Analysis briefly:
- Early this year, a preliminary agreement was reached between Ethiopia and Somaliland.
- Its object is to lease 20 km of the Somaliland coast through Ethiopia. Ethiopian port and Ethiopian military base are to be established in this territory.
- Ethiopia thus tries to regain access to the sea, which it lost as a consequence of the secession of Eritrea in the early 1990s. He wants better access to the maritime transport way moving through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
- In return, Somaliland hopes primarily for Ethiopia to recognise its independence. If this happens, Ethiopia will be the first independent country in the planet to take specified a step. Additionally, Somaliland will receive shares in Ethiopian Airlines.
- The agreement provoked outrage in Somalia. Somaliland de jure is an integral part of Somalia, although since 1991. de facto is an independent state. His independence, however, is not only recognised by Somalia, but by the global community as a whole.
- The case triggered a crisis in Ethiopia's relations with Somalia. Mogadishu points to a deficiency of respect for global standards and demands a complete cancellation of the contract. It even threatens with a military consequence if its provisions come into force. Addis Ababa argues that access to the sea is an existential issue for her, which suggests a large determination to prosecute the agreement.
- If tensions cannot be contained through diplomacy, the already unstable Horn of Africa is threatened with further destabilisation. We can besides see its effects in Europe.
On 1 January this year, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali president Muse Bihi Abdi signed a Memorandum of knowing on Cooperation. The details of the contract were not disclosed, but the key assumptions were made public.
They caused deep outrage and protests by Somalia due to the fact that under global law Somaliland is an integral part of it. For Mogadishu, protocol is an action behind Somalia's back, which is incompatible with global standards. The possible consequences of the introduction of the Protocol's provisions pose a hazard of further destabilisation and of an already unstable region. Although the dynamics of events has been tiny since January and it is possible to talk about any stagnation, in the last six months there have been respective noteworthy events. The subject will surely return sooner or later, for example, due to Ethiopia's immense ambitions, the relentlessly fragile safety environment in Somalia, and the current and future engagement of regional and possibly planet powers in Somalia.
What is Somaliland?
Somaliland de jure is part of Somalia. De facto Since 1991, it has been an independent state with an efficient political system, regular elections, safety forces (including the military and police), and even its own currency. The justice of the Somali government in Somaliland, whose capital is Hargejsa, is actually zero. Somaliland is so the second largest unrecognized country in the planet in terms of the controlled area. Somaliland's isolation is the direct consequence of the colonial past of these areas and events that occurred just after decolonization.
Its present territory coincides with the British Somali, a erstwhile British protectorate over which London held power from 1884 to 1960 (with a short break for Italian business from 1940-41). [1]. After the withdrawal of colonial forces, Somaliland gained independency on 26 June 1960, but already a fewer days later, on 1 July, joined the union with the Trust territory of Somalia, which technically was a United Nations trust territory under Italian rule. These 2 territories formed the national Republic of Somalia, so the state we know present [2][3].
Map No. 1 The Horn of Africa 1884 – 1960 (owning author)In this short, just five-day period of independence, Somaliland recognised as many as 35 countries, including any very crucial ones specified as the USSR and France [4]. The unification of both Somali territories after the withdrawal of colonialists in 1960 was in line with the plan set between all parties. The consent to specified a turn of events was besides in Somaliland, where moods dominated Somali nationalism and enthusiasm towards unification. This 1 passed quickly, however, erstwhile the details of the country's first constitution came to light.
From the position of Somaliland, the paper favoured the "southerners", so many residents boycotted the constitutional referendum. As many as 60% of those who went to the polls rejected the constitution, which was inactive accepted — the votes from the south of the country prevailed [5]. Today, however, representatives of Somaliland propose that it is precisely due to their opposition that the union was yet illegal, and that it is invalid under the law. The course of that process — alongside the fact that Somalia is actually a failed state — is the main argument of Hargeisa in the dispute with Mogadishu [6].
Map No. 2 Somaliland (self-titled author)What provisions do the minutes contain?
The most crucial point of the agreement allows Ethiopia a 50-year lease of a approx. 20-kilometre belt on the coast of Somaliland, west of the port of Berber. This patch of land in the Gulf of Aden is located on the way of 1 of the most crowded sea transport routes in the world. It lies right next to the Bab al-Mandab Strait (the “Brama Tears” or “The Gate of Tears” in Arabic), which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean just through the Gulf of Aden. It is simply a key point on the Europe-Radar East way since the beginning of the Suez Canal in 1869. [7].
Ethiopia's leased territory wants to build a commercial port. And if she had stopped there, possibly a diplomatic dispute could have been avoided. Ethiopia, however, besides intends to build a military base, which in Mogadishu is perceived as an ‘addition of territory’. Somalia never agreed to this. However, the biggest controversy is that of Somaliland — Ethiopia is expected to admit its independence.
Although Ethiopian officials have not publically expressed specified intentions, Somaliland politicians say this will happen. That would be a real breakthrough. Today, the only organism to admit Somaliland's independency is Taiwan, which itself is recognized by only a twelve countries in the world. Taiwan has never explicitly expressed its appreciation, but government parties characterise Somaliland as ‘country’ and ‘republic’ [8]. In addition, Somaliland is to receive shares in Ethiopian national airlines — Ethiopian Airlines [9].
Map no. 3 Planned location of the naval base (author work)Early in April, Somalia took action against the deficiency of consequence to her discontent: (i) expelled the Ethiopian ambassador, (ii) cancelled her ambassador to Ethiopia, and (iii) ordered the closure of 2 Ethiopian consulates. The second decision is rather interesting, that 1 of them is in Somaliland and the another in Puntland, another Somali region (officially autonomous), with which Mogadishu has increasingly worse relations. However, the decisions have no real impact, due to the fact that the central government has virtually no impact on both regions. The conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia is inactive only diplomatic, but the long-term hazard of escalation is serious [10].
Benefits for Ethiopia
Ethiopia is the sixth largest country in the planet (and 4th in Africa) without access to the sea. Given its population, it ranks first among all countries of the planet without its own coast and ports. Nearly 130 million inhabitants (with birth rate of 4.0) make the appetite of this country immense and equally large are demand. Among these ambitions is besides access to the sea that Ethiopia lost in the early 1990s, erstwhile after the long war Eritrea — formerly in the federation with Ethiopia and later aneccated by Ethiopia — gained independence.
Today, most sea imports (85%) and exports (95%) Ethiopia crosses the port of Djibouti. However, it's costly (about $1.5 billion a year) and uncomfortable due to the fact that it puts Ethiopia in the function of a client and this towards a small, mediocre neighbour [11]. Ethiopia has besides been a shareholder (19%) of the port in Berber since 2018, operated by DP World, a powerful logistics company from the United arabian Emirates (ZEA) [12]. Addis Ababa wants to diversify and reduce dependency on the port of Djibouti, and all this under the ten-year National Logistics strategy for 2018-2028 [13].
Abiy Ahmed defined sea access for his country as a "existing issue", and possibly crucial for the state's endurance in its current form due to many interior conflicts. It clearly suggests that this is serious. Even if the January memorandum is not implemented, Ethiopia will not quit the issue. It's turning up tension in the region. [14].
Benefits for Somaliland
Somaliland's declaration of Ethiopia treats as an opportunity. It would start the process of its global recognition, which is the precedence of the abroad policy of the region so far. It would be the first step to disrupt partial isolation. Partial, due to the fact that despite the fact that the government in Hargejs does not recognise almost anyone, Somaliland has relations not only with the Horn of Africa states specified as Ethiopia, Djibouti, or Kenya, but besides with the US, large Britain, Norway or Sweden. respective countries even have representations in Hargeia, including the UAE, Ethiopia, Denmark, Taiwan, Turkey and Kenya [15]. Participation in Ethiopian airlines looks on this background as a insignificant bonus, although surely useful and forward-looking — Ethiopian Airlines is Africa's second airline in terms of passengers transported and the largest in terms of fleet, number of countries served and gross [16].
At this point, the global designation of Somaliland is simply a very distant prospect. However, any additional country on a shortlist behind Taiwan will be a success for Hargejsa. It will lay the foundation for the construction of an authoritative statehood.
How did the global community react?
The memorandum received no support from either the African Union (whose seat is in the capital of Ethiopia), the European Union, the United Nations, the US or the League of arabian States. They like calls to cool down and deescalate so that the situation does not get out of control. Somalia takes the position that it is first curious in diplomatic solution. At the same time, however, it rejects mediation if the agreement is not full cancelled. These 2 positions are in a sense excluded, but the fact is that since January there have been no talks on the Ethiopia-Somalia line. There was besides a declaration that the government in Mogadishu was “ready to go to war” unless the memorandum was implemented [17][18][19].
Somaliland is comparatively unchangeable compared to Somalia, but besides to another countries of the region. However, this is not the right place for Poland to become active in its independence. Not even those countries that invest in Somaliland and have crucial influence throughout the region. no of the planet powers do that. So for present there is no reason for Poland to be a pioneer on this issue. Especially considering the forces behind Somalia.
Is the region so at hazard of another war?
The territorial integrity of Somalia is advocated, among others, by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Eritrea and the USA. The government in Mogadishu so supports considerable force, but it is doubtful that, in the event of an armed conflict, any of these states will decide to straight defend Somalia in its territory. War on specified advanced tensions cannot be ruled out, but it is improbable yet. In fact, neither side has adequate strength for it or motivation.
Somalia would not have the slightest chance in a direct confrontation with Ethiopian troops. Today, however, its biggest interior problem is not Somaliland, which is independent of Mogadishu longer than he was with him in the union. This threat is associated with al-Qaeda terrorist organization Ash-Shabaab. It was formed in 2006 following the intervention in Somalia by the coalition troops led by Ethiopia. [20].
As a consequence of this offensive, muslim fundamentalists from the Union of muslim Courts (UTI) who actually ruled Somalia at the time lost power. This 1 had its legal government in exile in Kenya. However, the power of UTI did not include Puntland or Somaliland. Ash-Shabaab controls large areas of land in central Somalia, mainly around Mogadishu, as well as in the south of the country, at the border with Ethiopia and Kenya. He besides occasionally attacks these 2 countries [21].
Ethiopia is besides battered with interior rebellions and wars. Although its stableness and strength are incomparably greater than Somalia, its safety situation is far from ideal. For 2 years in Tigraju (2020-2022), there was a brutal war between the partisans and the central government. As of 2018, the uprising of the Oromo rebels, Ethiopia's largest cultural group, besides continues. Last year, government troops began fighting the Amharic partisan Fano. The Amhars are the second largest cultural group in the country. In 2022, Ash-Shabaab made an offensive on the Ethiopian region of Somali, inhabited almost exclusively by cultural Somalis. Ethiopia's army rapidly dealt with Islamists, but they are besides a constant threat [22].
Somaliland, in turn, does not control the full territory to which it claims. In its east it was reactivated last year an autonomous creation called SSC-Khatumo. It comprises 3 regions — Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (hence ‘SSC’). Khatumo was created due to the mass protests of its population, which does not agree to the separation of Somaliland from Somalia. Khatumo is so to be an autonomous region of Somalia. Mogadishu recognized the Khatumo administration, which he wants to weaken Somaliland. After these protests from most of the territory, Somaliland troops withdrew. The situation is further compounded by the fact that Khatumo is at the same time a disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland [23][24][25].
Map No. 4 Areas controlled by Somaliland (owning author)Perspectives
As of 2007, Ethiopian soldiers have been stationed in Somalia in the ranks of an African coalition targeting Islamists from Ash-Shabaab and their allies. For 15 years it was held within the framework of the AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia): an African Union mission with the approval of the UN safety Council. In April 2022, Somalis took command and the mission changed its name to ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) and its character to a transitional one, despite the continued threat of terrorists. The mandate of ATMIS expires on 31 December 2024. [26]
At the end of ATMIS, the Somali Armed Forces will presume work for the fight against Ash-Shabaab. This, in turn, gives emergence to the concerns of the global community — the belief in safety by Somali forces is not great. The dispute with Ethiopia may further work in favour of terrorists from Ash-Shabaab, as it increases nationalist sentiments, which coincides with the ideology of this organization. This can so facilitate recruitment within their ranks. If Somali forces neglect to meet the task of ensuring safety, ash-Shabaab will most likely effort to fill the vacuum that will arise after the withdrawal of ATMIS forces [27].
On 1 July, Turkey attempted to reconcile the disputed parties. There was a gathering of representatives of Ethiopia, Somalia and Turkey as a mediator. Somaliland has not participated in negotiations that we know almost nothing about at the moment. The second circular of talks will be held next week in Ankara, besides without the presence of diplomats from Somaliland. There is no circumstantial information yet that would give hope of breaking the deadlock. Turkey has invested heavy in Somalia in fresh years and supports it. This year both countries signed an agreement under which Turkey would defend the territorial waters of Somalia. This aims, among others, to defend the country from the actions of pirates, which operate mainly on the Puntland coast. In the long term, Ankara is expected to aid Mogadishu build his own fleet. Turkish soldiers besides train their Somali counterparts, including peculiar troops. However, Turkey besides has a good relation with Ethiopia, in which it besides invests [28].
Ethiopia's ambitions and needs propose that it will effort to regain access to the sea in the future, even if the agreement with Somaliland will yet not enter into force. This, in turn, makes the escalation of conflict — including its armed appearance — impossible in the coming years.
The hazard is exacerbated by the fact that there are many fires in the region that can turn into wars. These include: (i) misunderstandings between Ethiopia and Egypt about the dam on the Nile built by the erstwhile country [29][30], (ii) rising tensions between Somalia and Puntland [31], (iii) the fact that there are crucial oil and natural gas resources in Somalia that Somalia will not be able to mine alone. In the last fewer years, we have seen renewed interest in extracting them. It had already begun in the mediate of last century, but it was discontinued in 1991 at the beginning of the civilian War. [32].
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[21] Ibid
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