The following interview is simply a fragment of the publication of the Institute of fresh Europe – A year of fear and hope. What awaits Europe in 2023? [Report]
Chance or threat? It is simply a dilemma that frequently knocks on the doors of European capitals erstwhile they contain a political, business or economical issue of cooperation with China. China's ideas for Europe have a lot, but many end up with promises and blurred plans. Dr. Michał Bogusz from the Center for east Studies explains what this is and how it can change.
Michał Banasiak: Despite many warnings and fears, coming even from the German government, China got a green light to invest in the port of Hamburg. Is this expected to be an emergency call for us?
Dr. Michał Bogusz: I think the case is simply a small blown up. This is little than 25 percent and not in the full port, but in 1 of the terminals. Of course, this besides involves possible dangers, but in my opinion – as much as I am skeptical of Chinese investments in critical infrastructure in the planet – the hazard is minimal. Without comparison to purchases in the port of Piraeus or attempts to take over full terminals in east Europe.
And yet the discussion about this movement went beyond Germany. It may be small, but it's a very strong political signal.
In Germany alone, this transaction was a pretext for discussion alternatively than its essence. There is simply quite a few talk in Germany about the dependence of the Chinese economy. And this already existing and deepening addiction is the consequence of the prognostic lobby in German business and its impact on politicians. It is no secret that at least any of the SPD and CDU were, is and in the foreseeable future will be financed by large German corporations, which is in the hands of developing further business relations with China. We saw this during Chancellor Scholz's visit to Beijing, where with him was a wreath of representatives of the largest German companies.
The Chinese turned out to be a complete alien to the realities of Central and east Europe. They looked at it through the prism of the erstwhile east bloc and thought it would be a reasonably natural environment for Chinese business.
We are talking so much about Germany due to the fact that it is simply a large European economy. However, the Chinese with many investment ideas knocked on a twelve another countries, especially within the 16+1 project, then 17+1. It is not known now how many European countries are seriously curious in this Chinese venture. Is this task dead or just frozen?
Half dead, half alive. The Chinese thought of this task in a two-track way. Firstly, they tried to find a grip in the Union due to the fact that a large number of EU countries were involved. They hoped that it would be easy for them to carry out 1 or the another project, put it in their portfolio and go to the West, saying: look, we in the realities of the EU economy, EU regulations have implemented this and this, so we will manage it besides in your country.
The declarations were many, but individual investments.
The Chinese turned out to be a complete alien to the realities of Central and east Europe. They looked at it through the prism of the erstwhile east bloc and thought it would be a reasonably natural environment for Chinese business. They proposed the same model of operation that they usage in Africa, i.e. the link between the project's execution and the capital from the debt at a advanced percent guaranteed by the state. They completely did not realize that there is simply a cheaper way to get money from the market. That our regulations supply for tenders and that it is not possible to bind contractors and loans. I besides believe that for the highest Chinese political leadership it was expected to be a bargaining chip for talks with Germany and the French. It's a Scarecrow card: you don't want to deal with us, we'll deal with east Europe. And if we could communicate with France and Germany, the task could be sacrificed.
The countries in Europe have begun to look forward to the failure to deliver on Beijing's promises?
Some said, "I'm checking." It turned out that they turned the card against China and themselves devoted this task to things of relation with the US. I'm talking first of all about the Baltics. For example, Balkan countries or Hungary are trying to look for political and economical benefits. And then another countries put it in the freezer and they wait. And we'll request it again.
It is usually about European movement in China that we say that we deficiency discernment in these realities. Meanwhile, you say that the Chinese do not know how to operate in Central and east Europe. What does that come from?
First of all, staff shortages. There aren't any people in the area who know each other. Let's see what recruitment to the Chinese Ministry of abroad Affairs looks like. The best hits the American episode, the remainder on Western Europe. In Central and east Europe, people from the same group that deals with Africa land.
So, Friday alumni takes care of the U.S., and we can number on 4 at the most.
Fridays go into business, not diplomacy. 4 are in charge. By the west, and 3 of them who ride on mediocrity go to Central and east Europe. Chinese think-tanks treat this area stepmother too. They besides deficiency people who talk local languages. The Chinese are expected to educate them, send them to college in different countries, but the reality is brutal. I'll give you an example of Chinese Polish students. For all 20 people, possibly 3-4 communicate well in Polish. And these people will not deal with Poland due to the fact that they will go into business. They're usually skilled linguists, so they master 2-3 another languages, and they land somewhere else. From respective years to work in diplomacy, possibly 1 person. We're talking about a country with a billion inhabitants.
For China, the European Union is an exhibition of the German and f ranch ruling class, which is to carry out their interests at the expense of another countries.
How is that possible?
They'd like to, but they just don't have the ability to handle everything. The American State Department is simply a well-functioning machine, but it has been built since the late 19th century. And the Chinese? They've been making up their MFA recently. He was born after the cultural revolution, or in fact only in the 1980s or even in the 90s. It has a form completely inadequate to Chinese ambition. And he's incapacitated ideologically and humanly. And he has a very narrow decision-making throat, due to the fact that all crucial decision has to go through the organization political office and even his standing committee. A very tiny group that is incapable to grasp everything that is happening in the world. So they do the most crucial things.
Let's go west of Europe. China present treating the European Union as a serious partner?
For China, the European Union is simply a German and French ruling class exposition, which is to carry out their interests at the expense of another countries. China looks at the planet through the prism of Marxism-Leninism explanation and tries to explain everything to each another in class. They believe that there is simply a ruling class in each country and that these countries operate on the basis of the performance of the class's interests. A large example is Chinese brexit analysis. According to the Chinese brexit, the British elite could not accept the fact that they were not allowed to co-decision on the European Union by the elites of France and Germany. And as a result, the British elites were to lead to the exit of the Union. Sometimes it takes a unusual thing, as it is simply a simple and simplified way of looking at the world. But he is.
In the context of China and their rivalry with the US, the fashionable concept has late become decoubling. What would the economical separation of these countries mean for Europe?
A painful adaptation process, which could yet prove beneficial, especially for Central and east Europe. any of the chains would have a chance to get here. Decoupling is in my opinion unavoidable, so we should prepare for it in advance. Offshoring, nearshoring – these are concepts we should be friends with, due to the fact that they open up immense opportunities for Europe.
It is hard to compete with China in terms of labour costs or mill emissions.
Western Europe could be repatriated to those cells that will give way to the green revolution and do not depend so much on labour costs. However, Europe's environment remains, which has a immense impact on it. If part of the factories were moved to Africa, migration from there could be halted on the 1 hand and, on the another hand, the developing African states could be tied together. For the next fewer decades, Africa will have the top demographic possible and it, combined with climate change, may be negative for Europe. But if we place any of the supply chains transferred from Asia there, we will be able to stabilise and migrate and possibly besides the political situation of these countries. It is akin with the Balkans or the mediate East. I repeat: Decouping will be a very painful process, but if it is to be done anyway, let's take advantage of it.
China has stubbornly pursued a very harsh policy towards coronavirus. With mass investigating and closing of full cities, they were actually the last in the world. It got hard in that economy.
Especially the export, and it allows the Chinese economy to be kept on the surface. Therefore, in my opinion, false were the allegations that Chinese pandemic restrictions would indirectly harm another countries. Without exports, China would have been in large problem long ago.
At the end of 2022, zero COVID policy was abandoned. In your opinion, will the Chinese economy be licking wounds now, or is it madly catching up with the large boom?
Abolishing any regulation means reflection. In the case of China, I believe that it will be mistakenly taken by many observers to solve all the problems in this country. For 6-12 months, it will be reflected and we will hear that China has returned to its improvement path. It's not like that. It is simply a mistake in my opinion to look at zero COVID policy as the origin of all China's economical problems. These are mainly due to the exhaustion of the current improvement model. The zero COVID policy only highlighted any of these problems and accelerated any entropy of the system. Her disappearance will work like a kind of accelerator, but it won't solve structural problems. This requires a very serious change in the political and economical model.
The zero COVID policy only highlighted any of these problems and accelerated any entropy of the system. Her disappearance will work like a kind of accelerator, but it won't solve structural problems.
Is that the change coming?
The authorities have chosen the direction of change, but restalinisation, increased state influence and increased ideologies can act in a paralysing way. Kill the innovation of the Chinese economy. We already know, there is even Chinese investigation that state companies are little innovative and little efficient. The level of return on investment is much lower and resources are frequently wasted. alternatively of solving problems, they are being put together.
Europe, mostly under US pressure, blocked China from building and investing in the telecommunications sector. Especially during the 5G infrastructure building decisions. Now it is pointed out that Chinese applications that could be a tool for spying on users should be addressed.
The threat from Chinese communicators is multiple. First, it gives a propaganda device a immense amount of data on which to build an effective transmission. shortly he may even be profiled, created into a circumstantial person. Secondly, there is simply a hazard that these platforms will distribute propaganda content. They can duplicate the prognostic narratives or undermine the legal or political order in the west. Thirdly, by means of the data collected and through the ability to scope people directly, it is possible to effort to influence selected individuals, which may be decision-makers or close decision-makers.
It's a direct political threat.
For now, China is at the first stage, i.e. building up databases and wondering how to effectively adapt its transmission to the western recipient. But we already gotta ask ourselves ahead of ourselves: what will they do about it? How will technology make and what opportunities will it give Chinese intelligence and its centres of influence?
I know that there are all kinds of geopolitical gurus who put in Excel the number of Chinese aircraft, the state of the fleet, and it turns out that China would win. That's not how it works. Ukraine has shown that the specified summation of combat measures does nothing.
In 2022, a very serious debate began about the armed conflict over Taiwan. prof. Góralczyk says in my ears that “China does not want war but is ready for it”. Do you agree with that?
No, China is not ready for war. The People's Liberation Army has no ability to challenge the United States and their allies. China realises that in conflict with them, Americans would not fight alone. They would have the support of Japan, Australia, it seems that besides the UK. I know that there are all kinds of geopolitical gurus who put in Excel the number of Chinese aircraft, the state of the fleet, and it turns out that China would win. That's not how it works. Ukraine has shown that the specified summation of combat measures does nothing. The Chinese army may be ready on a material level, but it is not ready on a level of training, tactical capabilities, command systems. So she's yet not ready for war today.
If you follow discipline Sun Tzu, if China isn't ready, the more war they don't want.
That's the question. They would evidently like to accomplish their goals for Taiwan without a heated conflict, but they seem to mature the belief that this will not succeed, that we cannot simply push Americans. And they seriously think that without any kind of armed conflict, they won't. And here we go again to ask if they are ready for this conflict. They're not. They think the West wants them to take action that they're not prepared for. They look at it through the prism of Japan and planet War II. In their optics, they were Americans, imposing an embargo on Japan's fuel, forced her to undertake a war that Japan was not ready for. China, of course, would like to be ready, but it will not be ready for at least a fewer years. And go to war unprepared?
We have a fresh example that doesn't pay off.
Yeah, but sometimes it comes to reasoning that war can solve quite a few problems. And China has quite a few interior problems. Now they are hard to overcome, but in a situation of war or martial law, tools would be obtained to accelerate certain processes. So it may turn out in Beijing that escalation, despite the many risks it carries, is the only way forward. Just for interior reasons, not external reasons, due to the fact that it would give tools to make changes that are necessary. Without them, the government will feel threatened.
Photo: Image Peggy und Marco Lachmann-Anke au Pixabay
