Are the MON plans to make 2 fresh divisions real? Lessons from forming the 18th Mechanized Division. Part 1/2

June of this year The Ministry of Defence announced plans to form 2 fresh divisions Polish Army. We like the idea. We believe that a strong army is 1 of the key factors that not only increase the safety of Poland, but besides predestinate our country to play a much wider function in the region and in NATO.

However, erstwhile talking to a fewer friends, we began to worry about whether the announcements in question were simply a "contribution" of PR. According to this version, MON would indeed search to increase the army's size, but on a much smaller scale. And that, in turn, we like this much less.

We believe that the discussion on safety requires a certain level of seriousness. We should so strive to guarantee that politicians are liable for making declarations in this area. Therefore, we decided to show you how the current process of forming the 4th WP – 18th Mechanized Division was going.

It has already revealed a number of problems that arise from the expansion of the army. On this example, you will see that creating fresh divisions is simply a powerful challenge and requires time, and deeper organizational changes. So either we take it seriously and we present a broader concept, or we don't make a declaration without covering it.

Where did the 18th Mechanized Division come from?

All right, let's start with a small discussion about army development. Prior to the start of the process of forming the 18th Mechanized Division, the basis of Polish land troops was 3 general military divisions. These were:

• 11 Lubuska Division of Armored Cavalry (Agage).
• 12 Szczecin Mechanized Division (Szczecin).
• 16 Pomeranian Mechanized Division (Elbląg, Olsztyn).

The units of these tactical unions were mostly stationed in the north and west of the country. So in the east of Poland there was a gap that was rightly decided to fill with the creation of a fresh division – 18th Mechanized Division (18 DZ). It includes the following components:

• 1. Warsaw Armoured Brigade (Warsaw – Merry).

• 19. Lublin Mechanized Brigade (Lublin).
• 21st Podhalan firearm Brigade (Rzeszów).
• 18th Logistics Regiment (Łomża).
• Staff, along with 18th Command Battalion (Siedlce).

The process of creating a fresh division is simply a long-term process. The recruitment of people, the acquisition of equipment, the expansion of military and civilian infrastructure, as well as the training process take just a long time. We'll tell you all about it step by step. We'll start by tracking how much 18 DZ is actually a fresh division and how its human resources were collected.

How much is the 18th Division of Mechanized actually a fresh division?

The announcement of the start of the formation process of the fresh division may be associated with the creation of completely fresh units and the expansion of the army. In the case of 18 DZ, however, this was not entirely the case.

1 BPanc of Wesoła is simply a ward that has functioned in army structures since 1994. As a consequence of the formation of 18 DZ, only a squadron of self-propelled artillery and a battalion mechanized in Biała Podlaska was created within the brigade. Before the construction of the fresh division under Warsaw, the unit was besides subject to formations located in the east of Poland (Chełm, Zamość and Lublin).

They were erstwhile part of the 2011 formatted 3rd Brigadeed Mechanizovanej Legions. As of 2019, their subordination began to change again – units from Chełm, Zamość and Lublin were the basis for forming 19 BZ. The recently formed structures of this branch were only staff, anti-aircraft regiment and artillery regiment.

21. The Podhalan firearm Brigade is besides a component that has been operating for years, which was then incorporated into the structure of 18 DZ. From the ground up, there were 18. The Logistics Regiment, based in Łomża. shortly the recently formed 18th Battalion of Command will most likely be renamed a regiment, and within it a chemical company will be built.

The formation of 18 DZ so mostly active the creation of extended staff structures which took command of already existing units. In addition to the 18th Logistics Regiment, respective smaller structures were created to complement the individual brigades. However, their construction is only at an early stage.

Despite that reading media reports may seem that the process of creating 18 DZ has already been completed, the deadline for this process was not set for 2026. So we're talking about 8 years. And that is assuming that most of the units to be part of the fresh division already existed.

So imagine how long it would take to form an full division from scratch?

The ellipse of the fresh division is usually experienced soldiers

The basis for creating a fresh unit is people. And it's not about the street catch. Healthy? 5 wheels? He does. We invitation you to join the Polish Army. Nope. It is hard for us to imagine creating a completely fresh division without the aid of experienced soldiers. And so was 18 DZ.

First a group of officers liable for creating the fresh division organized the base of the staff. In particular, officers and officers of the elder officers were wanted, as only they can hold the posts of chiefs of section, department or company in accordance with the regulations.

Once the staff was formed, the people stationed in it had their hands full. It was essential to fill the staff, and then to make certain that the soldiers were trained, where to live, what to wear, and equipped. Purchases of immense quantities of equipment were besides needed, and to guarantee that it was decently implemented.

In a very simplistic way, in the military, it looks like officers are liable for identifying the request for weapons, and the organisation of logistics and infrastructure facilities. The officers then gotta “take over” the transport of all these things. In turn, the ranks will wear the lockers, desks, and computers that come to the unit.

And imagine now that you would "move" this device with people who have no thought about the military? It can, but it'll most likely take a lot more time. As you have at your disposal an experienced private, he immediately “fire” elements that form the foundation of the continuity of the unit's operation: service, security, logistics.

In addition, he knows where and where to carry these lockers If you are dealing with a "new man", then he will request time to implement himself into military "modes". In turn, the officers and officers will be liable for his training process. And again, it is better that they already have experience in command, equipment handling and associated bureaucracy.

Where do the people who supply the ranks of the fresh division come from?

On the occasion of the creation of the staff of the fresh division, it is peculiarly crucial to make a personnel section which could then address the "collection" of more people to individual units. In the case of 18, this was usually done in 3 ways.

Firstly, announcements were distributed that soldiers curious in the service within the 18 DZ could apply for a transfer from another formations. This was mostly given a circumstantial priority. So the unit commanders whose personnel would like to power the ranks of the fresh division had very limited opportunities to block these movements.

In the Polish Army, this was an exception alternatively than a rule, as in average circumstances, obtaining approval to transfer may sometimes limit the second method of recruitment to a position, which is frequently utilized in the case of officers. Then you get information that they request you in 18 DZ and that's it. There's no way out. We gotta go there.

Only the 3rd way to get people into the fresh division was to recruit from a civilian or among reserve soldiers. It is more time-consuming. They do not mostly know the procedure, nor have they been trained by the army. So they request at least a twelve months to find themselves in the realities of the military.

However, building the fresh division on completely fresh staff would have its advantages. possibly this would let the MON's "concrete" to be crushed? However, this would require drastic organisational and intellectual changes. For example, how do you get to service on a phase that is reserved exclusively for an officer in the rank of a major, a soldier “uncontaminated by the system”?

They would should be trained anyway. In theory, it's possible. However, in practice, it is hard for us to imagine a situation in which a abrupt and deep organisational improvement would take place in the HR. In keeping with this assumption, people who are already able to decision within the military “machinery” will be able to make a fresh division “good” for the weight of gold.

Drifting of another units

One of the iron rules of functioning of the Polish Army is that it works “breaks up”. For example, if there is force to make 18 DZ, all another tactical compounds go to the background. And so for respective years until the announcement of "success". So if the fresh division needed experienced people, how did they get them?

From another units. The formation of the fresh division so weakened the combat capabilities of another formations, which lost any of the experienced staff. And since, in general, the statures among the officers and officers are not the highest, can you imagine what the scale of the staff drain would be if 2 fresh divisions were formed?

Especially if it means forming fresh units, alternatively than relying on those already existing ones, as was the case with 18. Consider 1 more thing – the level of completion of individual formations in the Polish Army does not belong to the highest.

The consequences of this situation were, among another things, observed in fresh years overburdening soldiers with tasks. Imagine that you are serving in the 17th Mechanized Brigade, in which the working conditions are not the highest. There are besides specified “flowers” as the same man occupies the position of the shooter in Company A and is besides seconded to Company C as the driver.

On paper then we have 2 people, but in reality it is inactive the same peasant At the same time 17 BZ is an "export" unit of the Polish army. This means that in a given year he must e.g. "jump" Mission to Romania, issue a quota per border and carry out a average unit training process (fields). Plus, it can inactive "fall" COVID.

Soldiers begin to be overworked, seldom home, and their morale falls. So there are departures. The situation would be different if the unit completion level were higher. The commander would then have more people at his disposal, and guests returning from Romania, for example, would not gotta immediately "heat" to the border.

Human resources must be prepared in advance

It is so crucial to consider whether the current state of office should be completed first, and then the formation of subsequent divisions should begin. If MON is taking its fresh ideas seriously, it should besides start the process of preparing for the expansion of the army.

What does this mean in practice? The starting point should be to reduce the scale of leaving the army or to quit as shortly as soldiers scope the threshold of 15 years of service. If this is not fixed, the military will never be able to get adequate fresh recruits.

The recruitment process itself will besides be inefficient and costly. The military will leave the service prematurely, and the resources needed to rise and train fresh soldiers will increase. It is not known from now on that it is cheaper to prevent departures than to organise marketing campaigns, fresh "waves" of incarnation into the army and tempt people with increases.

The training costs of a soldier serving in the military for 25 years are importantly lower and spread over a longer period than would have been the case if the individual filling the occupation decided to resign after 5 years. Then you gotta look and then train another man. And in 5 years, the same thing again...

The main reason for leaving the army is general disappointment in its way of functioning. So either we start organizational reforms or we will endure "staff shortages" forever. Especially erstwhile trying to grow an army.

Deep changes in the military training strategy are needed

In addition to the procedures to reduce the number of departures from the army, experience with the formation of 18 DZ shows that it is essential to prepare in advance the "overcomplementary" of enlisted officers, officers and specialists. They could then form the backbone of the forming fresh divisions without harming the functioning of the others.

And here's the real problem. The current training strategy is at least holes. For years, the request for various courses in the military has been large and the number of places has been very limited. There is so a request to increase the number of training centres or to grow those already existing.

Otherwise, the army will not be able to educate adequate people needed to fill existing jobs. Alternatively, this will be with a failure to the quality of education, which can inactive be doubted. The results of specified actions were visible, among others, during military service on the border with Belarus.

In fresh years, the preparatory service has been systematically reduced to the point where it covers practically only the training of the oath drill, and the training of keeping the rooms clean. specified individuals were then assigned to professional military service, after which, at its start, they were "cast" to carry out exhausting tasks at the border.

In the case of any of these soldiers, their inadequate preparation for service and deficiency of training are 1 of the reasons for prematurely marrying the army. It's a good thing MON saw the problem and decided to replacing the preparatory service with a voluntary primary service.

Demographic problems hindering the expansion of the army

However, demography will be a major challenge in recruiting candidates for voluntary essential services. They're pointing to it first. information on the comparatively low number of persons making a military oath this year. And long-term trends make it seem worse.

From the data our boy collected – Ariel Draginski It is clear that the citizens of the Republic of Poland, aged 20 – 49 (also those abroad) are: 8 million 134 thousand. And women: 7 million, 931 thousand. Below you can see the demographic breakdown by five-year cohorts (in thousands):

Not everyone, however, is fit for military service. In particular, wellness issues can be disqualifying. On the basis of publically available data, Ariel found that around 90% of Polish citizens receive military category A. The pool of available recruits should besides be deducted from those on the criminal evidence and those on emigration.

Hence, we can safely presume that the real number of people aged 20-49 who reside in Poland is about 10% lower than the full number of citizens. In 2022, therefore, MON had a number of 6 million 391,000 men and 6 million 401 000 women who could possibly power the ranks of the army.

Demographic trends are against MON

The population of Poles is ageing. Assuming that the percent of people incapable to service in the military does not change, the number of possible soldiers in little than 15 years will be reduced by more than 2 million! By 2035, only 5 million 121,000 men and 5 million 76,000 women would be available to the military.

Among the presently serving soldiers 91.7% are men and only 8.3% women. With the current sex ratio, the request of the Armed Forces, in the event of their expansion to 300 thousand, will be 273,000 men. This means that above 5% of all men would gotta find employment in the HR, Police or Border Guard.

If MON had planned to grow the army to 400,000 soldiers, this would mean that in 2035 as many as 9.8% of men in the age bracket mentioned earlier would gotta work in 1 of the 3 previously mentioned uniform formations. Hardcore. Where you don't throw a rock, there's a uniform.

And we did not take into account in these calculations another problem – the decreasing level of attractiveness of the military as a possible employer. Besides... what about another branches of the economy?

Therefore, plans to make fresh divisions should besides be accompanied by a plan to increase the population of Poles to 50-60 million. Then we would feel that our country truly wants to enter a serious global game. And it's not just the army that needs to be recruited to service in a private corps...

Misses in the Corps of elder and Officers' Troops

An improvement is besides required in the training strategy of officers and officers. In particular, the army lacks elder officers who are expected to fill crucial positions, specified as platoon commanders or technicians, securing equipment. Experienced officers are besides the foundation on which private training is based.

However, in Poland there are no Ensign schools. There are only junior advanced schools. Thus, the typical career way leading to the rank of a elder lieutenant involves joining the army in a private degree, serving a fewer years, and then obtaining approval to survey at a junior officer's school, ending with a promotion to the rank of corporal.

In order to become a younger ensign, there are 4 more careers to be completed. So the time needed for a soldier to join the ranks of elder officers is about 10 years.

Human resources problems besides be in the corps of officers. Despite the fact that in fresh years the number of people admitted to AWL is steadily increasing. 10 years ago, there were about 100 listeners. Now, number This increased to nearly 400.

Deficiency comes partially from past negligence. However, 1 cannot ignore what we wrote about earlier – the number of departures from the army increases and this besides applies to candidates for officers and officers. This is due to the disappointment of the quality of education and the reality of the WP, which are experienced by young people.

The problem is besides that a university that educates the largest number of officers, or WAT, is actually a quasi-military college. People who complete the most many directions, specified as electronics, cybersecurity, computer science, or mechatronics, frequently leave the army rather rapidly and go to work in a "civil".

Personnel shortages were attempted by recruiting officers and sub-commissioners from the WOT or through so-called. Academic Legion. In particular, the usage of this second option was besides frequently ended with a simplification in human resources quality.

So either the army will change the strategy of training and/or ranking individual positions, or the creation of fresh divisions will gotta increase staff shortages in the corps of elder officers and officers.

Creating 18 DZ shows that expanding the army is simply a major challenge

In the first part of the text we presented to you the scale of the staff challenges associated with the creation of fresh divisions. In the second part we will address the issues of equipment and infrastructure improvement in 18 DZ. We will besides effort to learn from these experiences.

But you can already see that expanding the army is simply a challenge. This is not an impossible task. However, it takes time to carry out organisational reforms in the military and to solve demographic problems. We can afford it. But we must decision from the declaration to the presentation of concrete and long-term proposals.

And then add hard work to it and political will to violate the interests of certain groups. You know what would happen if you abruptly started building a real, not painted West Point in Poland? The cries of opposition from all those who unfortunately have settled in the present, flawed "system"...

PS: Thank you very much Ariel Draginski for helping to make sub-chapters on demography.

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