In the first part of the articles we presented to you outline of 18 DZ and its structure. We besides tried to show how large a function experienced soldiers play erstwhile forming fresh units. That is why we have convinced you that the process of expanding the army requires prior staff preparation, and resolution of military recruitment problems.
In the second part we will talk a bit about the process of planning the acquisition of equipment, and how it affects the accomplishment of combat readiness by individuals, which are part of 18 DZ. We will besides draw attention to the training challenges associated with the implementation of fresh weapons, as well as the request to adapt military and civilian infrastructure to the requirements of the expanded army.
Finally, we will besides answer the question whether the creation of 2 fresh divisions is real.
Planning of purchases of military equipment
The acquisition of equipment is an crucial challenge in creating a fresh division. Theoretically, it should be determined by strategical plans for the improvement of the Polish Armed Forces. However, unlike Anglo-Saxon countries, access to specified papers is hard in Poland and the debate on them is limited.
However, there is much to be desired not only in the process of creating long-term plans, but besides in the implementation of their concepts. This besides applies to arms purchases. 18 DZ has not received most of the equipment so farwhich is to be provided for it.
Furthermore, it is not clear precisely what is the imagination of the army's expansion presently declared by the MON. We're inactive waiting for publication. the paper “Model 2035” announced by Mr Blaszczak.
The very fact that various purchases of military equipment were first announced, and only then a long-term imagination of the improvement of the army will be presented, however, shows the failure of the strategical planning process in Poland. This is then translated into the process of forming fresh tactical compounds.
It is already known that the war in Ukraine will further complicate this process. Handing over "Krab" to the neighbour will delay, for example, their implementation to the state in the individual components of "18th". We are not criticizing the MON for deciding to support Kiev. It was 100% right.
Increased request for arms in global markets
However, we note that weapons cannot be bought “from day to day”. This is due, for example, to the limited capacity of defence industries in individual countries. The transportation time for equipment is now steadily expanding and request in global markets is likely to increase.
It seems that the decision to buy Korean haubic K9 was dictated by the awareness that Polish plants would not be able to produce fresh “Krabów” at a fast adequate pace. And until they arrive in 18 DZ, the individual sub-units will not be able to begin the training process on this equipment.
So 2 more challenges related to the expansion of the army include improving the efficiency of purchasing planning, and expanding the capabilities of the defence industry. Only in this way will we be able to meet the concurrent task of supporting Ukraine and the process of expanding the Polish Army.
Let us besides remember that many of the MON's acquisition declarations are presently in a very early phase of implementation. With hurraoptimism, it is so essential to hold off until the negotiations are finalised, and to know the actual quantities of equipment ordered and the transportation dates.
What kind of equipment does the fresh division need?
By simplifying the substance slightly, the hardware needs of 18 DZ can be divided into the following categories:
- Combat vehicles forming the backbone of individual brigades: Abrams, Leopardy, BWPy, Rosomaki, or Borsuki.
- Anti-aircraft and artillery: ‘Poprad’ anti-aircraft kits, ‘Narew’ systems, ‘Krab’ cannonohaubice or ‘Langusta’ launchers.
- Unpiloted aircraft: ‘Flyeye’ or ‘Orlics’.
- Command components: command wagons (e.g. Rosomaki) or modular command stations.
- Communications equipment.
- Security vehicles: sanitary facilities, equipment for logistics and engineering troops.
- Means of passenger and truck transport.
The current trends besides point to the request to integrate all this equipment in the field of combat. Thus, the command post in 18 DZ should be prepared, among others, to rapidly receive information from the Abrams' attackers, operating 30 km further on the Rosomaks, circulating in the air of drones, as well as the platoon of reconnaissance located in another sector.
The division must besides master the art of interacting with another components of the Armed Forces. For example, it would be a waste to have F-35 sensors “packed” without the anticipation of utilizing the data it collects. They should be immediately analysed and transferred to, for example, artillery so that it can harm the mark as shortly as possible after its detection.
Russian artillery is presently only able to operate to a limited extent. Cas of detection opponent by ‘unmanned’ until its demolition is about 3-5 min. So if the Polish army had a advanced degree of integration of individual components, it could identify more enemy targets and destruct them faster.
Our military would then gain a crucial advantage over Russian forces. And it is precisely specified "decision loop" capabilities that any commentators have in mind, inter alia, the request to accomplish triumph in the "decision loop" area.
In the case of 18 DZ, the process of collecting essential equipment and training crews will most likely take about 10-14 years. And it is inactive not said that the ND will be able to integrate all of this into one, operating as we have outlined above.
Equipment is not only the parameters, but besides the man who serves it
The discussion on military equipment is besides frequently only brought to 2 issues in Poland: parameters and engagement of the Polish defence industry. These are of course very crucial issues and it is good that we are talking about them. But if you ask the average lieutenant after the "flash," do you want us to buy Leopardy, or Abramsy, do you know what he'll do?
He will shake his arms and say: “And these and these are awesome... So whatever they buy. The soldiers will inactive be smoking, that they got new, much better than the erstwhile tanks. Only after they decide that we are to ride Leopards, for example, should they pay for the maker to translate the inscriptions inside the wagons. Recently, they “saved” a small and had to learn German ”
Therefore, keep in head the 3rd aspect of the acquisition of equipment, namely its operation and training. Due to the mediocre quality of the military education system, however, the "traditional" in the HR has become that soldiers begin the training process on equipment only erstwhile it reaches the unit.
However, for the time being, 18 DZ has received mainly equipment that could be bought comparatively easy and cheaply or ‘pull’ from another divisions.
Equipment training
The deficiency of equipment in the recently formed division delays the integration of arms and crew training. For example, the "18th" Self-propelled Artillery Division has already been established. However, he does not yet have “Krabs”, so soldiers have nothing to practice on.
It is akin with the late formed battalion mechanized in White Podlaski. He received brand-new Ford Rangers, but there are inactive no BWPs or “Borsuks”. Thus, all day they "beat" the extinct, the drill or the tactics. The later the units receive the equipment, the longer it takes them to get ready.
And besides remember that modern weaponry does not look like what we inherited after the period of the "communies". It's not adequate to get in, burden and shoot. More and more space is occupied by electronics, which involves the request to operate advanced IT systems. These, in turn, require a soldier to have specialist knowledge.
The battalions mechanized in 18 DZ are to have, for example, anti-tank platoons, equipped with Spike PK. In order to be able to fire this system, the soldier must first master the “million” procedures and give hundreds of shots on the trainer. The ammunition utilized in these missiles is simply besides costly to pass the equipment into the hands of the “first better seams”.
Therefore, as the “real” shooting of “Spikes” occurs, even the general can come to them.
The acquisition of expertise and the usage of equipment is besides frequently linked to the request to get a safety clearance authorising access to classified information.
Do you know how long it takes to get it in 18 DZ? A few, respective months, and sometimes even over a year. Why?
Because SKW doesn't work with appropriate procedures. So we have another component connected with the expansion of the army – the request to reorganise and increase counterintelligence resources. Supposedly specified a "asshole", but we don't want the army to have more "emilies" in its ranks?
Specific training equipment handling
Let us besides remember that the division does not consist solely of linear units. The more specialized the division, the more costly and advanced the equipment it will have. In the state of 18 DZ there are, among others, command rosomaki, whose acquisition cost oscillates around respective million PLN/piece.
These transporters have 4 advanced radio stations, advanced ICT equipment and a combat management system. I don't think there's any another cars in the WP that have that concentration of communication systems.
They allow, among another things, to increase the safety of the staff, which can be distributed between respective specified vehicles. However, the tremendous capacity of the command rosomaks is only utilized by 18 DZ to a very limited extent. This is due to the fact that their service requires cognition at the level of computer discipline students.
During the organisation of the tender for these wagons, however, the package of long-term crew training was forgotten. At the time of their transfer to the state of 18 DZ divisions, WB Electronics conducted only a few-day instruction. The division does not so have adequate specialists to make full usage of the Rosomac capabilities.
In addition, it should be assumed that training and crewing of specified a car takes about 2-3 years. With the improvement of the combat field digitization process, equipment handling will become increasingly demanding. Shooting with the HIMARS, handling the Patriots, or integrating the F-35 will not so be the processes that our army will “take over” overnight.
Military and civilian infrastructure units
Remember that the unit is not only soldiers and equipment, but besides military and civilian infrastructure. This consists primarily of barracks and social buildings. recently formed units of 18 DZ inactive function mostly either on the basis of ‘containers’ or utilizing objects taken over from another formations.
These must be adapted to their requirements. The division staff building should, for example, meet certain standards in the area of protection of the facility (in peculiar the premises intended for the establishment of a cryptographic office) or fire requirements.
In turn, the infrastructure intended for soldiers should supply them with comfortable conditions for everyday existence. Until now, in the 18th command battalion in Siedlce, however, soldiers do not have their own lockers, washing machines (and uniforms request to be kept clean) and they frequently gotta "sit" in 1 area after 30.
There are besides no showers, and alternatively of the toilet, there is sometimes just a gap in the ground Only the ongoing renovations are to change that. Experience gained from 18 DZ shows, therefore, that it is not adequate just to designate "some" buildings for the needs of recently created units. They must meet certain safety standards.
Containers will should be replaced sooner or later with recently built buildings. In Polish realities, this process takes at least a fewer years.
Furthermore, civilian infrastructure must not be forgotten. Soldiers gotta live somewhere. And do you know what happened to the real property marketplace in Siedlce after it turned out that there would be a division office and a fewer divisions? Yeah, housing prices even went up twice.
So soldiers must rent apartments with their colleagues and it is harder for them to bring their household to their station. Theoretically, they could only visit on weekends, but first, this will lower the unit's combat readiness. Secondly, specified long-distance operation causes soldiers to “convent” to decision to another unit as shortly as possible.
Equipment retention places
The infrastructure of the unit must besides take into account its needs for adequate retention of equipment. We'll tell you about this anecdote.
One night 18 DZ soldiers returned from night patrol on the border with Belarus. They were tired, and they wanted to settle as shortly as possible with ammunition and go home. 1 of them besides had "fired" in cleaning and oiling of weapons. So he passed it in the condition that it was in erstwhile it came back.
In the following days, the everyday “monowska” existence snuck into the life of the division. So the soldiers could not collect their weapons due to the fact that the company chief had so many “tasks” in the kind of moving masking nets (because “ugly” looks) that he did not have time to open the warehouse. Bad luck wanted the commander to change in the meantime.
Right after taking up duties, the fresh officer decided to carry out a warehouse check. On top of that, he reached for the weapon of a soldier who didn't clean it. However, the "Beryla" could not even be reloaded. Turns out the weapon was rusting due to the moisture in the warehouse.
So the fresh commander punished the soldier. This situation could be avoided erstwhile the conditions for storing weapons were better. However, as the entity in which the situation took place is only at the phase of formation, it does not have the appropriate barracks infrastructure, including a real-time weapon storage.
The regulation is that the newer equipment we deal with the more delicate to atmospheric conditions will be its electronics. 18 DZ inactive lacks garages that can accommodate most of the equipment being equipped with a division. ‘Under the cloud’ must be stored, among others, Modular Command Posts.
Tactical exercise belt
Prior to the start of the formation of 18 DZ, the military unit in Siedlce was planned to eliminate. However, the decision was withdrawn and the division took over, among others, areas and facilities belonging to the branch. In the meantime, however, housing blocks have been built around this unit, preventing it from expanding.
The command was so forced to teardrop down the exercise belt so that barracks buildings could be built in its place. Located in Siedlce, the Self-propelled Artillery Squadron will gotta practice in a fewer kilometres distant area. However, this requires the full logistics operation related to the transport of wagons on track tracks on regular roads.
A akin situation is in Biała Podlaska, where the tactical exercise belt on the unit is very small. In principle, it is better to build barracks on the outskirts or at all outside the city, close forest areas. This allows you to place a training base within the unit, which makes it much easier to organize exercises.
This is how the 17th Mechanized Brigade operates, which is located right next to the camp. The word “green garrison” did not yet come out of nowhere We besides know that the "variability of decisions demonstrates the continuity of the command process", but the situation with the Siedlce unit shows that long-term planning is very crucial in the army.
Is the creation of fresh divisions real?
Both first as well as the second part of the article we wanted to show you how time-consuming the process of creating a fresh division is. Therefore, the military strength of the country depends on its ability to plan long-term and the strategical culture in force.
The forming process of 18 DZ has been moving since 2018 and de facto restoration of capabilities that the Polish Army lost in 2011, erstwhile the 1st Mechanized Division was liquidated.
However, it seems that in the current global situation there is no retreat from the expansion of the army. The military based on a low number, poorly completed divisions and outdated equipment has a very limited capacity to defend the country.
However, the process of forming fresh divisions should be based on 3 principles. First of all, it's not worth wasting time. The Russians made aggression against Crimea in 2014. We, in turn, went for 4 years for "beaching" to start playing the 4th division in 2018. Secondly, the expansion of the army must be linked to its organisational reform.
The formation of the fresh divisions will not win without solving the problems we have outlined regarding human resources training, keeping them in service, demography, appropriate planning of equipment purchases, or expanding military and civilian infrastructure. The improvement of the army besides forces increased investment on another elements specified as counterintelligence or logistics.
Thirdly, the formation of fresh divisions should not be detrimental to others. It is so logical to start this process by expanding the number of brigades within the current divisions. They can then be separated and the process of building fresh tactical compounds started on them. Just like it happened in 18 DZ.
It will not be easy, but it is besides not impossible. 20 years ago. The Polish Armed Forces had 240 1000 soldiers, focused among others in 7 military divisions. Later, however, it was decided to implement the concept of reducing the army to 100,000 professional soldiers.
Did you like the article? Do you believe what we're doing? If so, Consider providing us with support for the improvement of BiS. We would like to thank you with access to the columns, in which we comment on current events, as well as discounts on events organized by us.
It is thanks to the aid of subscribers that we can besides make more articles, podcasts and newsletters, as well as think about creating further interesting projects.
