There have been no crucial changes in the course of the front line in the last 2 weeks. However, this does not mean that the front has completely froze. From Kharkiv, through Donbas, to Kherson there are fierce fights. A lot is besides happening in the Russian back room, which is inactive struggling with “addictive smokers”. The front of Cherson attracts the most media attention, but the Ukrainian offensive on Kherson is inactive under questioning. First I'm going to describe the situation on individual sections of the front, and then I'm going to look at a broader perspective.
1. Kharkiv. The Russians have intensified the attack under Kharkov. In the last 2 weeks, the Ukrainian side has recorded a large number of Russian rallying on the Ukrainian rear. The Russians besides launched an attack on the alleged chuhujewski foothold – east of Kharkiv, it is the only Ukrainian foothold on the another side of the river Donet*.
*Smaller Ukrainian troops are most likely besides operating in the forests under Izium, on the “Russian” side of Donca, but it is hard to talk here about a permanent base
The goal of the Russian actions under Kharkiv is to force the Ukrainians to allocate part of their forces to defend this sector. Ukrainian forces bound by the fight close Kharkiv cannot be moved to another sections – e.g. under Kherson.
Situation under Kharkiv with marked Russian attack on the chuhujewski foothold, source: militaryland.net2. Bachmut. The Russians proceed to attack Bachmut and Soledar. Their intent is to push the Ukrainians out of the Bachmut-Siewiersk line. However, the Russian troops are moving very slowly. mostly due to deficiency of personnel. The attack on Bachmut is driven by Wagner Group mercenaries, supported by poorly equipped and poorly trained militias from Lugansk and Donetsk. The troops of the Russian army that fought for Siewierodonieck and Lisiciansk were moved to Cherson and Zaporozhye in mid-July.
The present Russians control the east part of Soledar. They are besides present on the east corners of Bachmut – without meals, however, Wagnerovcom will be very hard to occupy the city.
Situation under Bachmut by pro-Russian sources, source: Rybar3. Donetsk. The Russians proceed to invade Pisky, Awdijiwka and Marjinka. The Russian attack, as before, is based mainly on mass artillery fire, with which Ukrainian positions are equal to the ground. On 14 August, the Russian Ministry of Defence reported the seizure of the village of Pisky – Ukrainian sources deny, claiming that Ukrainians inactive control part of the village.
The Russian attack in this sector is going very slow and hard to anticipate any breakthrough. The Russians attack areas that have been the front line since 2014 and are strong fortified, allowing Ukrainians to lead “defence in the depths”.
The situation at Donetsk, in red I marked Pisky, Awdijiwka and Marjinka, source: militaryland.net4. Cherson. This is the section of the front that enjoys the top media interest. Despite the Ukrainian offensive announced for months, we inactive do not observe any larger operation by Ukrainians. Since mid-July, however, Ukrainians have consistently threatened Russian facilities and thus origin Russian logistical problems erstwhile it comes to supplying the Russian base in Khersonszczyń.
By mid-July, the Kherson foothold was supplied with bridges in Kherson: the Antonian bridge I (road) and the Antonian bridge II (rail) and the bridge on the dam in Nowa Kachowka. In mid-July Ukrainians attacked the Anton bridge (roads and railways) with the aid of the HIMARS launchers – the demolition was so large that the bridges were completely out of use. The Russians tried to repair these bridges, but unsuccessfully – the repair work had to be interrupted all the time due to subsequent attacks of Ukrainian artillery.
Currently there is only 1 permanent Russian crossing through Dniepr – a bridge on the dam in Nowa Kachowka. It's a more hard mark to destroy, due to the fact that the bridge runs here parallel to the dam. The fire of the bridge can so harm the dam and destruct the full Kachowski Tank. However, Ukrainians took a hazard and effort to destruct this crossing as well. The last attack on the bridge in Nowa Kachowka occurred on 19 August – however, the harm was negligible. 2 days later, the Russians resumed movement over the bridge.
Attacks on Russian facilities caused immense logistical problems erstwhile it comes to supplying troops at the Kherson bay. At the same time, there was no complete collapse of Russian logistics – as Ukrainians hoped.
The Russians – utilizing the bridge in Nowa Kachowka and the ferries under Cherson – are not only able to supply their forces at the base, but besides transferred crucial meals to the front. Currently, the Russians are effectively resisting Ukrainian attacks on the Kherson region, and in the last week they have even intensified attack action – although the results are poor. A fewer days ago, the Russians managed to occupy a tiny village called Blahodatne (Komsolmolśke). This is the first Russian prey in Chersonian since July (sic!).
The situation in Kherson is stale. Ukrainians – despite months of announcements – seem to have besides small strength to face Russians and approach Kherson. The Russians, on the another hand, have besides small strength and besides much logistical problems to completely safe the Chersonian cape.
More about problems concerning Ukrainian counteroffensive on Kherson I wrote in the text Battle for Cherson (30.07.2022).
Situation under Cherson, source: militaryland.net5. Since the end of May, the Kherson front has barely moved, and there is no indication that this will change quickly. However, it must be acknowledged that Kiev's declarations about the upcoming offensive on Kherson have achieved any tactical success. The Russians were indeed frightened by the Ukrainian counteroffensive on Kherson and conducted an operation to re-distribute their forces in Ukraine – the forces from Donbas were moved to Khersonczyzna and Zaporozhye.
This weakened Russian troops in Donbas so much that they were no longer able to carry out larger offensive operations and gave the Ukrainians any time to prepare further defensive lines. A good example is Bachmut, where, after the departure of a large part of Russian soldiers, the attack is supported by Wagnerovists, supported by militias from Lugansk and Donetsk.
6. Crimea. In the last 2 weeks, there has been a series of attacks on Russian bases in occupied Crimea. On August 9, a Russian air base was attacked in fresh Fedorówka, destroying 7 military aircraft and damaging 3 more. On 16 August, the Russian ammunition depot in Jankoj went up in smoke. On 20 August, the drone attacked the Black Sea Fleet office in Sevastopol.
Attacks on Russian bases in Crimea – in peculiar the 1 at the military airport in Nowa Fedorówka (nearly 220 km from the front) – led to speculation that Ukrainians had already received ATACMS – ballistic missiles to the HIMARS launcher with a scope of about 300 km (officially Ukrainians only have ammunition for HIMARS with a scope of about 85 km). However, there is no hard evidence that the Ukrainians actually received ATACMS. The Ukrainians could have utilized Grom-2 systems, Neptune, etc. as well for attacks in Crimea. There are many versions of events. There were even theories that there was a group of Ukrainian diversions on the peninsula a fewer months ago.
However, whatever “what” attacked the Russians in Crimea, the facts are that the Russians have a dilemma. While it seemed in July that the solution to the defence against the attacks of HIMARS would be to decision the ammunition depots about 90 km from the front line, now – after attacks on a 200 km base in Crimea – the issue is not so obvious. The experience of fighting in the Kherson region shows that Russian logistics is able to act erstwhile warehouses are 90 km from the front. However, if there was a request to decision these warehouses even further, 200 or 300 km, Russian logistics would be placed on the shoulders.
However, for now, as I say, we do not know precisely how the Ukrainians attacked in Crimea.
7. Commander-in-chief of Ukraine's armed forces, Walerij Załużny, stated that the Russian artillery is presently firing about 40,000-60.000 missiles a day. If that's true, it's an strength of fire akin to that of the conflict of Siewierodonieck and Lisiciansk. This is simply a bad signal, due to the fact that it means that after – logistics problems caused by HIMARS attacks in July – Russian artillery returns to “the erstwhile pace of work”.
8. On 20 August, Alexander Dugin's daughter, Daria, died in the Moscow bombing. Dugin is simply a well-known Russian geopoliticist promoting neo-imperial and Eurasian theories. Sometimes it is referred to as the “chief ideologist” of Putinovsk Russia, but this is greatly exaggerated. Although Dugin is known in Russia and his texts are lectured, among others, at the Academy of the Russian General Staff, he is not peculiarly respected in the Kremlin (although Dugin is close to any of the Cremlovian "fractions"). Paradoxically Dugin seems to be more celebrated in the West than in Russia itself.
Dugin's daughter had a akin view as her father. She presented them, among others, on Russian television, or by shooting propaganda films in Mariupol. It's not known if she was the mark of the assassins or if Dugin himself was. It is besides unknown who is behind the assassination – the Russians claim that the Ukrainians planted the bomb (but they deny you). There were many theories about the assassination, among others, that it was a consequence of rivalry between Russian services.
If anyone would like to learn more about Dugin and perceive about the rivalry of Russian services, I urge talking to Dr. Michał Sadłowski on the channel at Zychowicz.
It's worth listening to due to the fact that Dugin is simply a very interesting figure. By the way, Arestowicz besides had contacts with Dugin and engaged in the Euro-Asian movement Dugin.
9. next day Ukraine will celebrate independency Day. Kiev fears that the Russians will usage the vacation to hit Ukrainian cities. akin concerns are besides expressed by the US, which recommended that its citizens leave Ukraine immediately.
10. Further deliveries of Western equipment are inactive arriving in Ukraine. According to fresh leaks, next day the Americans – on the occasion of Ukrainian independency Day – are to announce further arms shipments, this time worth about $3 billion.
Meanwhile, CNN, citing sources in an American interview, claims that the Russians have started training in handling Iranian drones (information for further verification).
Comment. The last 2 weeks of war in Ukraine is simply a typical war of destruction. Ukrainians have had respective successes, specified as excluding the Antonian Bridge or attacking Crimea. However, it is inactive not adequate to think about the reflection of Kherson, which was intended to be the main goal of Ukrainian summertime counteroffensive.
It besides seems that my distance to information about Ukrainian reserves was besides justified. At the turn of July and August, fresh Ukrainian troops recruited from people mobilized at the beginning of the war were to enter the fight. It was especially hoped that these fresh troops would make a "difference" under Cherson. However, it is already the end of August and these troops are inactive not visible. Most of the mobilized have been sent as replenishments to units that have been fighting since February 24.
The tactical triumph of the Ukrainians, however, is the fact that the Russians were so afraid with the Ukrainian counteroffensive under Cherson that they withdrew a large condition of their troops from Donbas and threw them to Zaporozhye and under Kherson. As a result, Russian offensive activities are heavy limited.
However, the current comparative stableness of the situation in Ukraine is likely to last only until mid-September. Then the volunteer troops presently recruited in Russia should begin to arrive in Ukraine – volunteers signing contracts. A full of about 30,000 soldiers. Their arrival will surely activate the situation on the fronts. But will that mean a breakthrough? Doubtful.
I wrote it respective times and I will compose it again – the destiny of this war will settle not on the front, but in the cabinets of politicians. Winter, the energy crisis and the recession in the West can have more impact on the war in Ukraine than 100,000 Russian soldiers. Therefore, it is so crucial for Kiev that the supply of western equipment and western economical support should proceed to arrive in Ukraine.
