annually, overtaking the British (1.75 billion people) and the French (1.22 billion people). Of course, this was affected by the size of the German population, geographical location (service of foreigners), but besides by the level of state development, wealth of society etc.

Germany has besides not neglected the subject of the oldest "autostrad" which inactive plays a very crucial function for the German economy. German river roads are among the most frequented and best managed in Europe. Anyone who had at least 5 minutes at the edge of the Rhine surely had the chance to find out. The movement of the barge there is highly intense. Again, the German territory is supported by geographical and topographical conditions. Each part of the country has access to at least 1 large waterway. The south is served by the Danube, west by Ren, and east by the Elbe. These are the 3 longest rivers of Europe located west of the Vistula River. North Germany can in turn communicate by sea, and Baltic ports have easy access to those over the North Sea via the Kilonian Canal (no request for a sailing around the Jutland P.D.). In another words, Germany has had access to the cheapest way of transporting goods for centuries. At the same time, it should be borne in head that the RFN has a very extended network of river canals that combine the aforementioned watercourses into 1 large transport network. The network besides connects with the Czech Republic, France or the Benelux countries.

Finally, Germany has led the European Union over the last fewer years in terms of the number of passengers served in air transport. In 2018 it was 222 million passengers (second sunny place Spain – 221 million), while in 2020 (COVID 19) it was 57.8 million passengers (in Spain marginally less). The advance in this competition of tourist giants, i.e. the mentioned Spain, but besides France or Italy is significant.

Moreover, for a state with specified developed land infrastructure, Germany besides has 1 of the largest transhipment ports in Europe. In 2021 Hamburg was the 3rd largest port in terms of the volume of transhipment. He only gave way to Dutch Rotterdam and Belgian Antwerp. Bremerhaven took the advanced sixth position of this classification ahead of the best British port Felixstowe (8) and Italian Gioia Tauro (9). The French port of Le Havre was only 11th. So we compare RFN ports with ports of states considered to be naval powers.

In conclusion, excellent infrastructure enables and facilitates the functioning and growth of the German economy. Products produced in Germany can rapidly and comparatively cheaply scope abroad markets. Germany can usage its assets thanks to its excellent transport network. Built, developed and kept in good condition for centuries. It was formerly the rivers that served German peoples and countries to develop, and present the tracks, roads and seaports and airports have reached that.

HEARTLAND OR RIMLAND?

Germany besides benefits from its proximity to neighbouring markets, which are well communicated internally and in the mediate of Europe. As in ancient times, all roads led to Rome, so it seems that modern Rome is the German state, and surely the Ruhra Basin. It is the 3rd richest urban area in Europe (after Paris and London), which additionally neighbors and cooperates with the rich and largest European ports in Belgium and the Netherlands. It is besides a highly developed industrial and mining facility. All this combined with the proximity of the Benelux ports, the Rhine, the developed road-rail-aircraft infrastructure pumps blood into the German economy like a titanium heart.

Besides, the location of the full Germany is and was beneficial. Located in the south, the Alps separate the Germanic planet from the Mediterranean region. Although strong France has existed in the west for centuries, Germany has never had to fear expansion from the east. Unless they were gaining a common border with Russia. As long as there were another Slavic states (like Poland) then German civilization had nothing to fear from that side. besides located on the Jutland peninsula, Denmark has not been a challenge to the Germans for centuries, as have the Benelux countries.

All of this may lead to the conclusion that thanks to the central location, interior strength, and the comparative weakness of the environment, Germany can and should even dominate the continent. But they never succeeded. Why? 1 reason is that all German advantages over the remainder of Europe are linked to the land domain. Germany was and is inactive a land power. That's it. That's it.

And whenever a German giant grew to sizes that allowed ambitious reasoning about the dominance of the Old Continent, so many times the European robe was besides tight for the German economy. Especially since Germany's emergence in power and the threat it caused led to a situation where the European marketplace closed to Germany. Suffocating and thus limiting the further growth of the German economy. This was due to the fact that Germany could not replace French, British or Spanish outlets with markets outside the continent. They were not a colonial power, but access to those colonies that owned abroad fleets.

In another words, to gain the right interior power, Germany would gotta benefit from the advantages of the sea. Meanwhile, not only the British, but besides the French were on the seas just stronger than Germany. It was London and Paris that benefited from colonialism. It is London and Paris that have unfettered access to non-continental markets through the Atlantic Ocean. In the meantime, to leave the North Sea, Germany had to number for London or Paris (Canal of La Manche/GIUK) all time. Today, the Americans have the most to say on the seas. Making a long talk short. Germany is and has been dependent on 3rd countries for maritime trade. Building a land power, they were incapable to establish rivalry with the Anglo-Saxon-focused naval domain. Efforts in this direction have already proved pointless due to the geographical position of the United Kingdom, which is simply a kind of naval bastion guarding the exits and entrances from the Atlantic to ports of northern Europe. Among another things, this fact was frequently placed by the Berlin authorities on a collision course with London. Especially in the context of competition for influence in Benelux, whose ports and shipbuilding manufacture provided possible to build a powerful maritime fleet – capable of threatening Royal Navy.

Without unrestricted access to non-European markets Germany is able to dominate the Old Continent economically. due to the fact that whenever a German economy becomes besides much of a threat to others, so many another European powers are against it. To proceed growth – despite the opposition of continental competition Germany would gotta go beyond Europe. And they effort to do that, only that their exports to global markets depend on the US, global governance and the roadways of the sea. Thus German independency and possible imperial dreams depended and inactive depend on a maritime domain in which Germany never dominated. This weakness has evolved into 2 disasters in planet wars, as well as a large political dependence on the US in the last 80 years. Dependency, which manifested itself in situations specified as:

imposing further EU sanctions on Russia after 2014,
expulsion of Russian diplomats after effort to kill Skripal,
sanctioning the Nord Streams, no gas reception after completion of Nord Stream II,
Ukraine's support in the war against Russia after 24.II.2022.

In fresh years Germany has been able to conduct pro-Russian policies only within the limits accepted by the Americans. What besides became the object of mockery from the Russian side and Vladimir Putin himself, who pointed straight at Berlin's service towards Washington (which was a bitter evidence due to Putin's profession, which he hoped together with Germany would dissuade the US from Europe).

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POLICIES AND FAITH

In global politics, trust is everything. The value is not: paper with ink on it, content of contract records or signatures under it. The most crucial thing is that the organization that performs the symbolic parish will implement the provisions of the Treaty. If, in advance, we can presume that, for example, Vladimir Putin is as untrustworthy as Adolf Hitler utilized to be, is there any sense of signing a peace treaty, whose durability will be based only on a good word? The Ukrainians answered this question, who declare a fight until the final triumph despite the tremendous costs associated with the ongoing war on their territory. In Kiev, they are aware that the Russian army must be beaten so hard that for at least the next fewer years it is not able to re-agree to Ukraine. Only then – from the position of the Ukrainians – will it be possible to sit down for peace talks with the hope that they are not just a means to accomplish strategical pause in war activities. Pause, after which the Russians will return after a fewer months or years.

Because of a deficiency of assurance in the authorities of the country, wars had begun. This was the case in 1940 erstwhile the Finns did not believe in the sincerity of Stalin's proposal (territorial exchange) and decided to fight in a pre-lost war against the power of the USSR. This shows how crucial currency credibility is and even for the top powers in relation to much weaker partners.

The principles of ethics and the consequences of their infringement are besides well visible in global policy on the example of the national Republic of Germany. To this day, Germany cannot reconstruct the trust lost internationally by creating 2 planet conflicts. What happened over a 100 years ago in the context of planet War I and over 80 years in the case of WWII. The effects of the failure of credibility affect them until now and are very specific. Germany cannot and does not have its own General Staff, and in the event of a conflict with NATO, it must waive the operational command of all combat units for NATO commanders. In another words, during the war the German army would be subject to de facto Allied leadership. For this reason, it should not be amazing that the German aversion to the financing of its own armed forces has so far occurred.

The historical consequences of the deficiency of assurance in the Berlin authorities are not limited to safety issues. Actions committed in the first half of the 20th century have an impact on the current form of German abroad policy. past hinders German politicians from freely expressing their intentions. Especially if it could be seen as a manifestation of imperial or powerful thinking. German diplomats must usage a softer language than their French colleagues, for example.

Also interesting is the instrumental treatment of historical events by parties who face force from Berlin. erstwhile Germany attempted to impose conditions on the Greeks during the negotiations on financial support for Greece (in connection with its informal bankruptcy), the government of Athens issued a bill to Berlin for the losses suffered by Greece during planet War II. Warsaw uses a akin tool. The deficiency of real resolution of war reparations by the German side exposes it – inactive 80 years after the war – to the constant return to this topic. This is not only an image problem, but besides hampers negotiations with erstwhile victims states. For this reason, Germany cannot play its interests by adopting a morally superior attitude. This card was frequently played and inactive played by Americans (not always right). Furthermore, Germany inactive has to calculate the hazard that, whenever 1 of the countries raises the issue of war reparations, another countries may issue claims for it. specified a hazard must inactive be calculated in Berlin.

Lack of organization resilience

The modern, low credibility of Germany is not due solely to the historical attitude and actions of the current Berlin authorities. It is besides about the reality of the German administration and the political sphere. These were and are inactive highly susceptible to Russian: surveillance and influence. It is adequate to remind you that there was a erstwhile German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on the Russian payroll for many years. Schroeder was given a lucrative position in Rosnieft, which he held until May 2022. At the same time, he was appointed president of the Management Board of Nord Stream 2 AG. He most likely resigned due to the fact that he was threatened with EU sanctions. The fact that a individual holding the highest and most crucial position in a country after his political career ended, went to the Russian “retirement” does not give the best evidence to specified a large and would seem a serious state as the national Republic of Germany. And although this kind of problem does not concern only Germany (but besides Austria and even Poland – vide The casus of Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz), however, is the fact that it was Russia that gained influence in Germany after 24.II.22' additional importance. But without this, it is crucial that the Russian Federation was able to bribe the most crucial politicians of the richest European state and the leader of the European Union. It should be the opposite! At least in theory, Russian politicians and officials should be given jobs in wealthy and influential Germany. In theory, due to the fact that while we all have an thought of the level of corruption in Russia, I think we are all aware of how Russian services work. What we could remember in cases involving Litvinenko, Skripal or Navalny.

In any case, German opposition to Russian influences (which come in parts besides from the erstwhile GDR) is highly doubtful. besides in the context of fresh scandals.

In October 2022 Cancelled – effective immediately – Arne Schoenbohm, Head of the national Information safety Office. A reason? A period later Condemned reserve officer Bundeswehry, who provided the Russians with information on reserves in the German army. On December 22, a national Intelligence Service (BND) worker accused of espionage was arrested. These are the last 3 months we know about. In their face, the words of John Sipher, an American intelligence specialist, a CIA expert, who in September accused German services of being useless in terms of protection against Russia take on an additional tone. Sypher straight stated‘German intelligence services are absolutely not reliable partners for RussiaIt’s okay. ”

According to Sipher's account, erstwhile Americans provided information to the German BND about the anticipation of invading Ukraine, German partners behaved very arrogantly and did not accept this information.

If we combine all the planes:

the policy of the Berlin authorities and the way it is practiced,
Germany's energy dependency on Russia,
so far and revealed Russian influences in German: politics, administration and services,

it is hard not to get a very negative impression for Germans that their country on many levels favours Russia. And any action that can be interpreted in this way is not random. This is 1 large image disaster in Germany, which results in a failure of credibility in the most crucial partners (US, UK, Central European countries, Ukraine and even France).

On specified grounds the future position of Germany as the natural leader of the European Union, which could at the same time service as an American proxy for Washington's interests in the Old Continent, cannot be built. Berlin is finished in these dimensions. The 3rd specified chance will no longer be given to Germany (1 – Obama's period and "reset", 2 – Biden's just after he took power, "America is back"). At the same time in the Union itself, Berlin's position is much weaker than before. German energy policy (putting on Nord Stream II after Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2014) and how to supply assistance Not only did Ukraine not contribute to the safety and stableness of the European Union, but, on the contrary, encouraged aggressors to hit EU interests. That's not how the community leader does it.

IN THE FIRE?

The German “turnover” on the global phase is as celebrated as it is mythographic. The Berlin authorities for decades strengthened their cooperation with Moscow, based their energy-political strategy on partnership with the Kremlin, and at the end of the day had to throw it all in the trash. Since Berlin could not decision on to the agenda over Russia's aggression into Ukraine, was the German east policy truly completely sovereign, independent and susceptible to outside pressure? Why did Berlin not block EU sanctions on Russia imposed after 2014? Why did he bow to the force of Washington and neglect to fulfill his contract with Nord Stream II? Finally, why do Germany – so energetically dependent on Russia – cut off from this origin of energy supplies and supply support to Ukraine? possibly for the same reasons why Angela Merkel endured patiently the humiliation of president Donald Trump?

Since the Berlin authorities are incapable to proceed their multi-annual political strategy after 24.II.2022, do Germany have real freedom to build partnerships with China? Is Beijing a viable alternate to Washington?

As long as Americans tolerated German-Russian friendship, then partnership on the Berlin-Moscow axis flourished. However, erstwhile the Kremlin went to war, Washington utilized all possible persuasion levels to cut Russia off from the benefits it benefited from the West deal. The Americans were able to break up the German-Russian partnership with a amazing ease. There was no 1 day, 1 incident, or 1 message from the German elite that would cast uncertainty on the course that was set in Washington. The German decision-makers did not make any proposition of opposition to the attitude imposed on them by the United States. The only thing they were able to do was tardiness and inefficiency in carrying out the activities they were expected to do. That's all.

In view of the above, it is not hard to conclude that the situation on the Berlin-Pekin line is precisely the same. Germany is trying to probe the American position by making subtle, but only formal steps towards closer relations with China. The Americans besides tolerate certain behaviours due to the fact that on any levels they gotta cooperate with China, more specifically with the Chinese economy. What happens, however, if, like Russia, the situation gets worse? Will the Americans not usage precisely the same arguments and tools to persuade Germany (but besides the EU as a whole) to build any axis on the Berlin-Pekin line?

The German ‘options’ are powerfully narrowed against appearances. German affluence in abroad policy is far insufficient compared to German ambition. It is adequate to mention that since 2015 Germany must accept the assertive attitude of Poland. An attitude that is proof and a reminder of the German disaster as regards the implementation of the east policy and the alleged project. Mitteleurops. Poland is another surviving proof of German powerlessness erstwhile it comes to opposing American interests on the Old Continent.

SUMMARY Is the German power already behind us?

Collecting all the above thesis, data and thoughts together, 1 very crucial fact needs to be highlighted. Four of the 3 German pillars and geopolitical targets collapsed. Berlin's achievements in key issues are as follows:

Project failure Mitteleuropa in political terms, failure of influence in relations with Poland, but besides weakening position in another countries of the region (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) -> the process has been going on since 2015,
The failure of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis project, meaning EuRussia from Lisbon to Vladivostok, including energy policy based on the supply of Russian natural materials, which were to be redistributed on the European marketplace by Germany, the failure to build a Russian-German energy and economical and technological partnership,
Devasting the German image as a leader of the European Union, both in economic, political and safety matters, due, inter alia, to the inept conduct of abroad policy, based on the argument of force (economic) whose effects have contributed to the outbreak of war in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU and the crisis in Europe, which can all together find the project's failure Federalisation of the European Union under the co-chair of Germany.

The last German pillar to hold on to is economical power, but this 1 depends heavy on external factors. The German economy based on production and export is highly susceptible to all kinds of stress-testing. In a planet where the most crucial German partners are at war, Germany will bear the costs of these conflicts, whether they participate actively in them (after speaking on 1 side) Or not.

It is besides clear that Berlin – unlike Paris, for example – cannot afford large assertiveness towards Washington. Faced with the failure of German abroad policy, the collapse of the credibility of German elites and state structures, as well as the dubious attitude during the trial for the Western world, 1 can anticipate that After the war in Ukraine, Germany will pay a advanced political price for its actions and omissions. Part of this price will include the natural consequences of a failed policy (loss of credibility). In my opinion, however, the settlement of allies and partners from their attitudes is already ongoing in Washington. Wartime is simply a time erstwhile forces and means must be consolidated and unity demonstrated to external threats. Peace is time to settle. In this respect, Germany seems to be inactive under the line. Like Hungary. The argument that as shortly as the time is right, the Americans will cut Berlin's loose leash so far – it does not seem to be overgrown. Especially since there will be a determination in Washington to warrant more certainty for the future erstwhile it comes to supporting partners and allies (although in the context of rivalry with China).

And in mention to China It is besides hard to defy the impression that this German turn towards the Far East – which additionally measures Americans – will besides end in disaster. This will consequence in further failure of global position and credibility.

It is not possible to conduct a abroad policy against the interests of a country on which its own depends Prosperity and safety. It is in the United States that the German economy earns the best. It's from US Navy The safety of the waterways depends. yet this US Army is stationed in Germany and now besides in Poland. What I did not compose in this article (and what is in the book) is besides due to the weakness of the Bundeswehr. due to the fact that even if the Berlin authorities had the will to conduct a completely different abroad policy, they wanted to support Poland and the Baltic states in the safety field (and thus support Ukraine, which depends on the situation of Poland's security), they would not have the tools. However, paradoxically, possible German investments in a large and strong army will not bring allies to Germany. On the contrary, specified actions (which are already announced) will alternatively be of concern. For historical reasons and deficiency of credibility.

The only beneficial and alternate solution for the Germans – in terms of safety – would be to accept a French task for the European army. The investment would not rise concerns among German partners, but would besides become a political tool and a warrant of EU security. The problem is that the thought of building a European army is against American business... Again, we return to the question of whether this fact was the origin of the fact that specified an army had not yet been created, and the Germans referred to the thought in a restrained or skeptical way?

PROGNOSIS – Overturning ambition and emergency option

At the outset, it should be stated that the forecasting of anything is subject to advanced risks, and the thesis and conjecture put forward by the author should be regarded as intellectual entertainment. And not make decisions on the basis of them, especially financial decisions.

At the same time, it is besides worth mentioning another issue that is not described in this article (and what is in the book). Germany as a nation is at this very circumstantial minute in past at which they will gotta decide their identity. Historical patterns were rejected for natural reasons. The erstwhile Prussian militarism was replaced by the thought of pacifism. At the same time, the national Republic of Germany is simply a country with a large proportion of immigrants and immigrants. There are wars in its territory which Germany is simply a hostage. spiritual but national conflicts (e.g. Kurds vs Turks). frequently there are riots, street brawls, and manifestations of spiritual and cultural minorities. In addition, through immigrant environments, abroad countries (e.g. Turkey) gain their influence in Germany, which sometimes translates into a negative impact on interior safety in Germany.

The social structure of Germany is changing, which has and will have an expanding impact on national policies. Germany will face an identity crisis that will affect abroad policy. How will many cultural and spiritual minorities identify with the German national interest in abroad policy? There are also levels, including military ones. Even now, the Bundeswehra has major recruitment problems, and the thought of hiring immigrants in the army is being thrown completely seriously. This is all to be remembered, as the social situation will play its function across the state.

With all this (and not only this) in mind, Germany's global position, including this regional EU/European position, can be expected to weaken. Germany will not be able to subdue Mitteleuropa and strengthen its position in the European Union. In particular, the European Central Bank, which, although placed in the German Frankfurt am Main, is managed by representatives of countries with advanced public debt. Nor is large advancement expected on the federalisation of Europe. Berlin's egoistic policy: "stronger is right" did not favour Germany. Yes, in Central Europe, in the Balkans, but besides among "south" people, Italy, Spain, Greece or Portugal. There is besides no return to a strategical partnership with Russia. At the same time, turning towards China seems unrealistic.

Business as user?

The German attitude towards Russia and the war in Ukraine so far dictates to believe that Berlin decision-makers (not only them) are inactive reasoning about what the post-conflict government will look like. And it can be assumed that Germany is inactive counting on the return of the world, in which the Berlin-Moscow axis will return to the wallpaper. Will that truly happen?

In my opinion, German calculations in this area are a dream. If Russia wins in Ukraine and takes control of Kiev – what's truly going on in the war – then the Western planet under the leadership of the US will proceed a hard line towards Moscow. What I wrote and explained many times. Americans cannot afford to neglect with weak Russia in a situation where they must show power to their allies in the context of the conflict against China. Washington will be ready to starve Russia, and this would mean further years of isolation of Moscow, sanctions, embargoes and the inability to import Russian natural materials – as Germany can number on. Thus, even in the favorable variant of events in Ukraine, Russia is finished (as I explained in the April text: "The Russian Federation has already lost – the question of how much more harm can it do?It is not known whether or not you are taking advantage of me. In 10-15 years Moscow – due to its powerful interior problems – will not be a partner for anyone to talk or form geopolitical structures. On the contrary, the full of the European Union and Germany may not even want to engage in a falling Russia relationship, which will only be a burden for possible partners.

On the another hand, erstwhile Russia loses in Ukraine (which will alternatively be presented as a draw, but the Kremlin's goals will not be achieved) and there will be any peace treaty on the West&Ukraine – Russia, the Kremlin's position will then be incredibly weak. Firstly, Putin's failure can lead to an interior power conflict, which may end in the dissolution of Russia. Secondly, the war defeat can velocity up the outbreak of many interior crises that digest the Russian Federation (financial and economic, technological, social etc.). Thirdly, Moscow, whose West dictates peace conditions, will be a geopolitical dwarf erstwhile it comes to global adversities.

Let us add to that the fact that Nord Streamy has been damaged, and the only land-based pipeline and pipeline connections between Russia and Germany run through Poland and Ukraine. After the winning war with Russia, Warsaw and Kiev will decide whether and in general it will be possible to transfer Russian gas and oil to the west. This will be very problematic for Berlin, due to the fact that Poland is already becoming independent of supplies from Russia, so the authorities from Warsaw will be able to block Russian gas. Ukrainians are besides fighting for full independency from Russian natural material. As far as oil is concerned, Refinery in Gdańsk uses only half the processing capacity to meet the needs of the Polish market. In another words, if Poland guarantees itself contracts to supply oil across the sea (e.g. from the Persian Gulf, but besides from the US) – what is already happening at the minute – then the oil “Friendship” will besides not flow a drop of Russian black gold.

In another words, for completely nonsubjective reasons, it will depend mainly on Poland and Ukraine German-Russian deal for oil and gas supply through pipelines. In specified a situation, a long-term political and energy strategy cannot be planned. At most, you can conclude ad hoc contracts or agreements with the agreement of Warsaw/Kijów, but with the cognition that the origin of supplies is not completely controlled by Berlin or Moscow. In another words, the national Republic Germany is fundamentally doomed to a strategy in which it must build independency from Russian energy resources. This in turn will weaken the common interest between Berlin and Moscow. At the same time, the common Polish-Ukrainian interest in energy policy will form a political partnership on the Warsaw-Kijów line. Even the informal block of Poland and Ukraine can constitute a serious obstacle to the possible construction of even purely political cooperation between Germany and Russia. Especially erstwhile Poland and Ukraine will not be delicate to losing Russia's respect and will not be afraid to present an assertive or even opposing attitude towards the Kremlin. In specified a situation, Germany will not have anything to look for in a strategical partnership with Russia, as Moscow will not be able to warrant Berlin neither the supply of energy resources nor the adequate political power to influence the full alleged Intermortal. Making a long talk short. Russia will be a geopolitical bankrupte who, in exchange for German money and technology, will not be able to offer anything. So from Germany's perspective, why invest in specified a bankrupt man?

This will bring about a fresh situation for the Germans, in which they will lose their partner to joint management Mitteleurope (it has already happened). Without a strong and threatening Moscow's neighbours (the bogeyman), Germany will not be able to break the assertive attitude of Warsaw. Argument: "Be better with us, due to the fact that the Russians will come for you" will no longer work. Thus, the goal of building a political Mitteleuropa (because the economical 1 has already been created) should be considered to be not realistic. If so, Germany will not be able to see its sphere of influence widened both in the east direction and in the European Union itself. Their position towards the “south” or even France itself will simply weaken (it has already happened and possibly Olaf Scholz's lonely journey to Beijing was a desperate effort to regain his position).

In conclusion, after the war in Ukraine – regardless of the variant of events – Germany cannot number on the effectiveness of its east policy in the average and long term. In the variant of Russia's war defeat, in the short term, Germany may effort to drag Ukraine (using German and EU money) to play politically Warsaw, but this is not adequate to build Mitteleuropa, and to return to Berlin-Moscow axis. due to the fact that German attempts to recreate the second will always lead to closer cooperation on the Warsaw-Kijów line. As a result, it will weaken Germany's position even towards Poland itself. Business as user with Russia, within the meaning of energy strategy and building the political block of EuRussia, they have no chance of being implemented. Especially since this kind of script will be torpedoed by the United States. Washington will always be betting on Warsaw to block specified ideas. And that is what will happen, due to the fact that the US is no longer counting on Russia to "bring" Russia on its side against China. After Putin broke the first reset and after the fresh invasion of Ukraine in Washington, it was understood that Russia is not and will not be any reliable partner for the future. Russia must be neutralized so that it cannot interfere with the confrontation with China and strengthen Beijing. What I have besides written many times about, for example in the 2019 text: "US is going to beat Russia. There will be no reset’.

So Russia, left to itself, after losing the war in Ukraine and with immense interior problems, will be no partner for the US or even for Germany. And even if the second thought otherwise, the Americans would block any initiative to rebuild the concept of EuRussia. Which is another argument for the fact that the German east Policy in its present form is over.

Two-speed Union – a political bloc within the EU?

In view of all the failures and full failure of the political line, German decision-makers will in the following years consider developing a fresh political strategy for Germany. It will be a time of real (and not only apparent) revision of the ideas about the future of Germany, their function and their position in the European Union. What we can be certain is to launch a billing process, the calculation of which will answer the question of whether Germany will inactive be able to proceed the European Union task in the form it is, or to think of an emergency option in the future (as the EU cannot be transformed). And if so, how is this emergency option expected to look?

In trying to answer this question, it should be noted that the implementation of the task Mitteleurops to give Berlin arguments to manage the unruly and indebted EU south. At the same time, the failure of this task most likely means veto to build the EU federation, but besides to grow the euro area. In the face of all this, Germany may lose hope of obtaining blocking mechanisms for processes that lead to an economical cost of maintaining debts incurred by the “Southers” of the euro area.

In the face of the political reluctance of the countries of Central Europe (with Poland at the head) and the economical burden in the form of states from the south of the Union, Berlin decision-makers can truly start reasoning about the two-speed union task in a alternatively narrow sense. Let us remind you that this is an thought put forward in 2017 by politicians from Luxembourg and then Belgium, which assumes any kind of block within the European Union. This block could be composed of the Benelux States (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), Germany and France. That would mean de facto the breakdown of the European Union, only that without official: "we are turning off the light".

However, before that happens, at least 1 more effort by Germany to gain EU dominance is expected. Berlin can look at its chance – paradoxically – to bring Ukraine into the European Union. Germany may believe that Kiev's addiction to the EU financial drip will give them political control of Ukraine. However, this can only give effect in the short term, until Ukraine is back on its feet. In the average and long term, it is in Kiev's interest to focus on Warsaw. For example:

a community of safety interests (Russia),
a community of interests in the blocking of the Berlin-Moscow axis,
the fact that the merger with the EU and its marketplace will lead through Poland and that Poland will bring Ukraine into the Union (perhaps not the only one, but we will become an crucial intermediary),
the credibility of Warsaw as a partner on which you can trust at the most hard moments (vide post-invasion attitude with 24.II.22’).

What I wrote in my last analysis was: “Ukraine will be a burden for Poland – east strategy of Poland after the warIt’s okay. ”

Given all of this, 1 can boldly presume that The national Republic of Germany is the biggest political victim of Russian aggression against Ukraine among the states in the European Union... Vladimir Putin not only put the destiny of the Russian Federation on the war card, but also, like a bridge player, bid the interests and geopolitical plans of a German partner.

Krzysztof Wojchal

geopolitics, politics, economy, law, taxes – blog

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