Argentine Geopolitics School

The primaries of Argentine geopolitical thought are born in the 19th century, against the background of organization and spatial improvement of the Argentine state itself. On 25 May 1810, it gained independency as the United Provinces of Río de la Plata (Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata) on the road of the alleged May Revolution (Revolución de Mayo) from the Spanish Viceroy of Río de la Plata existing since 1776. However, in May 1811 he declared independency to Paraguay, and in August 1825 – Bolivia, thus breaking out of Buenos Aires' power. The name "United Provinces of South America" (Provincias Unidas de Sud América) was besides utilized interchangeably, which reflected Buenos Aires's aspirations for political control of the isolated periphery of the erstwhile Viceroy of Río de la Plata and for the political integration of the South American advanced level.

Another form of Argentine statehood was the Argentine Confederation (Confederación Argentina), existing from 1831 to 1861. The word “Argentinian Federation” (Federación Argentina) was utilized interchangeably at the time, reflecting the conflict between supporters of the centralisation of the state and advocates of a looser form of binding its province. A typical of the Argentine Confederation in external relations was the politician of Buenos Aires from 1835 to 1852, Juan Manuel de Rosas (1793 to 1877). After losing Buenos Aires forces at the conflict of Caseros in February 1852, Justo José de Urquiza y García, the erstwhile politician of Entre Ríos Province, took over. It led to the adoption of the Constitution of 1853, which in turn resulted in the secession of Buenos Aires, existing as an independent state (Estado de Buenos Ayres) to the victorious conflict of Pavón in September 1861 erstwhile it joined the defeated arm of the Argentine Confederation as its dominant entity. The last change of the name of the State to the Argentine Republic (República Argentina) in December 1861 was the result.

Julio Argentino Roca (1843–1914) played a immense function in forming the territory of Argentina, the author of the 1879-1884 wars with Mapuchas (the alleged "conquest of the desert", the Spanish Conquista del desierto) and the dominant character in Argentine politics from 1880 to 1904. The establishment of Argentine statehood in its now known form can only be spoken of since the end of the “conquest of the desert”, so since the mid-1980s. In 1867 president Bartolomé Mitre Martínez issued a decree giving farmers and cattle farmers the right to occupy the land in Pampas and Patagonia. In 1879, the 8 thousand-soldier Argentine forces began aggression against Mapuchów office south of Río Negro. After winning at a cost of 1.5 million. pesos campaign, 20 million. ha was distributed among the 500 closest contributors of J. A. Roca, and designation of earlier title ownership extended the effective control of Buenos Aires into these territories.

Natural conditions of Argentina

The emergence of geopolitical thought in Argentina was understandable, given the excellent geopolitical conditions of that country. Argentina is 1 of the most geopolitically isolated countries in the world. After eliminating the Brazilian threat in Guerra da Cisplatina (1825-1828) and Paraguayan in the Paraguayan War (1864-1870), the origin of the direct territorial threat to Argentina remained only 12,000 km away. The UK, since 1833, maintaining colonial power over the Malvins, an effort of armed liberation which by Argentina ended with the defeat of Buenos Aires in 1982, did not endanger the continental geopolitical core of the Argentine State.

The Argentines besides favour natural conditions. Unlike the remainder of the South American continent, the tropical climate is not dominant in Argentina, and the dominant plant formation is not tropical formation. The Argentine years are dry adequate to grow the seeds of conventional crops. Winters are cool adequate to destruct insects carrying germs that are dangerous to humans and livestock. The territory of the state is an extensive, flat, moderately hydrated plain. Equal surface formation, combined with prairie vegetation and average climate, makes Argentina 1 of the world's most fertile agricultural zones. The La Plata river system, created by the rivers Paraná, Paraguay, Uruguay and the estuary of Río de la Plata, is floated almost over the full length, and, along with its connecting rivers through canals and sluices, is 1 of the most extended river transport systems in the planet – the mouth of which is geopolitically controlled by Argentina.

The interior communication of the La Platy region allows to trigger the effect of economies of scale, make more capital and feed larger populations than in tropical or Andean countries of South America. Argentina is privileged in terms of transport conditions produced in the La Platy region of goods. Transport by waterways is 10 to 30 times cheaper than transport by land roads. The transport network of the La Plata river strategy so allows to make large amounts of capital at much smaller costs than for land transport. Among another things, road infrastructure needs to be built. However, the cost of building land infrastructure is besides reduced by a level playing field and good communication with ocean ports. River transport besides increases the profitability of exports of Argentine agricultural products specified as soya, corn or wheat, where the volume-to-value ratio makes it unprofitable to transport them by land over long distances.

Integrating the river strategy and plain surface formation besides promotes the emergence of a unified political power, in which Argentine conditions contrast e.g. with Eurasian conditions, where the meridian river network led to education along different rivers of separate, hostile political organisms. The only political organism whose full territory is located in South Cone (Cono Sur) of South America is Chile, separated from Argentina by a scope of nearly 7,000 metres above sea level. The Andes; a cruise from Santiago de Chile to Buenos Aires takes more time than a cruise from London to fresh York, Chile is so not a rival to Argentina that threatens its geopolitical core.

Argentine geopolitics precursors

During the formation of the Argentine statehood in the 19th century, works specified as “Argiropolis: O la Capital de los Estados Confederados del Rio del Plata” (1850) by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811-1888), later president of Argentina from 1868 to 1874, were created erstwhile the last regional caudillos were defeated. The author argued in favour of the establishment of a fresh country capital on the island of Martín García on Río de la Plata, so as to give impetus to further integration of the lands of the erstwhile Viceroy of Río de la Plata. He advocated drawing from the unifying traditions of European liberalism to overcome the heritage of the Spanish Empire and its origin caudillismo. The emblematic example of the provincial caudillo was for D. F. Sarmietnto the long-term politician of Buenos Aires, J. M. de Rosas – for his regulation the power was concentrated in the hands of privileged oligarchy, which, according to the author of “Argiropolis”, was an obstacle to the education of national sense and the awareness of the integrated state territory among Argentines.

To grow the Argentine State's organization strength to more effectively bind to Buenos Aires lands historically forming part of the Viceroy of Río de la Plata, he called on the administration of J. A. Roca in his work “Reconstruction Geografico de America del Sur” (1879) nationalist author Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884). Like D. F. Sarmiento, so J. B. Alberdi pointed out the threat of a reduced civic sense and recognition of state Argentines in the absence of a participatory political and social system. In the second half of the 19th century, further Argentine governments tried to remedy this by expanding patriotic and national indoctrination in state education. The impression was that Aregentine and her territory were constantly threatened by strong and expansive force centers: Brazilian, Chilean and British. At the beginning of the 20th century, the patriotic Argentine communicative highlighted the large economical successes of the country in the 19th century, against which the UK and the USA were against in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1833, the English picked up the Malwin archipelago from Argentina, while the origin of possible economical recovery could be for Buenos Aires the exlocation of undeveloped or underdeveloped areas specified as Patagonia, oceans, or Antarctica. Turning to them would aid to educate the national thought of the Aregntian and gain its rightful place for Argentina in planet politics.

General characteristics of Argentine geopolitics school

Of the Latin American countries with their achievements in geopolitical thought, only Argentina, alongside Brazil, created its own school. Argentinian thought represents an internally coherent doctrine; it has a past that goes deep into the past; it is made up of many representatives; and has a crucial influence on the interior and abroad policies of the state. Published in Argentina from 1969 to 1983, the periodical “Estrategy” represented in its field the highest substantive level in Latin America, and most most likely in the world.

The main areas of interest in Argentina's geopolitics school are: the expansion of Brazil and its pursuit of hegemony; the concern of the Brazilian alliance with the US; the function of Argentina as the natural leader of the confederate Cone region; maritime orientation with a peculiar focus on the South Atlantic, the liberation of Malwin from British colonialism, and the safeguarding of Argentina's rights in Antarctica; atomic energy and the acquisition of its own atomic weapons, in peculiar in the event of Brazil's development; the impact of external centres on Argentina's interior situation and its possible for national development. A characteristic feature of the Argentine geopolitics school is besides a affirmative attitude towards the German geopolitics school, even after Germany lost in 2 successive planet wars.

Particular attention is given to maritime and oceanic issues in Argentina's geopolitics school; the function of Argentina as a maritime state, according to its peculiar position in the “Equatic Hemispheric Hemispheric School” (i.e. southern); the peculiar work of Argentina as a centre of control of strategical “entry” and “exit” of the South Atlantic; the dominance of Argentina over the Magellana Strait and the Cape of Good Hope, which would have gained peculiar importance in the event of the closure of the Panama Canal; the strategical importance of the Malwin archipelago and the necessity to liberate them from British colonialism; the current and possible strategical importance of Antarctica and the request to safeguard Argentina's rights towards it vis-à-vis another force centres.

Beginnings of Argentine Geopolitics School

The first Argentine author, clearly inspired by the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical thought – specifically by the works of the Englishman, Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947) and the Yankee, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) – was Admiral Segundo Storni (1876-1954). His work “Intereses Argentinos en la Mar” (1916) is considered a precursor to the Argentine geopolitics school. The author points out various trade routes and geographical regions in the planet Ocean. The Atlantic and Pacific consider undeveloped spaces as the natural direction of the expansion of the economically strong Argentine state, leading in the 19th century in exports of maize, flaxseed, beef and wheat. It is incorrect that Argentina, depending on the maritime transport network and maritime trade, has not so far shown any interest in maritime areas. The seas and oceans surrounding Argentina can not only become additional economical assets for it, but besides expansion in their area can become an axis for forming the national Argentine idea. To be effective on the seas, Argentina should make a strong manufacture and modern technologically armed forces. The improvement of Argentine trade and maritime transport should be accompanied by the improvement of Argentine fishing and the fish processing industry.

The shift of Argentine interests towards the German geopolitics school took place in the years ’20 and ’30 of the 20th century, erstwhile the political situation in the country began to be subject to degradation during the inept regulation of the small-town Radicals (1916-1930) and the proliferation of labor-related occurrences, causing force and chaos in the streets, and disrupting the functioning of the economy. The confusion further deepened after the 1929 economical crisis, which marks the beginning of the alleged “disgraceful decade” (Décade Infame) from 1930 to 1943, erstwhile a large part of the Argentine average and labour layers were plunged into economical ruin and pushed into misery. On this background, there was increasing uncertainty about liberal democracy and capitalism, considered unstable, ineffective and generating political and social chaos. A symbol of the collapse of assurance in democracy was the overthrow by military petty-radical president Hippolito Yrigoyen (1852-1933) in September 1930.

The inspiration for an alternate imagination of the state as an organism provided a German thought. In 1900, president J. A. Roca formed the Higher War School (Escuela Superior de Guerra) in Buenos Aires. A year later, her Dean was German Colonel (then General) Alfred Arent, later author dedicated to Argentina's work “Land der Zukunf” (1905). For the first decade of the 20th century, half of the staff of the Higher War School, educated on two-year courses of Argentine officers, were military from Germany. German officers, specified as Johannes Kretzchmar, continued their work in Argentina until the 1940s, creating a disciplined hierarchical structure in the Argentine armed forces. At that time, the Argentine Army allowed only Catholics to enter the officers' ranks, and 1 of the pupils of the Higher War School was the later leader of Argentina, Juan Domingo Perón (1895-1974) who visited Italy and Germany in 1938, where he consulted the strategy of fighting in the mountains and geopolitics. Upon his return to Argentina, J. D. Perón was appointed commander of the Mendoza Mountain Unit and wrote a number of popular articles and books on planet War I, the past of the 19th century, and military strategy issues.

The worldview of the Argentine armed forces during this period can be described as saturated with the theories of social Darwinism, the organic state of Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), Catholicism, anti-communism, nationalism developing lushly in the face of adverse trade relations with the UK, as well as the reluctance to demoliberism, burdened with work for the state's weakness and the activities of corrupt political parties. The issue of national safety was seen against the background of an organic imagination of the Argentine Republic, in which individual rights had to yield to the well-being of the congregation. Argentine officers specified as Gen. Juan Bautista Molina, saw themselves as the nation's saviors in the face of the threat of communism and demoliberous decadence and decay.

German geopolitical thought readers in Argentina were able to read through the work of Richard Hennig and Leo Korholz “Einfuhrung in die Geopolitik” (1934), which was published in the Spanish translation in 1941 as “Introduccion a la geopolitica”. The book's lead thesis on the organic state and the request to have a strong army, which guarantees safety in times of uncertainty, found supporters in the Argentine officer corps. The work of Brazilian geopolitics, Mário Travassos (1891-1973), Projeção Continental do Brasil (1938), emphasizing the explanation of the “moving frontier” as an expression of the state's strength which the Argentines adapted for the purposes of their own patagonian and Antarctic peripheries, was a akin success. In the 1930s and 1940s, Argentine authors follow closely the methodological and doctrinal framework outlined by Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) and his disciples.

The interest in Antarctica increased markedly in Buenos Aires following the coup d'état of the United Officers Group (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos) in June 1943, and especially after being taken over in 1946 by its erstwhile associate Juan Domingo Perón, who was the head of the Argentine State until 1955. The geopolitical thought of J. D. Perón characterizes the belief that Argentina has become a victim of British colonial aggression in the Malwins and Antarctica, that it should stay neutral in the face of the conflicts of states from the Northern Hemisphere, and that it should accomplish geoeconomic self-sufficiency.

In 1948, J. D. Perón ordered the Institute of Military Geography to make maps of the Argentine Republic covering Malwiny and Antártida Argentina. All maps of Argentina published under J. D. Perón must have included the Argentine Antarctic sector and Malwina. British and Chilean claims to Antarctica were considered illegal or even considered to be outright. The concept of “Tricontinental Argentina” was created, consisting of a circumstantial part in the form of the Argentine Republic, Malwina, and Argentine Antarctic. In 1946 this concept was introduced into school education. A separate Ministry of Malvin and Argentine Antarctic was established in 1947. The thought of “tricontinental Argentina” was then reproduced on Argentine postage stamps, atlases and murals.

In the peronistic narrative, Argentina was a victim of the colonial partition and usurpation of its lands through the UK. Its respective territory, including island and Antarctic territories, grew virtually from 2.8 million km2 to 4 million km2. The rich, overcrowded and industrialised northern states threatened Argentina's economical sovereignty over its natural resources and its emerging industry. The publications appearing during this period, specified as “Diccionario Histórico Argentina”, duplicated the Argentine geopolitical code defined by J. D. Perón. The work of J. E. Jasón and L. Perlinger “Geopolitica” (1948) and Major Emilio Isoli and Colonel Angela Barry “Introducción a la Geopolítica Argentina” (1950), where the most crucial theories of European geopolitics were reported from the Argentine perspective. The work of Spanish author Vicens Vives “Tratado general de geopolítica” (Argentinian edition 1950) and Alberta Escalony Ramosa “Geopolitica mundial y geoeconomica” (1959).

National safety Doctrines

After planet War II, doctrines of national safety were extensively developed in Argentine military circles, responding to the recognition of the alleged communist threat in events specified as Bogotazo (1948) in Colombia, the Cuban Revolution (1959) and the defeat of the US in the Bay of Pigs (1961), or Ernesto “Che” Guevary (1928-1967). Inspirations for publications published in “Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra” provided contacts with participants in French military missions in the 1950s; consultations on geopolitics, national security, economical and social improvement and strategies with military countries specified as Brazil, Chile, Peru or Venezuela; training of Argentine officers and military specialists in specified Yankee institutions as the School of America in Georgia and the Inter-American Defence College; studies created in the ellipse of Brazilian geopolitics school, in peculiar works by Gen. Golbera to Couto e Silva (1911-1987).

In the case of Argentina, national safety doctrines have highlighted the threat to society and the economy by subversive currents aimed at destabilising the state and its space and undermining Christian and Western values. The military sought to establish cooperation with industrial and commercial circles, and to identify and destruct subversive tendencies. The military intervened in the political process in 1963, 1966 and 1976, explaining this by the necessity of countering communist aggression and economical crisis. Political instability, labour strikes and unrest of the 1960s and the 1970s were evidences for the military Argentines of the existence of centrifugal trends threatening the full body of society – from household to individual economical branches and the Catholic Church to the end. Military leaders specified as Juan Carlos Onganía (1966-1970), Jorge Rafael Videla (1976-1981), or Roberto Eduardo Viola (March-December 1981) treated the occurrence of these centrifugal processes as “a challenge” for the Argentines, the answer to which would be a fresh axis of national integration for them.

Classics of Argentine Geopolitics School

New institutions were established in Buenos Aires to supply analysis and expert comments on the situation of Argentina and the challenges facing the state: Institute Argentina de Estudios Estrategicos y de las Relaciones Internationales (INSAC), Institute de Estudios Geopoliticos (IDEG), and the National improvement Agency and preparing for abroad service the Argentine abroad Service Institute. From 1969 to 1983, INSAC issued an influential periodical “Estratégia” (presumably the leading geopolitical magazine in the world), including geopolitical issues specified as the improvement of Patagonia; securing Argentina's position in the Río de la Plata pool, in the Malwin archipelago, in the Beagle Canal, or in the Antarctic; and stopping the expansion of rival strength centres specified as the UK, Chile, or Brazil. Under the name IDEG, the letter “Geopolítica” appeared, where stronger emphasis was placed on the interior integration of the different territories of Argentina. This title addresses topics specified as regional integration, national improvement and global cooperation.

Issues specified as the threat of the Argentine territories by the UK, Chile and Brazil; increasing discontent with the inept civilian rule; finally, the alleged communist threat and the russian Union posed a climate of uncertainty in the 1960s and 1970s, under which a convenient environment for the improvement of geopolitical doctrines was created. Among the geopolitical works written during this period is “Qué es la geopolítica?” (1965) Col. Jorge E. Atencio, arguing that geopolitics should supply guidance to statesmen, identifying the territorial and natural needs of the state. This author besides defended German geopolitics against allegations of specified Yankee authors as Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950) and Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903-2002), noting that the usage of geopolitics by fascists does not overturn the legitimacy of taking the spatial origin into account in reasoning about politics. The discrimination between German military thought and the category of Fascism and Nazism was besides present in the wider circles of Argentine military; the German military thought was given large confidence, while fascism was pointed out by weakness in the form of lifting unpredictable and irrational leaders to power. The approach of J. E. Atencio, portraying Argentina in his book as the possible major maritime power in the South Atlantic and Antarctica area, fits this trend.

Another drawing attention to the survey from this period is the “Estrategy of y Poder Militar” (1965) by Advocate Fernando A. Mill, where the tradition of German geopolitics is besides cited, but the author does not present expansionist projects, but argues for the request to make the state's periphery – including the Malwin archipelago and the Argentine Antarctic, whose importance would increase even more if the Panama Canal were closed. Argentina is seen here as a maritime and semi-island state, and communicative is carried out from a thalassocrat position. A memorial is besides worth the work “Geopolítica y geostrategia americana” (1966) Justo P. Briano. The author argued there in defence of his interest in German geopolitical doctrines, as well as for the adaptation of Yankee and Brazilian theories to prepare Argentina to play a leading function in global relations.

The most crucial character of the Argentine geopolitics school was Gen. Juan E. Gugliamelli, commander of the 5th Army corps, Rector of the Higher War School, associate of the military government of J. C. Ongania, and editor-in-chief of the periodical “Estratégia”. As an officer, he was liable for peripheral regions of the country specified as Patagonia and the Atlantic. Argentina was seen as a peninsulad state, with distant peripheral regions in the north and south. To prevent Argentina's sovereignty being undermined by competitive force centres, Buenos Aires must safe and invest and make these outermost regions. The concepts of J. E. Gugliamelli meet the German concept of an organic state and the South American (Peronist) explanation of dependence (dependent) and the thought of fighting for geoeconomic subjectivity.

The most crucial work of J. E. Gugliamelli is “Geopolítica del Cono Sur”(1983), where he argues that the structure of Argentine exports, where the most crucial place is taken by agricultural crops, exposes the country to the hazard of dependence on external centres, narrows the field of free political decisions, and does not let to meet the needs of prosperity and well-being. With respect to the national safety area, it limits the freedom of strategical action, creates spaces susceptible to unscathed stimuli in the relations of the South Cone States of the South American continent (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, the historical core of Brazil in the southwest of that country). In interior politics, this threatens Argentina with permanent social instability and left-wing agitation.

J. E. Gugliamelli's peculiar interest is Brazilian expansionism, dating back to the expeditions of bandeirantes, extending the effective power of Rio de Janeiro1 much further west than foreseen by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). This trend continued with the “father of Brazilian diplomacy”, Baron Rio Branco2 (Minister of abroad Affairs of Brazil from 1902 to 1912), whose doctrine of abroad policy included: the extension of Brazil’s “natural borders”; control of buffers Paraguay and Uruguay; weakening Argentina — especially in Misiones Province; replacing the UK as Brazil’s most crucial ally. J. E. Gugliamelli besides argued with M. Travassos, cautioning against his geopolitical doctrine of Brazil's expansion on the east-west axis, towards Bolivia, which aimed at breaking Bolivia's conventional communication axis on the north-south line, through the La Plata River System.

In many articles published in “Estrategia”, J. E. Gugliamelli addressed issues specified as: the threat posed by the Brazilian-German atomic agreement (1975); the built by Brazil from 1975 to 1983 by the water power plant Itaipú on Río Paraná; he conducted criticism of the geopolitical explanation of M. Travassos and G. de Couto e Silva; he besides advocated the adaptation of the explanation of boundaries by the second for the purposes of Argentine geopolitics; he criticized Brazil's close relation with the US and proposed Brasília “soy for liberation”, in case she decided to quit close ties with Washington, in another case, while respecting “open confrontation”3.

In a akin tone, Julio E. Sanguinetti wrote, drawing attention to “Estrategy”4the importance of Brazil's alliance with the US. Brazil is simply a satellite of the United States AP, associated with the ties of subservience and unilateral and uneven dependence. This has strategical but besides economical reasons: the US needs Brazil to extend its defence lines from Natal to the Cape of Good Hope; they must besides guarantee that Brazil does not become a communist state, as this could jeopardise the confederate flank of the US and act as a catalyst for a revolution of the same character in the remainder of Latin America, Brazil is yet in the sphere of economical influence and dominance of the US. Brazil is 1 of the “key countries” to the global dominance of Washington, sharing this position with West Germany, Taiwan and another countries.

In turn, Colonel Augusto B. Rattenbach pointed out5 to the cooperation of the US and Brazil arms industries and to the export of Brazilian weapons and weapons as an expression of Washington's imperialism and sub-imperialism and its instrumentalized sub-imperialism. The Brazilian arms manufacture is an extension of the Yankee military-industrial complex, and Brazil's sale of its products to neighbouring Spanish-speaking countries is yet another manifestation of the expansionism of the Portuguese-speaking giant, which is active in the construction of Anglo-Saxon dominance over the South American continent.

A. Bianchi warned against the dominance of Brazil in the South Atlantic. Oscar Camillion pointed to the geopolitical axis of Washington-Brasília and its importance for the relations of Brasília-Buenos Aires, while stressing that Argentina's weaker position in this arrangement of forces is partially blamed by the weak interior geopolitical coherence of the Argentine State. Nicolás Boscovich analysed Brazil's expansion in the La Plata pool and suggested to counter it that Bolivia be made available to the ocean via the Argentine Bermejo River, and thus under the control of Buenos Aires. Col. Florentino Diaz Loza besides portrayed Brazil as a tool in Washington's hands, and her aspirations as “subimperialism” of the USA. Andrés Fernandez Cendoya in the mid-1970s pointed to the conversion of Bolivia into a Brasília pawn and warned against Argentina's anti-Argentine alliance of Brazil and Chile. Eduardo Machicote criticized G. de Couto e Silva's theories and doctrine as serving the American imperialism in reality. Carlos P. Mastrorilli besides criticized Brazil for utilizing the US, as well as polematically referring to the writings of Brazilian geopolitics, Carlos de Meira Mattosa (1913-2007).

Armado Alonso Piñeiro warned against Brazil's expansion in buffer states specified as Bolivia and Paraguay, as well as recommending Argentina to lead the integration of Spanish-speaking countries, which would counterweight the US-Brazil axis. Admiral Isaac F. Rojas has threatened the threats posed by the expansion of Brazil in the La Plata region and implemented hydroelectric projects there by Brasília; the Brazilian plan of the dam and hydroelectric plant Itaipú requires the approval of Buenos Aires, due to its impact on the Argentine plan of the Corpus Dam. Argentina should start exploiting its electricity potential, which is crucial in the face of the crisis of access to energy sources. Commander Rolando Segundo Siloni conducted a historical analysis of the Louisiana-Brazilian expansion in the La Plata pool.

J. E. Gugliamelli's Theories besides had an inspiring effect on another representatives of the Argentine geopolitics school, specified as Gen. Osiris Guillermo Villegas (1916-1998), Minister of the Interior, then a key negotiator in discussions on the resolution of the Beagle Canal crisis (1978). INSAC co-worker Gen. J. T. Goyret, author of the work “Geopolítica y subversión” (1980), where he adapts to the needs of Argentine national safety explanation binding strategical variables to economical and social variables by G. de Couto e Silva. In his writing “Armas y Geoestrategia” he stressed the request to link military safety and improvement issues in his thoughts, and to guarantee the improvement of marginalised regions to counter threats to state safety both inside and outside the Argentine Republic.

Economist and geopoliticist Carlos Juan Moneta in 1975 argued for Buenos Aires' taking over material power over the Malvins, and for the request to defend the South Atlantic against communist and Brazilian penetrations. C. J. Moneta warned that Brazil would effort to extend its business over Antártida Argentina until 1990, as Brazilian military realize the importance of the polar continent and Drake Strait. Buenos Aires' interests in the Antarctic region are besides to be threatened by Washington and Moscow. Authors specified as Vicente Palermo (born 1951), F. A. Millia, or Pablo Sanz indicated that the improvement of surrounding Argentine oceanic areas would become an impulse for unprecedented economical development, and would give Argentina a historical mission, adding its importance to the household of Christian Western nations. During this period, Argentine military circles sought to build, with the aid of the US, the confederate Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) to counter the communist and alleged russian diversion in the region.

A completely different, continental and emancipative line was represented, connected with the writing of “Geopolítica”, Gustavo F. J. Cirigliano, author of the work “La Argentina triangular : geopolítica y proyecto nacional” (1975). He advocated overcoming 2 geopolitical weaknesses in Argentina: the underdevelopment of “open spaces” in Patagonia and Antarctica, and the excessive demographic and industrial concentration in Buenos Aires Province. Integrating its periphery and achieving a balance as a national state, Argentina was to “repair its geography and history”. In the global dimension, G. F. J. Cirigliano advocated regional Latin American integration and a policy of non-involvement in the Cold War. Argentina would take the lead of the confederate Concave States, which would be freed from US influence. The improvement of the confederate cone would be carried out in the geopolitical triangle of strategical axes dominated by Buenos Aires: the river axis (Río de la Plata), the Andean axis (north-west Argentina, Chile, Peru), and the confederate axis (The Magellana Strait, Malwiny, Antarctica). The blame for Argentina's erstwhile failures on the way to power are the USA and the UK.

The importance of national integration and interior order in the state for its geopolitical cohesion was stressed by Basail Miguel Angel. The defence of Argentina's rights to the South Atlantic, the Malvins and the Argentine Antarctic, and the importance of these areas in the event of the closure of the Panama Canal was represented by Juan B. Bessone. In his work “Geopolítica de la liberación” (1972) Norberto Ceresole: The Talassocratic Axis of Washington-Brasília maintains an advantage in the seas, Argentina should so take the lead in the Tellurocratic integration of the Spanish-speaking countries of South America. Kmdr. Benjamín Cosentino stressed the historical, geopolitical and strategical importance of the Malwins and the South Atlantic. Héctor Gómez Rueda proposed building the meaning and size of Argentina through its integration with neighbouring countries. akin recommendations were made by Jorge Nelson Gualco, proposing South American integration under the Argentina wire, with the exclusion of Brazil, whose improvement model criticized as neocapitalist and subordinate to US interests. The emancipation of Argentina from the US in the arms manufacture was postulated by Gen. Eduardo Juan Uriburu. The task called the “Plan of Europe” and included the acquisition of arms and military technologies in European countries, especially Germany, France and Belgium. Horacio Veneroni besides pointed out that the U.S. “imprisoned” Latin American arms industries in an arrangement of its own. The emancipation of Argentina through the improvement of its full geopolitical possible was postulated in 1970 by Gen. Osiris Guillermo Villegas.

Augusto Pinochet (1915-2006), notes6 that the Argentine political elite and the creators of the Argentine geopolitics school are aware that the location of their country puts it beyond the scope of the effective impact of planet powers, which gives Buenos Aires the freedom to prosecute hegemony in the Cono Sur region. These trends take the form of both a sense of work for the peace and safety of the confederate Conk, as well as a quest to make “Great Argentina”, including Malwiny, confederate Sandwich and Argentine Antarctic. To illustrate this geopolitical predisposition of their country to dominance in the La Plata region, Argentine officers usage the metaphor “an orange trail” (El Camino de la Naranja): an orange (or whatever else) dropped into the stream of any river belonging to the La Plata river system, sooner or later must go to Buenos Aires, under the control of Argentina.

The failure of Argentine geopolitics school

After the end of military rule, which continued during the period known as the “Process of National Reorganization” (Proceso de Reorganización Nacional) from 1976 to 1983, and after the introduction of demoliberism and during the reign of the first demoliberal president of the state, Raúl Alfonsín (1983 to 1989), the Argentine geopolitics school was decomposed and lost its originality. The erstwhile orientations of “continental” (non-subsidiary) and “western” (projankean) have lost their importance, while a number of works written in Marxist or liberal spirit have emerged, accusing geopolitics of being a doctrinal tool of militarism, dictatorship, expansionism and terrorism of military governments. The tradition of the Argentine geopolitics school is maintained by specified authors as N. Boscovich (e.g. the work “Geoestrategia Para la Integracion Regional” 1999), C. J. Moneta, Hugh Gaston Sarno, Andres Alfonsin Bravo and others. Spanish translation of works by K. Haushofer, H. J. Mackinder and Saul Cohen, among others, besides appears. The issues discussed are: regional economical integration. Mercosur, democratic governance and non-involvement policy, the globalisation and relations of the US with Latin America, as well as the classical issues of territorial safety and borders – peculiarly with respect to the inactive remaining British Malwin colony.

Ronald Lasecki

Literature:

1. kid J., Geopolitical reasoning in Latin America, “Latin American investigation Review”, Vol. 14, No. 2/(1979), pp. 89-111.
2. Dinges J., Condor Time. How Pinochet and his allies planted terrorism on 3 continents, Black Publishing House, Volowiec 2015.
3. Dodds K, Geopolitics and Geographic Imagination of Argentina, [in:] K. Dodds, D. Atkinson (ed.), Geopolitical Traditions.A century of geopolitical thought, Routledge, London and fresh York 2000, pp. 150-185.
4. Dobrzycki W., Latin America in modern world, Ministry of Defence Publishing House, Warsaw 1989.
5. Same, global Relations in Latin America. past and Modernity, student technological Publishing House, Warsaw 2000.
6. The Geopolitics of Brazil: An Emergent Power’s conflict with Geography, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/44/44401_An%20Emergent%20Po.pdf (14.03.2020).
7. Pinochet Ugarte A., Geopolítica. Segunda Edicion, Editorial Andres Bello, Santiago 1974.